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The thesis discusses the development of government 
and missionary policies on African secondary education 
in Southern Rhodesia between 1934 and 1971 in the 
context of the country's colonial history. 
It examines the rationale for state and church 
policies, their objectives and overall impact on 
secondary educational development. Extensive use is 
made of archival material of the Anglican and Wesleyan 
Methodist churches. 
It is argued that the factors which determined 
secondary educational policies originated in the nature 
of the colonial system which came into existence with 
the advent of white rule in 1890. Three basic themes 
are discussed. one deals with the link which recurs 
continually in the study between colonial politics and 
the nature of educational policies and programmes that 
evolved. 
A second theme examines the interaction between 
government and missionary policies and the conflict 
between them in terms of the objectives of their educa- 
tional programmes. Also considered is the conflict 
between missionary political support for white 
colonialism and their educational policies which appear 
to contradict . -hat position. 
A third theme discusses the scope for educational 
reform in an essentially conservative colonial society 
ii 
that was resistant to political, economic and social 
changes which may have benefited the black majority. 
Also discussed are the limitations and implications of 
educational reform in such a society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of African education in Southern 
Rhodesia is essentially a part of the history of white 
colonialism. In a colonial society, where the rulers 
form a distinct numerical minority and depend for their 
privileged survival on the maintenance of political, 
economic and social domination over the majority, the 
educational institutions and systems that evolve are 
either overtly or implicitly designed to sustain that 
domination. 
This was the case in Southern Rhodesia, where 
African education was developed within the broad 
framework of colonial policies and objectives. As with 
the political, economic and social systems, the struc- 
ture of African education was determined by the state in 
accordance with the policy of separate racial develop- 
ment which formed the basis of Southern Rhodesian 
colonial society and was intended to perpetuate white 
privilege and supremacy. 
In April 1899, Cecil John Rhodes, the founder of 
the colony, advised a committee which was deliberating on 
the first education ordinance, on the structure of the 
country's education system. A racially segregated 
system was evolved and a disproportionate emphasis was 
laid by the colonial government on the development of 
European education, while African education was left 
2. 
exclusively in the hands of Christian missionaries. 
Although for many years African education was 
developed by missionaries, the influence of the colony's 
racial politics and the effects of government control on 
its overall development was considerable since mission- 
aries depended on the colonial state for financial aid 
and political support. In order to understand the 
forces which determined the structure and development 
of African education in this country, it is therefore 
important to examine the interaction between church and 
state in this field against the background of white 
settler colonial politics. 
This thesis deals with the history of government 
and missionary policies on African secondary education 
and examines their development in the context of the 
history of colonialism. It is argued that a comprehen- 
sive understanding of the various issues of contemporary 
educational realities in this colony can be arrived at 
only through a historical and political analysis. 
Such an analytical framework provides for a closer 
examination of the impact of colonial history on 
educational develoments. It facilitates the discussion 
of the factors which influenced and in some cases 
determined the policies of missionary churches and 
successive colonial governments on African secondary 
education in terms of the politics of white colonialism. 
The considerable impact of the racial attitudes and 
3. 
interests of the white settler community on both church 
and state work in African secondary education throughout 
Southern Rhodesian colonial history, makes the use of 
that analytical approach appropriate and imperative. 
Two churches, the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist,, 
have been selected for detailed analysis because, after 
the Roman Catholic church, they were the most important 
missionary societies in the development of African 
secondary education in terms of their involvement and 
the influence they exercised on the policies of 
successive colonial governments. Originally it was the 
intention of the author to include the Roman Catholics 
in this study but lack of access to their most recent 
primary sources precluded this. However, reference is 
made to them where available sources and data permit. 
The dates selected provide two important landmarks 
in the history of African secondary education in this 
colony. The year 1934 marks the beginnings of African 
secondary education in terms of planning for its initia- 
tion, whereas 1971 marks the end of the first Five Year 
Plan for African secondary education under the Rhodesia 
Front Government. Both dates are therefore significant 
in the history of African secondary education. 
THEMES 
The thesis examines three broad themes. One theme 
discusses the impact of the colonial policy of protecting 
white political, economic and social interests on 
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government and missionary policies and programmes in 
African secondary education. Particular attention is 
paid to the rationale for, and objectives of, state 
policy and the methods applied by successive colonial 
governments to influence and control missionary policies 
so as to determine the structure of African secondary 
education, its rate of development and its curriculum. 
The second theme considers the conflict and/or 
convergence between (a) the objectives of government and 
missionary policies and (b) the policies of different 
missionary churches. 
The third theme examines the scope and limits of 
progressive educational reform in a colonial society 
which was opposed to rapid African political, economic 
and social advancement. In this respect, particular 
reference will be made to the attempts by Garfield Todd 
and Edgar Whitehead to reform educational policy between 
1954 and 1962 and the implications of those reforms for 
the development of African secondary education. 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis falls into five chapters. Chapter 1 
examines the evolution and development of white 
colonialism in Southern Rhodesia and the emergence of a 
social structure based on race. In this context, the 
discussion centres on the conquest and colonisation of 
Southern Rhodesia by the British South Aff-rica Company and 
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the white settlers in 1890. Also discussed is the role 
of missionaries in the colonisation process. 
In the light of this history, an attempt is made to 
examine the factors which influenced government and 
missionary policies on African pre-secondary education 
and compare the objectives and impact of their policies. 
The chapter also studies the attempts by successive 
colonial governments to determine and subordinate 
missionary educational policies to the major colonial 
objective of maintaining white privilege and domination. 
Chapter 2 looks closely at the factors which 
influenced government and missionary policies on African 
secondary education and discusses its introduction and 
development during the period 1939 to 1952. Part I 
discusses the transition from primary to secondary 
education between 1934 and 1938 and the attempt by the 
missionaries and the government to evolve a policy for 
secondary educational development. Part II studies 
the establishment of African secondary education and the 
evolution of state and church policies during the war 
period (1939-1945). Part III-investigates the govern- 
ment's attempts to control missionary policies and 
overall development of secondary education during the post 
war period (1946-1952). Also considered is the conflict 
which developed between state and church policies and 
the implications of this conflict for secondary educational 
development. Part IV summarises the policy situation by 1952. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the introduction and implemen- 
tation, of relatively progressive educational reform in 
African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia during 
the ten years of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 1953-1963. Part I examines briefly the 
formation of the Federation and the concept of multi- 
racial partnership on which it was supposed to be based. 
Part II looks at the attempts by Garfield Todd (Premier 
of Southern Rhodesia between 1954 and 1958) to reform 
some aspects of the colonial system in his effort to 
implement a form of multi-racialism. Part III studies, 
in the light of Todd's reformist policies, the intro- 
duction of educational reform by the government and the 
missionaries acting in collaboration. The imDact of 
educational policy reform on the development of secondary 
education is examined as are the limitations and implica- 
tions of "progressive" educational reform in an essentially 
conservative Southern Rhodesian white society. Part IV 
investigates the continuation of Todd's educational 
reforms by his successor, Edgar Whitehead (1958-1962) and 
analyses the achievements and limitations of a unified 
church and state secondary educational policy. 
Chapter 4 examines the changes in government and 
missionary policiest administration and organisation of 
African secondary education under the Rhodesia Front 
regime between 1963 and 1971. In Part Ia close look is 
taken at the political ideology of the Rhodesia Front 
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Party as a framework for government educational policy 
and,, in Part II, an examination is carried out of the 
changes which occurred in the administration and organis- 
ation of African secondary education and their implica- 
tions. Part III discusses the changes in government 
and missionary policies and looks, firstly, at the 
introduction of vocational secondary education, the 
rationale behind it, its implementation and implications. 
Secondly, the change in overall academic secondary 
educational policy is also examined. Of major 
significance are the implications of the Rhodesia Front 
government policy for the development of African academic 
secondary education. Also considered is the scope for 
African secondary school graduates to acquire university 
education and the employment opportunities available for 
secondary and university graduates under the govern- 
ment's racist policy. 
Chapter 5 summarises the main arguments raised in 
the study and draws conclusions from these arguments. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Most contemporary research on African education in 
Southern Rhodesia has been concerned with the the 
development of primary education and the role of 
individual churches in that process. In his study of 
the history of Christian missions in Matebeleland between 
1859 and 1923, Bhebe, for example, examined the attempts 
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by the London Missionary Society (LMS) to establish 
primary education with little success until the advent 
of colonial rule. He discussed the problems and 
constraints which confronted the 124S missionaries in 
obtaining African support for their religious and 
educational work. He showed that the Society failed to 
make significant achievements in both the religious and 
educational spheres until it was provided with political 
and financial support by the colonial administration 
following the conquest and colonisation of Southern 
Rhodesia in 1890. In the colonial period 1890-1923, the 
author discussed the rapid expansion of the LMS and other 
mission stations and educational work in Matebeleland as 
a result of the assistance given to the missionaries by 
the British South Africa Company 1. 
Similarly, in his study of the history of Christian 
missions in Mashonaland between 1890 and 1930, 
Mashingaidze examined the contribution of various 
missionary bodies in the establishment and development 
of African primary education in the context of the 
colonial system. He also discussed the impact of mission 
education on Africans in terms of its contribution to 
N. K. Bhebe: Christian Missions in Matebeleland 1859- 
1923 (Ph. D. Thesis, London University, 1973), Ch. VI. 
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the propagation and acceptability of Christianity 
1. 
Zvobgo, in his discussion of the history of 
Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia during 
the period 1891 and 1945 examined the development of 
specific Methodist primary schools and assessed their 
contribution to the spread of Wesleyan Methodism 
2. 
Kamusikiri 3 and Rennie 
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examined the roles of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church and the American Board for 
Foreign Missions in the establishment and development of 
primary education in the Manicaland and Gazaland provinces 
of Southern Rhodesia in the years 1896 to 1960 and 1890 to 
1935 respectively. The latter also discussed the contri- 
bution of mission education to the rise and development 
of African nationalism in that part of the country. 
E. K. Mashingaidze: Christian Missions in Mashonaland 
- Southern Rhodesia 1890-1930 (Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of York, 1973), Ch. VIII. 
2. C. J. M. Zvobgo: Wesleyan Methodist Missions 
Southern Rhodesia 189'1-1945 (Ph. D. Thesis, 
of Edinburgh, 1974) 1 Ch. 6&8. 
in 
Tniversity 
3. J. G. Kamusikiri: African Education under the Methodist 
Episcopal Church in Rhodesia 1896-1960 (Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1978). 
4. J. K. Rennie: Christianity, Colonialism and the 
Origins of Nationalism among the NDAU of Southern 
Rhodesia 1890-1935 (Ph. D. Thesis, North Western 
University, 1973) . 
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Atkinson, in his study of the history of education 
of all the races in Southern Rhodesia, discussed at 
length the development of African primary education and 
European, Asian and coloured primary, secondary and 
university education 
1. Where reference to African 
secondary education was made, the treatment was sparse. 
Research on more recent developments in African 
education has concentrated on the impact of Rhodesia 
Front Government policies on various aspects of educa- 
tional growth and the school leaver unemployment problem. 
But the emphasis has been on developments in the 1970s. 
Murphree's sociological study examined the aspirations 
2 
of African secondary school leavers in the 1970s, while 
Riddell discussed the development of both African primary 
and secondary education in the context of employment 
between 1970 and the 1978 internal political 'settlement 
3 
As far as the available literature is concerned, 
there has so far been little or no systematic attempt to 
examine the role of church and state in the development 
N. D. Atkinson: Teaching Rhodesians (Longmans, London, 
1972. 
2. M. W. Murphree: Education, Race and Employment in 
Rhodesia (The Association of Round Tables in Central 
Africa, Salisbury, 1975). 
Rodger Riddell: Education for Employment (From 
Rhodesia to Zimbabwe Series, CIIR, London, 1980). 
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of African secondary education in the period covered 
by this thesis. Part of the reason is that most 
missionary archival sources for this period are closed 
to the public, thus making research on African secondary 
education difficult to undertake. 
Using sources, most of which have not been previously 
available, this study goes beyond primary education and 
undertakes to examine various aspects of African secondary 
educational development from the point of view of the 
policies through which those developments were carried 
out. The significance of this study, it is hoped, lies 
in its intrinsic historical value and the use and inter- 
pretation of primary sources. Also, an understanding 
of the educational developments discussed, the achieve- 
ments and limitations of past educational policies and 
programmes, may assist in the implementation of appropri- 
ate educational reform in terms of the needs and motiva- 
tions of students and their parents in the present socio- 
economic and political context. 
Of some importance may be the contribution this 
thesis makes to the current debate on the relevance to 
individual student's needs for vocational and/or academic 
education in the context of a school leaver problem 
which, in post colonial Southern Rhodesia and other 
developing countries, is already acute. The problems 
of an educational reformer in independent Zimbabwe may, in 
12. 
certain respects be similar to those of Todd and 
Whitehead and the Anglican and Methodist churches. 
It is hoped that this study will make a significant 
contribution to the history of African education in 
Southern Rhodesia. 
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on archival and library 
research and uses three types of primary source: one 
being that of missionary archival material which is 
divided into the following categories: Correspondence, 
Synod/Conference Minutes and Annual Reports of - 
(a) The Anglican Church; (b) The Wesleyan Methodist 
Church; (c) International Missionary Council/Conference 
of British Missionary Societies; (d) Southern Rhodesia 
Missionarv Conference (later, the Southern Rhodesia 
Christian Conference); (e) Society of Jesus; and (f) 
Council for World Missions. Most of these sources have 
not been previously available. 
The second t,,, -pe of source comprises official reports 
of successive Southern Rhodesian governments on African 
education and these appear under five different titles: - 
(a) Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner 
(b) Reports of the Director of Native Development 
(c) Reports of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development 
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(d) Reports of the Director of Native Education 
(e) Reports of the Secretary for African Education 
The third type includes newspapers, British govern- 
ment colonial documents, some Rhodes House archival 
material and miscellaneous reports. Considerable use 
is also made of published and unpublished theses and a 
wide range of secondary sources. 
With regard to the primary sources used, one of the 
main limitations is that they contain little or no 
recorded African opinion on the various educational 
issues. This is perhaps inevitable since government 
reports reflect official thinking on educational programmes 
and policies while missionary sources represent mainly a 
record of missionary work. But, in the absence of 
recorded African opinion, it is difficult to arrive at a 
comprehensive assessment of African attitudes and responses 
to the education they received. Had this study been 
conducted at a time when the political situation in 
Southern Rhodesia was ideal, some research in that country 
might have proved useful in providing information not found 
in the sources used. However, the war situation 
which prevailed precluded this. 
Another drawback encountered with the primary sources 
was the lack of recorded information pertaining to the 
socio-economic background of the African pupils/students 
who attended schools, or their careers after school, apart 
from teaching and evangelical work. Such information 
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would have been of considerable value in assessing more 
fully the motivations behind the students' search for 
education and parental support or otherwise. 
Similarly, very little information on the churches' 
political views is found in missionary records (with the 
relative exception of Wesleyan Methodist sources). The 
scarcity of this information is due, in part, to the 
censorship imposed on the archival sources by the 
missionary authorities who allowed the present author 
access to selected closed archives. Again, the lack 
of records prevented a more comprehensive analysis of 
missionary political support for colonialism, especially 
in the 1960s and 70s. Such an analysis would have 
proved useful in contrasting the political position of 
the missionaries with their educational policies. 
However, the sources provide a rich insight into several 
aspects of government and missionary educational policies 
and programmes. 
In all research there is room for differences of 
opinion, even where opinion is based on evidence. But 
where evidence has to be inferred or assumed, the 
possibilities of disagreement are even greater. Whatever 
limitations of interpretation or analysis of evidence may 
appear in this work should be considered in the light of 
the limitations of the sources used. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIES 
ON AFRICAN PRE-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
1890-1933 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
establishment and development of white colonialism in 
Southern Rhodesia. This is necessary to provide a 
framework for the analysis of various aspects of the 
evolution of policies on African education in this colony. 
The chapter then proceeds to examine the development of 
government and missionary educational policies in the 
context of that colonial framework. 
It is argued that the factors which influenced 
African educational policies and programmes originated in 
the nature of the colonial system which came into effect 
in 1890. It is useful at the beginning to stress the 
important link between colonial politics and the develop- 
ment and implementation of church and state policies on 
African education in Southern Rhodesia. This link recurs 
continually throughout the study. 
The chapter falls into two parts. Part I discusses 
the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South 
African Company and the establishment and consolidation of 
colonial rule. In it, is also examined the role of the 
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missionaries in the colonisation process. The intention 
is to show how this compromised them to the colonial 
system and initially undermined their position and 
acceptability in African society. 
Part II discusses the evolution of government and 
missionary policies on African pre-secondary education. 
It examines the rationale for state and church policies 
and the differences and/or similarities between them in 
terms of the objectives of their educational programmes. 
Also considered is the interaction between (a) church and 
state policies in their implementation and (b) the conflict 
between missionary political support for colonial rule and 
white supremacy and their educational policies which 
appear to contradict that position. 
PART I 
EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY 
Colonisation of Southern Rhodesia 
The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia was organised 
from South Africa by one of the champions of British 
imperialism, Cecil John Rhodes. It was effected in 1890 
when a group of white settlers, known as the Pioneer 
Column, marched into the country and raised the Union 
Jack at Salisbury. 
This colonial venture was part of Rhodes' grand 
design of bringing the whole of Africa from Cape to Cairo 
under British rule. It had therefore as its primary 
17. 
objectives the establishment of colonial rule and the 
fostering of colonial capitalism in Southern Rhodesia 1. 
The attractions of the colony were considerable. it 
possessed a wide range of natural resources including gold 
and fertile land 
2, large reserves of cheap human labour and 
a climate ideal for white settlement. The scope it 
provided for the development of a capitalist economy and 
its strategic importance as a trade base in Central Africa 
led to the granting of a Royal Charter to the British 
South Africa Company (BSA Co. ) by Queen Victoria in 1889. 
The Charter authorised the company to administer the 
colony on behalf of the Crown 
3. Many British citizens 
Colonial capitalism is defined by J. M. Marshall as the 
economic, political, social and cultural domination of 
a weaker state by a dominant one. See J. M. Marshall: 
The Political Economy of Dependence - Ghana 1945-66 
(M. Sc. Thesis, Institute of Social Sciences, The Hague, 
1972), p. 10. For a detailed analysis of the concepts, 
processes and effects of colonial-capitalism, see 
P. Gutkind & P. Waterman: "The Political Economy of 
Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism" in African Social 
Studies (Heinemann, London, 1977), pp. 154-214; 
Sally Frankel: Capital Investments in Africa - its 
course and effects (Oxford University Press, London, 
1938), pp. 149-215 and D. K. 11-Fieldhouse: The Theory of 
Capitalist Imperialism (Longman & Green, London, 1967), 
pp. 2-44. 
2. L. Gann: A History of Southern Rhodesia - Early Days 
U'D to 1934. (Chatto & Windus, London, 1965). pp. 85-36 
I and A. T. W411s: An Introduction to the History of 
Central Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), 
p. 197. 
3. Claire Palley: The Constitutional History and Law of 
Southern Rhodesia 1890-1965 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1966), P. 63. 
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were encouraged by their Government to go and take advan- 
tage of the opportunities the country offered and many 
came to settle 
1. (Between 1890 and 1901 the European 
2 
population rose from 196 to 11,000 These settlers 
came determined to establish a permanent white colony and 
create a society in which white political, economic and 
social position was supreme. 
The BSA Co. immediately set up an administration 
through which to govern the colony. The reason for 
excluding direct British rule was, according to Palley, 
that the British Government wanted to avoid the financial 
3 burden of direct administration But, in opting out of 
direct rule, Britain effectively conceded local autonomy 
to the settlers and British authority was, in practice, 
4 
only nominal 
Between 1894 and 1898, the Company set up the main 
instruments of government and African administration which 
See Duke of Fife' s address to the BSA Co. in London in 
1893, Minutes of the BSA Co. Annual_Re port 1893, p. 23. 
2. Robin Palmer: Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia 
(Heinemann, London, 1977), p. 11. 
3. Palley,. 2p. cit., p. 94. 
4. Larry Bowman: Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in 
an African State (Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts, 1973), p. 6. 
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became the basis of white rule throughout the territory's 
colonial history. The legal system 
1, the instruments of 
law enforcement 
2, land policy 
3 
and the electoral system 
were created in that period and., in 1899, a legislative 
4 
council dominated by whites was established 
In the absence of adequate British control over the 
way the company administered the colony, the settlers were 
free to function with little external restraint. This 
left African rights and interests largely unprotected and 
subject to violation. 
From the first year of occupation, for example, the 
BSA Co. began to expropriate African lands for European 
settlement. In 1894 the company divided the country 
into European and African areas with the objective of 
setting aside productive land for the settlers 
5. In the 
process many Africans were evicted from their homes in 
order to make room for white immigrants. By 1895, more 
than 15,, 000,000 acres of land had been taken over by the 
6 
company 
1. Palley, op. cit., p. 117. 
2. Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
3. Palmer, 2p. cit., pp. 26-34. 
4. Palley,, pp. cit., pp. 133-135. 
5. Palmer, op. cit., pp. 30-34. 
6. The Bulawayo Chronicle, 12th October 1895. See also 
The Weekly Review of Men, Mines and Money, 21st August 
1895, p. 13. 
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Furthermore, the Company administration began to use 
force to recruit Africans to work in the mines and on white 
farms and plantations because they would not voluntarily 
undertake wage employment This was because the maDority 
of Africans feared that wage labour would destroy tradi- 
tional communal life as those who went to work stayed away 
from their homes for a long time. This also deprived the 
villages of male adult manpower needed to work in the 
fields and thus threatened to destroy subsistence agricul- 
ture on which the African communities depended. 
Deprivation of land, forced labour, the lack of 
caution and sensitivity displayed by the Company officials 
and the settlers in dealing with Africans led to the 
1896-97 revolt during which the Ndebele and Shona tribes 
2 
engaged in a war of resistance against colonial rule In 
that war the settlers and European missionaries Joined forces 
in suppressing African resistance. 
For a discussion of the use of force to mobilise African 
labour in the mines see Charles Van Onselen: "The Role 
of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900- 
1935", African Affairs Vol. 72, No. 289,1977, pp. 
410-411. 
2. For a full discussion of the 1896-97 revolt, its causes 
and course, see T. O. Ranger: Revolt in Southern 
Rhodesia (Heinemann, London, 1967), pp. 191-226 and 
F. C. Selous: Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia (Rowland 
Ward & Co., London, 1396). pp. IX-XII and 19-60. Also 
see T. O. Ranger: "The Nineteenth Century in Southern 
Rhodesia" in Aspects of Central African Destiny 
(Heinemann, London, 1968), pp. 142-152. 
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The missionary role in the occupation of the colony 
Missionaries of some European churches came into the 
country with the Pioneer Column. Leading officials of 
such churches as the Anglican, the Wesleyan Methodist, 
the Roman Catholic Society of Jesus, the Dutch Reformed 
and the Salvation Army, on hearing of Rhodes' proposed 
venture into Mashonaland, volunteered to join the 
1 
column from their bases in South Africa Other churches 
followed soon after white occupation of the colony had 
been effected. 
All of them were anxious to see the country 
colonised and white power established because this would 
provide them with the political protection they needed 
in an area in which many of them had failed to operate 
in the Dast due to the hostile attitude of African chiefs 
towards missionaries 
2. Rhodes personally encouraged 
missionary participation in his colonial design because 
he believed that their presence would give respectability 
to his plans which were already under criticism in England. 
Like his contemporary advocate of British imperialism, 
Sir Harry Johnston, Rhodes believed that missionary 
religious influence would provide an ideological arm for 
colonialism in African society which would, as Sir Harry 
put it: 
1. Mashingaidze, on. cit., pp. 60-68. 
2. Ranger (1968) op. cit., pp. 138-142, and C. E. Fripp & 
V. W. Hiller: Gold and Gospel in Mashonaland 1888, 
Oppenheimer Series No. 4 (Chatto & Windus, London, 
1949), pp. 140-142 and W. F. Rea (S. J. ): Missionary 
Endeavour in Southern Rhodesia (St. George's '. Iission 
Press, Salisbury, 1962), pp. 7-11. 
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strengthen {coloniall hold over the country .... spread the use of the English language .... fandl induct the natives with the best kind of 
civilisation. 1 
Each mission was regarded as of vital importance in the 
propagation of Christianity, western civilisation and 
culture and in aiding the establishment of colonialism in 
those areas the British intended to annex to the empire. 
Many missionaries themselves displayed active enthusiasm 
in the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia. Those who came 
up with the Pioneer Column gave medical, moral and 
spiritual attendance to the trekkers. The Reverend Father 
Hartman of the Society of Jesus observed that, had it not 
been for missionary medical aid, few of the trekkers would 
have survived the regular attacks of malaria 
2. On 
arrival, missionaries acted as emissaries between the 
settlers and Africans and gave tacit support to the methods 
used by the Company to subjugate the African population. 
When the revolt broke out, many members of missions 
present in the country joined the BSA Co. 's military 
forces in suppressing African resistance in order to 
n, 
3 
preserve white rule Also, during the revolt, mission 
1. Rene Maurier: The Sociology of Colonies, edited and 
translated by E. D. Lorimer (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1974), p. 23. 
2. For an account of the missionary role in the overall 
colonial process, see Rhodesia Herald (Special 
Pioneer Number), 12th September 1930. 
3. See Mathew Morton: Recollections of a Native 
Matebele Rebellion 1896, (1925), Mss. Afr. S. 141, 
ff. 149-161, Rhodes House Archives; C/M/B, John White 
to M. Hartley, 12th August 1897, WMIMS Archives. 
Also see Letters and Notices, Vol. XXX, No. CLXXII, 
July 1908r pp. 488-450, SJ Archives. 
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A 
stations were used as centres of intelligence b,,, - the 
ComT)any 1. According to a prominent Wesleyan Methodist 
missionary and one of the founders of the church in the 
colony, the Reverend Frank Noble, missionaries 
co-operated with the Company in crushing African resis- 
tance because this would eliminate the "heathen and 
tyrannous native rule" and enable the churches to 
operate under "a civilised and Christian government ,2. 
The role of missionaries in the colonisation process 
made them initially unwelcome amongst most Africans and 
seriously undermined the acceptability of their missionary 
work. They were regarded as part of the colonial 
machinery and, consequently, during the revolt, mission 
stations, missionaries themselves and those Africans loyal 
to them were attacked by African forces. The attack 
against the churches was so violent that missionary work 
almost came to a halt during the rebellion 
3. 
By supporting white colonialism, missionaries directly 
or indirectly condoned the oppression and exploitation 
inflicted on the African people for whose advancement and 
wellbeing they claimed to be responsible 
4. The contra- 
diction between missionary political support for white 
1. Ian Linden: The Catholic Church and the Struggle for 
Zimbabwe (Longman, London, 1980) , p. 15. 
2. C/M/B, John White to M. Hartley, 10th November 1896, 
WMMS Archives. 
3. Ranger (1968) 22. cit., p. 142. 
4. See C/M/Bj John White to M. Hartley, 10th November 
1896, WMMS Archives. 
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supremacy and their commitment to promote African advance- 
ment through education and training (which the settlers 
regarded as a threat to white security) is a major 
continuing theme underlying the conflict between 
missionary and government educational policies. 
Consolidation of white power 
The suppression of the revolt in 1897 marked the end 
of African jurisdiction over the territory. The Company 
embarked on a series of measures designed to consolidate 
white -oower and these can be divided into three categories: 
(a) laws and policies designed to enhance white political 
control; (b) economic policies intended to establish 
white economic domination and (c) social policies designed 
to foster white supremacy in the Rhodesian colonial 
society. 
Amongst the political measures were the Pass Laws 
first introduced in 1894 but vigorously enforced after the 
revolt. These required all male adult Africans to obtain 
passes which they should carry on their persons at all 
times. The objective was to control African freedom of 
movement within the native reserves (areas allocated for 
their residence under the 1894 Lands Act) and in European 
areas. This was intended to prevent collective African 
political activity and the organisation of another revolt. 
The Pass Laws caused serious hardship to Africans because, 
in many cases, those who did not carry the passes or were 
25. 
found in areas in which they were not supposed to move, 
were prosecuted and either fined or imprisoned. 
Another measure taken to strengthen white power was 
the franchise system formulated in 1899. This introduced 
a system of voting based on property and income qualifica- 
tions which required that an applicant to the electoral 
register possess a building within the electoral district 
to the value of E75, or own a mining claim, or receive 
wages at the rate of E50 per year 
1. Africans met none of 
these requirements. In the first instance, no African 
had a house of the stipulated value. Secondly, Africans 
were prohibited by the Company from holding mining rights. 
Thirdly, the most that Africans earned from wage labour was, 
2 
on average, only E5 to E8 per year Consequently, none 
had the required income or property. This effectively 
denied Africans franchise and therefore political power 
and representation in the Legislative Council. Moreover, 
the replacement of the African traditional system of govern- 
ment and administration by a colonial system run by European 
District and Native Commissioners also effectively 
consolidated white power in African society. This gave the 
settlers the overall dominant political position they needed 
1. Palley, op. cit., p. 136. 
2. C/R/B,, Reverend George Eva to M. Hartley, 12th April 
1910, WMMS Archives, Box 825. 
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to determine economic and social policies. 
In the economic sphere, the BSA Co. administration 
sought to establish white supremacy through a variety of 
legislative Acts and policies. From the time of colonisa- 
tion, the Company gave supreme importance to the establish- 
ment of a predominantly white economy. In mining, for 
example, this was done by giving whites a monopoly of the 
industry. All prospecting and mining by Africans was made 
illegal, while European private companies, syndicates and 
individuals were encouraged to undertake extensive mining 
operations. They were readily provided with mining 
licences and cash capital investments for that purpose 
1. 
By 1895, as much as Eý million had been made available to 
Europeans by the BSA Co. as an investment in the mining 
industry 2 and as many as 70 mining companies and syndicates 
were already operating 
3. Such preferential treatment 
gave whites access to one of the richest sources of income 
and wealth. By the 1920s, for example, revenue from 
4 
mining had reached E4.1 million 
The Rhodesia Weekly Review of Men, Mines and Money, 
7th August 1895, p. 13. 
2. Rhodesia Herald, 11th January 1895. 
3. The Rhodesia Weekl Review of Men, Mines and Money, 
7th August 1895, p. 13. 
4. Colin Leys: European Politics in Southern Rhodesia 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), p. 18. For a further 
discussion of the mining industry after 1930, see 
D. J. Murray: The Governmental System in Southern 
Rhodesia (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970), pp. 118-135. 
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In the agricultural sector, the BSA Co. also gave 
priority to the settlers by undertaking to assist all 
those who were interested in establishing themselves on 
the land. This was done through a policy of land division 
between the races which made it legally possible for the 
company to evict Africans from areas allocated for white 
settlement. Under the 1894 Lands Act, for example, 15 
million acres of land were compulsorily acquired from 
Africans for European use 
1 That figure rose to nearly 
122 million acres under the 1914 Lands Act 
2 
and increased 
further to 149 million acres under the 1930 Land Apportion- 
3 
ment Act (LAA) This land was sold to white farmers at 
as low a rate as 8ý, 
d. 
per acre for cattle ranching purposes 
and 39d* per acre for agriculture, while Africans in the 
reserves became increasingly more short of land. 
This land shortage was aggravated by the government's 
refusal to readily sell productive land to Africans. By 
1925, for example, out of the 122 million acres set aside 
for individual buyers under the 1914 Lands Act, only 
40,000 acres had been sold to Africans compared to 3 
4 
million acres sold to whites . The reason for this 
massive disparity was largely that the government did not 
1. Palmer,, 22. cit., p. 30. 
2. Ibid., p. 82. 
3. Leys., pp- cit., p. 28. 
4. Martin Loney: Rhodesia - White Racism and Imperial 
Response (Penguin African Library, Middlesex, 1975), p. 51. 
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want to encourage African competition in farming. Also, 
the government feared that, if land was readily sold to any 
Africans who could afford the price, this would retard the 
influx of Europeans into those areas in which Africans 
bought land due to white resentment against African farmers 
as neighbours. Moreover, it was feared that the presence 
of African farmers in any area would lead to the depreciation 
1 
of the value of land in that area So government policy 
was to refuse Africans access to the areas best suited to 
agriculture. This ensured that Europeans obtained the most 
productive areas and boosted their agricultural production. 
Apart from providing white farmers with productive 
land, the BSA Co. also gave them other forms of assistance. 
In 1908 a Department of Agriculture was set up to undertake 
agricultural research and advise farmers on the best farming 
2 
methods to achieve high quality yields The denartment 
also provided farmers with extension facilities. In 
addition, a Land Bank was established in 1912 to provide 
credit facilities to white farmers to enable them to buy 
land, livestock and farm equipment 
3. 
All these provisions helped to foster white confidence 
in the future of farming and attracted many more farmers 
Report of the 1925 Land Commission CSR 10 
Printers, Salisbury, 1925), p. 4. 




from overseas. Census figures revealed that their 
1 numbers rose from 545 in 1904 to 11,324 in 1911 Croo 
production also increased. Maize production, for example, 
rose from 17,000 bags in 1899-1900 to nearly 46,000 in 1903- 
2 1904 and, by 1920, it had risen to 1,120,000 bags 
Legislation such as the 1934 Maize Control Act protected 
Europeans against African competition and gave them a 
3 
monopoly of the market 
In the area of African labour, on which the entire 
white economy depended for its development, a series of 
laws and policies were enacted to ensure the regular availa- 
bility and flow of labour to all industrial sectors. In 
Mashonaland,, the shortage of African labour in the first two 
decades of white rule led to the use of force to secure that 
labour. Native policemen were used to recruit Africans 
into the mines. When that proved inadequate, a system of 
taxation was introduced soon after the 1896-97 revolt to 
force Africans to seek employment. Personal tax on all male 
adults, hut tax, livestock tax and other forms of taxes were 
introduced and designed to make it more imperative for 
Africans to undertake employment. Those who failed to pay 
1. Palmer, pp. cit., p. 91. 
2. Ibid. 
3. See Richard Gray: The Two Nations (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1960), p. 154. 
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these taxes on time were fined or imprisoned. This 
compelled many Africans to engage in wage labour. By 
1910,, for example, as many as 34,000 Africans had under- 
taken employment in the mining industry and 21,000 in 
f arming and agriculture 
1. 
The tax system served a dual purpose. Apart from 
enabling the BSA Co. to secure the much needed African 
labour force, it also provided considerable revenue and 
in 1904-1905 African tax payments accounted for 41.4% of 
the total public revenue. This was an increase of nearly 
15% over the 1902-1903 period and was a much higher contri- 
bution than that paid by Europeans whose contribution only 
accounted for 27% of the total public revenue even though 
2 
they were wealthier than Africans Despite this high 
African contribution to public revenue, the 1910-1911 Native 
Affairs Inquiry Committee recommended a further increase in 
African taxation because it felt that "the supply of labour 
would be increased as men would be compelled to work more to 
3 
earn the increased amount" Many who continued to refuse 
to enter employment had their livestock confiscated to deny 
them alternative sources of income with which to pay the 
taxes 4. Those at places of work were forced to remain 
1- Rhodesia Herald, 27th May 1910. 
2. Loney.. 
. 
2p. cit., p. 52. 
Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry 1910- 
11 (Government Printer, Salisbury, 1911), para. 181. 
4. Rhodesia Herald, 20th May 1910. 
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there by native policemen employed to guard them. 
This measure was reinforced by the 1910 Masters and 
Servants Act 1 which prevented African employees from 
leaving their places of work or absenting themselves from 
duty without prior permission. This Act served as an 
effective means of labour control. 
The overall effect of these policies was to create 
an economic system which depended on the exploitation of 
cheap African labour and resources -a system in which the 
European economic position was dominant. 
In the social sphere, the land policy provided the 
basis for Southern Rhodesia's racial segregation system 
which continued to exist throughout the country's colonial 
history. This system led to the evolution of a policy of 
parallel racial development and a dual system of education 
for the black and white races. All these features of the 
Southern Rhodesian colonial system were designed to 
establish and consolidate overall white supremacy. As will 
Palley, op. cit., p-54- 
The Masters and Servants Act was a common feature of 
British colonial administration elsewhere in Africa. 
It served the dual purpose of controlling labour and 
providing a code of conduct for African employees. In 
all cases it defined the punishable offences for its 
contravention and these included: (a) neglect of duty, 
(b) failure to start work after signing a contract, 
(c) refusal to carry out employers' instructions, (d) 
drunkenness at work, (e) leaving place of work without 
prior permission and with intent not to return. See 
Raymond Buell: The Native Policy in Africa (Macmillan, 
London, 1928), Vol. I, p. 42. In Southern Rhodesia 
13,000 Africans were prosecuted under this Act between 
1910 and 1915. The Act codified and entrenched a 
system of forced labour already prevailing in the mines. 
See Charles Van Onselen: Chibaro - African Mine Labour 
in Rhodesia (Plato Press, London, 1976), passi . 
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be seen in Chapter 2, Godfrey Huggins (Premier of Southern 
Rhodesia from 1933 to 1952) adopted and developed the 
separate racial development policy into his party political 
ideology. This ideology determined every aspect of his 
governmental policies including that on education. But, 
even in the very early stages of the country's colonial 
history, the racial segregation and development policy 
was already an important factor in determining government 
policy on African education. 
By 1923,, when Southern Rhodesia gained self govern- 
ment, there had emerged in this colony a social structure 
in which the European political, economic and social 
position was dominant. 
Transition from BSA Co. rule to responsible government 
and implications for Afric-an education 
Under the terms of the Royal Charter, BSA Co. rule 
was to end after a 25 year period. As that period reached 
its close, it became necessary for the British government 
to find ways of determining what form of government would 
administer the country in the future. Discussions 
between the Colonial Office and the BSA Co. administration 
in 1920-21 produced a solution 
1. The settlers were given 
two alternatives. One was to join South Africa and 
become part of the Union and the other was to become a 
self-governing territory. In 1922, the 33,620 whites 
made their choice in a referendum from which Africans were 
excluded, and opted to make Southern Rhodesia a self- 
governing territory 
2. 
See "Home Rule for Rhodesia"jFile General Native 
Affairs, IMC/CBMS Archivest Box 1221, Southern 
PhnrI, zciA- 1C)91- 
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The decision to opt for self-government was dictated 
largely by the fear of the majority of whites that joining 
South Africa would lead to their being dominated by the 
Afrikaners and thereby losing the supremacy they had 
gained in Southern Rhodesia. In 1923, the Southern 
Rhodesian colony was granted responsible government by 
1 
Britain In doing so, the British Government gave the 
colony a unique status in which the whites had a 
parliament of their own to decide and control internal 
affairs. They also controlled African administration, 
the army and the police. Thus, the colony was granted 
powers which were not given to the settlers in other 
British colonies (except Kenya). From 1923, Southern 
Rhodesia was never, in any real sense, ruled by Britain as 
were other colonies where direct British rule was operative. 
In terms of education, the attainment of responsible 
government had significant implications as it meant that 
state educational policy was decided not by the Colonial 
Office in London but by the settler government which had 
its own independent policy-making machinery and procedures. 'ýý 
1. Palley, op. cit., pp. 215-225. 
2. For a discussion of British Educational Policy, see 
Brian Holmes: Educational Policy and the Mission 
Schools (Case studies from the British Empire) 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967), pp. 5-45 & 
83-111. 
For a detailed description of British colonial 
educational policy in Africa, see High Leigh: 
"Educational Policy in Africa" (1924), IMC/CBMS 
Archives, Box 253 & Box 255. 
34. 
British colonial policy on education, as operated in other 
British colonies, was therefore not applicable to Southern 
Rhodesia . This differentiated, in many ways, state 
educational policy in this colony from that which existed 
in other British colonies. The Rhodesian colonial 
educational policy resembled more that of South Africa's 
than that in other colonies in its racial orientation and 
1 
aim of promoting separate racial development In the 
discussion that follows, it is the intention to examine 
the nature of Southern Rhodesian colonial government 
policy on African education in the context of the history 
of the colony as outlined earlier in this chapter. In 
that respect, the factors which determined that policy 
will be studied and it is also intended to examine the 
factors which influenced missionary educational policies, 
in particular those of the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist 
churches. An attemot will be made to identify the areas 
of conflict and/or convergence in the policies of (a) the 
churches and (b) between the missionary policies and that 
of the colonial government (s) . 
Baruch Hirson: Year of Fire, Year of Ash, The Soweth 
Revolt: Roots of a Revolution (Zed Press, London, 
1979) 1 pp. 22-32. 
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PART 
GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIES: OBJECTIVES 
AND PROGRAMMES 1890 - 1933, 
The evolution of state and church policies on African 
education and their implications for educational develop- 
ment 1890 - 1923 
The Governments of the European West African 
colonies have, through the greater period of 
their West African existence, been endeavouring 
to train the natives on European lines, to make 
them competent in .... professions with no fear 
of their competition with the ruling class which 
in the tropics can administer but cannot colonise. 
In Africa, South of the tropics where the 
European thrives, the effect of the development 
of the native and his social and other relations 
with the white man has constantly been kept in 
view by the governments concerned and has led, at 
any rate, in most cases, to that development 
being checked rather than encouraged. 1 
After the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia had been 
effected, all the missionary churches present in the 
country were given substantial areas of land on which to 
establish themselves by the BSA Co. The land was given 
partly as a token of appreciation for the role played by 
the churches during the colonisation process and partly to 
enable them to embark quickly on their Christian work. 
Company officials were anxious to ensure that Christianity 
was propagated quickly because they believed that its 
influence would make Africans less rebellious, more 
Memorandum prepared for the Imperial Education 
Conference held in London in 1925 by J. Lenfest,,;,, a .A 
Southern Rhodesian Schools Inspector, 3rd December 1923, 
IDIC/CBMS Archives {Africal, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
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submissive and easier to administer. Christianity would 
1 make Africans "better servants, honest and truthful" 
The role of missionaries was seen by the company adminis- 
tration largely in utilitarian terms 
to create a moral order, to make Rhodesia safe 
for the shop-keeper, the farmer and the labour 
recruiter and to make it easier for masters to 
deal with their boys. 2 
Missionary work was therefore expected by the company and 
the white settler community to promote colonial interests. 
As such, the churches were also expected to operate within 
3 
the framework of company policies and objectives 
1. Rhodesia Herald, 24th March 1894. 
2. Rhodesia Herald, 3rd may 1895. 
3. While this was the intention of the BSA Co. administra- 
tion, in aiding missionaries, it had its own counter 
. effects. For example, missionary work and the 
education it provided, far from making Africans sub- 
missive, made them more vocal and critical of white rule. 
In some cases, missionary activities turned against the 
government, as in the case of the Watch Tower movement 
which became politically subversive. Some missionaries, 
like the Reverend Shearley Cripps of the Anglican church, 
became outspoken critics of government policies. See, 
for example, Reverend A. S. Cripps: Memorandum prepared 
for submission to H. M. Secretary of State at the 
Dominion Office, London, on the subject of the 
Segregation Propos is of the Land Commission in H. M. 
Colony of Southern Rhodesia 1925. SPG. S/R/General/Ct 
D 1925 SPG Archives. Marxist historians nowadays see 
revolutionary significance in such activities. See 
J. E. Ha6sbawnn Labouring Men (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
London, 1973) , Ch. 3. 
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The Anglicans were given 35,359 acres of land; the 
Wesleyan Methodists, 44,486 acres and the Roman Catholics 
127,059 acres 
1. By 1899, the BSA Co. had made land grants 
totalling 325,730 acres to the ten missionary churches 
2 
present However, as far as most missionaries were 
concerned, this assistance from the Company did not commit 
them to work for Company interests and, although they 
supported the continuation of colonial rule, they had 
their own religious and educational goals to fulfil in 
African society. After all, that was their reason for 
coming to the country. The pursuit of those goals some- 
times led to conflict with the BSA Co. when their objec- 
tives were thought to undermine colonial political, 
economic and social interests. In the case of the 
Anglicans and the Methodists, they were soon in conflict 
with the Company administration when its officials began 
to interfere with the development of their educational 
work by attempting to determine policy. 
In discussing church and state relations in African 
education and the evolution of their educational policies, 
it is important to look at the three main areas in which 
conflict developed: (a) curriculum - which of two types 
Thomas M. Franck: 
' 
Race and Nationalism: The Struggle 
for Power in Southern Rhodesia (Fordham University 
Press, New York, 1969), p. 118. 
N. B. There is no obvious explanation for the differ- 




of education, academic or vocationalf was to receive 
priority in African schools? (b) development policy - 
what programmes should be given priority? and (c) what 
role should be played by church and state in developing 
African education? 
The establishment of African primary education by the 
mission churches began soon after the colonisation of the 
country in 1890. From that time, the BSA Co. 's primary 
concern was to ensure that the aims of that education did 
not conflict with, or undermine, white colonial interests 
in terms of the influence it could have on African political, 
economic and social aspirations and their attitudes towards 
undertaking manual work. This was important especially at 
a time when the settlers were seeking to establish and 
consolidate their supremacy. The dependency of the white 
capitalist economy on the availability of cheap, uneducated 
and unskilled African labour for its development has 
already been discussed earlier in this chapter. Because 
of this dependency, the Company administration did not want 
African education to concentrate on academic work but 
rather on vocational training. The objective of such 
vocational training was to train Africans in rural ýrades 
and simple skills which would enable them to improve rural 
life withoutat the same time, making them resent manual 
labour or aspire to compete with Europeans for white collar 
professional, managerial jobs and other skilled services. 
In the opinion of one Native Commissioner (NC), literary 
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primary education was not to be encouraged because it 
would: 
unfit the natives for the work they were 
required to perform. They would refuse to 
work, preferring to loaf about as learned 
vagabonds rather than stoop down to what they 
regarded as below their dignity on account of 
their literary knowledge. 1 
The Company administration indicated clearly that academic 
education for Africans should not be considered for a long 
time and that the policy should be to "develop the native's 
natural proclivities first on lines less likely to lead to 
any risk of clashing with Europeans. ,2 
From 1899, when the first Education Ordinance was 
issued, the BSA Co. tried to use financial aid as a lever 
by which to influence missionary educational policies and 
programmes. It laid down certain conditions which mission- 
aries were required to follow if they were to receive 
government grants. One of the conditions was that a 
school should devote at least two out of every four hour 
school day to vocational training3. According to 
Mashingaidze, the objective of this condition was to 
force missionaries, at the time they needed money most for 
their educational work, to design curricula as specified 
Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 1932, No. 16, 
pp. 100-101. 
2. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 1945, No. 22, 
P. 19. 
3. Atkinson, pp. cit., p. 89. Also see Southern Rhodesia: 
Re2ort of the Native Education Inquiry Commission 1951, 
para. 13(ii). 
40. 
by the Company. This would ensure that the development of 
African education was on lines less likely to lead to 
economic and political conflict with Europeans in the 
future 1. Atkinson observed that the insistence of the 
Company government on industrial education constituting a 
substantial part of the curriculum was a significant 
"revelation of the main lines of the official policy 
towards African education in the years which followed. 
In his view, the objective of the Company was to ensure 
that Africans were given only such education as would 
enable them to "become efficient workers in agriculture 
and industry and perhaps render more efficient service to 
European employers" 
3 but not make them competitive or 
ambitious to reach the European political, economic and 
social position. There was, therefore, no interest on 
the part of the Company in Africans gaining literary educa- 
tional qualifications. 
There were significant differences between the 
attitudes of the Company and missionaries, particularly 
the Anglicans and Wesleyan Methodists, towards African 
academic primary education. In the latter case, formal 
education was considered of crucial importance in two 
1. Mashingaidze, o2. cit., p. 323. 
2. Atkinson, 22. cit., p. 89. 
3. Ibid. 
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respects. Firstly, as a vehicle for promoting their 
Christian work and, secondly, for aiding the socio- 
economic advancement of African society by providing 
Africans with qualifications which would enable them, in 
the future, to secure better jobs with higher wages and 
so improve their lives. 
The Anglicans and Wesleyan Methodists took the decision 
to engage in educational work while they were still in South 
Africa. Two leading officials of the Anglican Church, 
Bishop Knight Bruce, former resident commissioner of 
Bloemfontein, and the Reverend Canon Balfour, approached 
Rhodes in 1890 to negotiate terms under which they would 
Join his venture. The assurances they sought were land, 
financial support and protection of the BSA Co. for the 
educational and religious work they proposed to undertake 
1 
in Mashonaland It was only after receiving those 
assurances that they agreed to Join the Pioneer Column. 
On arrival in the colony, their undertaking of educational 
work amongst Africans was immediate. By 1914 they had 
already established a dozen prominent educational institu- 
tions with St. Augustine's, Penhalonga (1891) 
2, St. Faith's, 
Rusape (1910) 3, St. Michaells, Runyarano (1911) 4, St. David's, 
1. Fripp & Hiller, 22. cit., pp. 140-142. 
2. SPG. S/R/D, Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia July 18_99, SPG Archives. Also see Missionary 
Teports, 1899, 'E' Series. 
3. Ibid. 
4. SPG. S/R/Dj Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia for 1912, SPG Archives. Also see Missionary 
Reports, 1912, 'E' Series. 
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Bonda and St. Patrick's, Gwelo (1912) 1 as their main 
stations. 
The head of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in South 
Africa, the Reverend Owen Watkins, sought similar assur- 
ances from Rhodes. He received a guarantee of adequate 
land for the church's proposed educational and religious 
work, plus a yearly grant of E100 towards the cost of 
2 maintaining the missions they intended to establish it 
was after receiving these guarantees that Watkins asked 
his assistants Isaac Shiomin and George Eva to lead the 
3 Methodist team into Mashonaland In the same period as 
the Anglicans, the Methodists established eight missions, 
of which Negumbo (1891), Epworth (1895). Tegwani (1897) 
and Woddilove (1911) were the main centres of educational 
4 
work 
From a religious viewpoint, both the Anglicans and 
Methodists saw literary education as a powerful force by 
which to weaken the influences of indigenous religion, 
superstition and witchcraft on African society and expedite 
1. SPE. S/R/D. Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia 1914, SPG Archives. Also see Missionary 
Reports, 1914, 'E' Series. 
2. R/C/A/B/6 mic/fi copies: Papers of Owen Watkins, 9th 
December 1890, WMMS Archives. 
3. Zvobgo, op. cit., p. 37- 
4. S/M/R/Bj 1898-99 Mashonaland and Rhodesia District 
Synod Minutes, WN24S Archives, Box 1898-99 and S/M/R/B, 
1912-22 Rhodesia Synod Minutes 1919, Statistical 
Returns, Box 1912-22. 
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the acceptance of Christianity. Their experiences in 
South Africa and elsewhere in British Africa had shown the 
impor ance of education in religious work. Schools became 
nerve centres of Christian work by serving as places where 
Christian values and beliefs were systematically inculcated 
1 
in the young The Methodists in their West African 
experiences had discovered that, in places where schools 
had closed down, the church had tended to wither away. 
But, in those areas where schools had thrived and people 
were taught to read and write and follow the scriptures on 
their own, the church had found a firm foundation and 
2 flourished Both the Methodists and the Anglicans were 
therefore determined to expand their network of primary 
schools in order to promote their religious work. As 
Shirmnin explained in 1899: 
It is with the children that our main, indeed 
our sole hope of building up a Christian 
community in this country rests and from the 
beginning it is our aim to endeavour to provide 
them with a Christian education. 3 
Also, the development of African primary education was 
seen as of considerable importance because it facilitated 
the education and training of Africans for the ministry. 
This was necessary especially during these early days when 
C/-R/B, Isaac Shimmin to M. Hartley, 18th May 1899, 
WMMS Archives, Box 825. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C/R/B,, Isaac Shimmin to M. Hartley, 17th June 1899 
WNLMS Archives. 
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missionaries were little acquainted with the local condi- 
tions, languages and customs and needed Africans to assist 
them in evangelical work. The speedy acceptance of the 
Christian church in African society was very much dependent 
on the active participation of Africans themselves in 
Christian work as the Anglican Bishop for Southern Rhodesia 
explained in 1910: 
The whole future of the church depends on our 
training in our schools African catechists, 
lay preachers, teachers and school masters to 
take an active part in our Christian work. 1 
While the BSA Co. administration supported the speedy 
growth of the Christian church amongst Africans, it was 
opposed to what it saw as attempts, by the Methodists and 
Anglicans in particular, to encourage Africans through 
education to aspire to rapid socio-economic advancement 
because this threatened not just the European socio-economic 
position but also the political future of the white popula- 
tion given the existing franchise system based on income 
and property. 
The BSA Co. was especially concerned about the 
Anglicans encouraging other churches to provide 
universal primary education for Africans. Two of 
the resolutions adopted by the Anglicans at their 1904 
Synod Conference held in Cape Town confirmed the Company 
administration's fears that the church's aims and activities 
SPG. S/R,, General/C, D. 1910, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia 
to SP%, -: 7 Overseas Secretary, 12th September 1910, SPG 
Archives. 
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in African education might encourage rapid African 
advancement and undermine white security. Resolution 3, 
-C for example, urged the Company to co-operate with the 
churches in introducing "as soon as possible a universal 
system of education" for Africans 1. A resolution that 
was even more objectionable to the BSA Co. was that which 
called upon the churches to educate Africans "for the 
highest services they were capable of offering to society". 
This resolution also emphasisedothe right of educated 
iý2 Africans to exercise the full rights of citizensh p- 
The Company administration regarded these resolutions 
as an attempt by the Anglicans to propagate ideas of 
racial equality and encourage Africans to seek political, 
economic and social parity with whites which, in the 
Southern Rhodesian colonial society was anathema. The 
Anglican church, however, maintained that it had no 
intentions of encouraging racial equality because "neither 
individuals nor races are born with equal facilities or 
opportunities ,3. As such, Africans could not claim 
Report of the Diocesan Synod of the Church of England 
of the Province of South Africa held in Cape r1lown in 
1904, IMC/CBMS Archives fAfricaTr South, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224, Resolution 3. 
Ibid.,, Resolution 7. 
3. Report of the Diocesan Synod of the Church of England 
of the Province of South Africa held in Cape Town in 
1903, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfricaF, South, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224, Resolution 8. 
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equality with whites until they had shown themselves 
"possessed in some degree of personal and corporate 
responsibility"'. The church supported the development 
of African academic education because, in the view of its 
officials, African advancement was the true justification 
for Christianity and a credit to white rule. To deny 
Africans the opportunity to advance, was to defeat the 
very purpose for which missionaries came to the country. 
The Bishop of Southern Rhodesia warned in 1905 that, as 
long as Africans remained uneducated and barred from the 
influences of Western civilisation, European advancement 
would be held back 
2. 
The Wesleyan Methodists were of the opinion that 
educating Africans had practical advantages. The Reverend 
John White, Chairman of the Methodist Synod for many years 
and the man who made a considerable contribution towards 
the development of African education, thought that: 
The object of the government and the missionary 
societies ought to be to teach them {Africans} 
to read, write and speak English as this would 
save a lot of misunderstandings between employers 
and employees. 3 
See SPG. S/R General/C, D. 19051 Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia to SPG overseas Secretary, 4th March 1905, 
SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. S/R General/C, D. 1905, Bishop Gaul to SPG 
Overseas Secretary, 20th May 1905, SPG Archives. 
3. C/R/B, Rev. J. White to M. Hartley, 12th February 
1905f W14MS Archives, Box 825. 
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At the 1905 Synod Conference, he argued strongly that 
the education and advancement of Africans was . Jnseparable 
1 from Christian work It was he and the Anglican Bishop, 
the Right Reverend Gaul, who strongly urged all the 
churches to co-operate in organising African primary 
education. The two men succeeded in bringing together 
all missionary churches in the country for the first time 
in 1906. The objective was to discuss ways of co-ordina- 
ting all missionary educational and religious work. The 
significant outcome of that meeting was the formation of 
the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference (SP14C) a 
2 representative body of all the missionary churches Its 
objectives were to work for the propagation of 
Christianity amongst Africans, to promote the speedy 
development of African education, welfare and development 
and to make representations to the Company on matters 
3 relating to African interests 
Strong criticism of Anglican and Methodist approaches 
to African education came from the Society of Jesus (SJ), an 
ar 4--Y, 
of the Roman Catholic church. The SJ believed firmly in 
the myth of the superiority of the white race and supported the 
settlers and the BSA Co. in every possible way in establishing and 
S/M/S/A/B 1906-1911, Synod Minutes for 1906, WMMS Archives,, 
Box 1906-1911. 




consolidating white rule. In the opinion of its leading 
officials, it was absurd for any church to provide Africans 
with an education which was likely to encourage them to 
foster false hopes of equality with Europeans. Literary 
education for Africans was therefore not to be considered 
for many years to come. Father Hartman, founder of the 
SJ in Southern Rhodesia, and its spokesman (who spent the 
two years of the 1896-97 revolt in military service with 
the BSA Co. forces) clearly spelt out his church's policy: 
"We teach the natives religion and how to work but we do 
not teach them how to read and write. This is fifty 
years too soon. " 
1 
The Jesuits believed that the mind of an African was 
not fully developed to cope with academic education and 
appreciate its value. According to Hartman, to cram 
African minds with such knowledge was to do them more harm 
2 than good 
In a bitter criticism Of the Anglicans and the 
Methodists, another leading Jesuit official, the Reverend 
W. F. Rea, accused them of proceeding on wrong lines by 
providing Africans with a literary education because this 
"unfit the natives for the services they were required to 
offer ,3 Academic education would produce"the most 
1. Letters and Notices, Vol. XXIX, No. CLXXII, July 1908, 
p. 4881 SJ Archives. 
2. Zambezi Mission Record, Vol. II, No. 17, July 1902, 
Editorial. 
Letters and Notices, Vol. XXIX, No. CLXXII, April 1908, 
p. 520, SJ Archives. Also see Zambezi Mission Record, 
Vol. II, No. 17, July 1902, Editorial. 
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pernicious effects upon the pupils .... inflate the native 
and rob him of his simplicity"'. He would begin to regard 
himself as "a gentleman who must on no account demean 
himself by honest toil,, 2 . He warned those people who were 
"in favour of the kaffirs receiving an education such 
as {wasl imparted to the European youth of fair abi l, ty,, 
3 
against the political consequences of such action. 
The Jesuits, as members of the SJ, were called, shared 
the opinion of the BSA Co. that African education should 
concern itself TDrimarily with religious and vocational 
training. When, in 1906, other churches agreed to co-operate 
in developing African primary education, the Jesuits refused 
to join the SRMC because they felt that it was a pro-native 
association. 
Neither the Anglicans nor the Methodists objected to 
providing industrial education in their schools. They 
acknowledged the fact that it had an important role to play 
in rural development. The Anglicans provided training in 
animal husbandry, farming and agriculture, soil conserva- 
tion, building, carpentry, nursing and domestic science 





and other trades at almost all their main institutions 
11 
as did the Methodists at theirs2. But, unlike the BSA 
Co. and the Jesuits, the Anglicans and Methodists 
considered it important to give priority to academic 
training and educate Africans to apply their minds 
"intelligently and profitably and aspire to higher 
,, 3 professions In the opinion of John white, the reason 
for not giving priority to industrial education was that, 
from the point of view of employment, the demand in 
Rhodesia was for unskilled and not skilled African labour. 
I believe in industrial training but difficulties 
in the way here are such as to make it practically 
very difficult. Suppose you, e. g., train twenty 
pupils for brick laying, their own people cannot, 
and the Europeans will not employ them. The 
greatest need here at present is for unskilled 
and not skilled labour. 4 
The Company argued equally strongly that, in terms of 
employment, academic education had no place in the white 
economy. European employers did not wish to employ a 
"jumped up mission native with the gratuitous insolence 
SPG. S/R/D., Annual Reports of the Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia for 1910*, 1912 and 1915,, SPG Archives and 
Missionary ReTp 
,,,. orts 
1915, 'E' Series, SPG Archives. 
2. S/M/R/B, 1912-22 Rhodesia Synod Minutes for 1912, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1912-22. 
3. C/R/B,. John White to M. Hartley, 2nd February 1907, 
WMMS Archives, Box 826. 
4. S/M/R/B, Rhodesia Synod Minutes for 1911. Evidence 
given by Rev. John White to the Native Affairs 
Commission of 1910 on behalf of the Methodist Church, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1906-11. 
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acquired to perfection from no more than 2 years of 
mission training"'. Such Africans were considered a bad 
influence on the rest of the labour force. One native 
Commissioner explained that: 
Of all the qualifications of which an employer 
{hadl need, reading and writing {werel the 
least. Here and there, it {wasJ convenient 
to have a native who {couldl read and write and 
pay a little extra wages for being so but in a 
vast majority of cases it {was} an accomplish- 
ment in a native for which there {wasIno market. 2 
The problem facing the progressive missionary educator 
at this time was that, in the attempt to develop African 
education, he found himself confronting not just the BSA 
Co. but also the entire white colonial society of which he 
was an integral part. This was because, by encouraging 
African education and advancement, he was indirectly 
undermining white supremacy. It is, however, quite 
possible that, in a historical context, many missionaries 
did not see their educational policies and actions as in 
any way conflicting with colonial interests. 
The Anglicans and the Methodists continued to seek 
the support of the BSA Co. administration in developing 
African academic primary education throughout SRMC. A 
Committee of Inquiry set up by the Company government in 
1. Rhodesia Herald, 5th April 1906. 
2. Rhodesia Herald, 18th October 1908. 
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1910 to look into various aspects of African af-fairs and 
education, urged the Company to co-operate with mission- 
aries in their African educational work. The Committee 
regarded such co-operation as the only effective way by 
which the Company administration could gain greater 
influence over missionary policy and be in a position to 
direct African education into the paths of which it 
approved. In the Committee's opinion, there was no way in 
which the Company could stop Africans from obtaining an 
academic education. It was therefore in the Company's 
interest to participate in providing that education so as 
to influence the curriculum. This was made clear in the 
Connitteels report: 
The expediency or otherwise of giving the native 
any literary education has greatly exercised the 
minds of many witnesses {consulted by the 
Commission}. The Committee are of the opinion, 
however, that those who would with-hold it have 
not realised that the movement for literary educa- 
. -ion has long assumed practical form, and that, do 
what we may, the native will get it. Apart from 
the responsibilities of the dominant race in regard 
to this question, we should .... accept the inevitable and take every means of retaining the 
control of this class of education so that it may be 
directed into paths which we can approve of and can 
be applied to its most useful purpose. 1 
As more and more Africans began to regard education as 
the escape route 4, -: rom rural poverty and manual labour, the 
demand for it increased. The BSA Co. started to seriously 
consider ways of controlling African educational develop- 
ment. One way was by increasing grants to mission schools 
Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry 1910-11, 
paras. 13-14 & 16. 
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1 in order to make them more dependent on government aid 
This would enable the Company to gain a stronger voice in 
the decision and policy-making processes. The Inquiry 
Committee proposed that, in addition to using financial 
aid to control missionary educational work, the Company 
should give schools inspectors more administrative author- 
ity over mission schools. This would enable them to 
influence teaching methods and curricula and ensure that 
no subversive literature or undesirable material was taught 
to pupils. 
Although missionaries needed more government funds to 
expand their educational work, many were not willing to let 
the Company wield too much control over policy. They 
feared that this would severely curtail their ability to 
control their own schools. Between 1911 and 1917, 
attempts were made by the SRMC to seek a more agreeable 
basis for church/state co-operation in African primary 
education 
2. 
But these attempts suffered a serious setback 
when Company policy took on a more concrete form from 1917 
onwards with the appearance of H. S. Keigwin on the educa- 
tional scene. 
BSA Co. grants to the 115 approved mission schools in 
existence in 1910 stood at 22,780. See Franck, op. cit., 
p. 118. 
2. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Great Zimbabwe, 24th- 
29th June 1915, RMC/CBMS Archives {Africal, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224. 
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A native commissioner in the DeDartment of '. , ýative 
Affairs (DNA) which was responsible for rural African 
administration, Keigwin believed that the government 
should take a firm step towards controlling African 
education and ensure that it was directed more into 
industrial lines. He impressed upon the Company the need 
to create a Department of Native Development (DND) which 
would be responsible for directing African education, 
1 
welfare and development His primary objective was to 
evolve an educational policy and development strategy 
capable of dealing effectively with the problems of rural 
African development. He considered the main purpose of 
African education to be that of building up an agricultural, 
rural society rather than encouraging Africans through 
academics to aim for the white collar professions 
2. 
Keigwin had conceptualized a policy and scheme of 
African education which aimed at taking out pupils from 
what he described as the "cold intellectual atmosphere of 
a classroom ,3 into outdoor training in such rural trades 
as basket weaving, carpentry, building and, most 
1. Steele Murray: The Foundations of Native Policy in 
Southern Rhodesia (Ph. D. Dissertation, Simon Frazer 
University, Canada, 1972), p. 309. 
2. Ibid. 
3. See H. S. Keigwin: "An Educational Experiment", Southern 
Africa Journal of Science, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 1& 21 pp. 
172-182, December 1921. Also see File: Director of 
Native Development, Southern Rhodesia 1919-1925, IMC/CBMS 
Archives, Box 1221. 
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importantly, farming and agriculture. He regarded 
carpenters, builders and agricultural demonstrators as the 
kind of manpower more needed in the native reserves than 
scholars. But Keigwin did not hide the fact that he 
intended this education to serve as an instrument of 
promoting the policy of separate racial development. if 
Africans were directed away from white collar professions, 
he thought, this would prevent them from developing any 
notions of acquiring the same jobs and status as Europeans. 
As he explained: 
If we do not intend to admit blacks, be it now 
or by degrees, to encroach on social equality, 
let us not put false ideas into their heads nor 
encourage them to foster hopes of equality. 1 
The creation of the DND and the educational philosophy 
of its progenitor, were both unwelcome to missionaries. In 
the first instance, they saw the creation of the DND as an 
attempt by Keigwin to take over their responsibility for 
organising African education 
2. Secondly, they (in parti- 
cular, the Anglicans and Methodists) resented Keigwin's 
plan to bring missionary educational policy into line with 
that of the BSA Co. as this would severely reduce their 
1. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 1924, No. 2, 
p. 53. 
2. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisbury 16th-19th 
June 1910, IMC/CBMS Archives-7A-frical, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224. 
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= 1-% Dility to determine curriculum and overall policy. 
Thirdly, they regarded Keigwin's industrial education 
scheme as an unnecessary and expensive duplication of 
courses already provided in many mission schools Most 
importantly, however, the missionaries feared that, if 
Keigwin became the Company's chief educational policy-maker, 
he would use his influence to make the Company administration 
less sympathetic towards the needs of mission primary educa- 
tion. This would draw away most of the Company funds from 
primary to industrial education. Indeed, when the SRMC 
approached the colony's administrator, Sir Charles Drummond, 
in 193.0 with a request for increases in government expenditure 
on African primary education, they found him unsympathetic and 
unco-operative. He turned down all three of their requests: 
one calling for a government subsidy for the salaries of those 
teachers in primary schools who had completed two or three 
2 years of training in a recognised training establishment 
The second called for capitation grants to be given to all 
mission schools on aE for E basIs3, and the third called 
for the provision of school equipment grants also on aE 
for 2 basis 4. The administrator's reason for turning 
Proceedings of the SRMC held at S'alisb 
, 
ury 16th-19th 
June 19'20, IMC/CBMS Archives iAfrical,, mic/fi 99,, Box 
1221-1224. 
Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisbury 30th May - 
4th June 19'22, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfricaý, mic/fi T-9, 
Box 1221-1224, Resolution 1. 
3. Ibid.., Resolution 3. 
4. Ibid., Resolution 4. 
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down all three of the requests was that he could not commit 
a new impending government. to an expenditure it might not 
approve of. In reality, however, the administrator's 
decision had been influenced by Keigwin who prevailed upon 
him not to yield to missionary demands until they had agreed 
to fall into line with government educational policy 
1. 
In addition to financial sanctions, missionaries were 
subjected to further pressures aimed at frustrating their 
work and eliciting their co-operation with the Company in 
implementing Keigwin's proposed scheme. From 1921 onwards, 
mission schools were to be rigorously and regularly super- 
vised and inspected by Native Commissioners and officials 
of the DND. This made it difficult for missionaries to 
operate freely restricted as they were by having to seek 
prior approval from the government for their programmes2. 
The SRMC was anxious to reach some kind of compromise 
with Keigwin because it realised thatfunless a working 
relationship was established with the DND, it would be 
very difficult for missionaries to operate in primary 
education. At the 1922 SRMC, its Chairman, John White of 
the WMMS, and the Anglican Bishop, impressed upon all the 
member churches the need to recognise that "cordial 
Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisburý: 30th May - 
4th June 1922, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfrical, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224, Appendix 3. 
2. S. C. Murrayr OP. cit., p. 283. 
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co-operation of government and missionaries was essential 
for the development of Native Education"'. In the opinion 
of White, the only way in which missionaries could have 
effective influence on government policy was by having a 
body in which the churches and the government were 
represented. Such a body would be responsible for deter- 
mining policy. The presence of missionaries on it would 
be a great advantage in that their views would be more 
effectively expressed to the government and their interests 
would be better protected. A Central Advisory Board of 
Native Education was proposed and it was the SRMIC Is idea that 
the Board should consist of six representatives - three 
selected by the government and the remainder by the 
missionaries 
2. 
Although Keigwin approved of the idea of the Central 
Advisory Board, and closer co-operation between the 
missionaries and the government, he left the missionaries 
in no doubt whatsoever that he did not approve of their 
academically oriented educational policy. In his own 
words, the government did not believe in: 
institutionalising native life or standard- 
ising our educational products so that we 
produce one type of intellectual machine- 
made, bookish native child.... We do not 
believe in producing change for the sake of 
change. 3 




Keic jwin was therefore determined to ensure that industrial 
education was given priority in mission schools. 
The implementation of Kei 
policy_and prograinme 
In 1920, Keigwin persuaded the BSA Co. to set up two 
African industrial schools which would provide Africans 
with the type of education he had in mind for them. 
Domboshawa and Tjolotjo schools were built near Salisbury 
and Bulawayo in 1921 and 1922 respectively to specialise 
in training Africans in farming and agriculture and 
building 1. The Phelps Stokes Commission arrived in the 
country in 1923 from the United States to inquire into the 
state of African education in Central Africa. After 
studying Keigwin's scheme, the Commission impressed upon 
the newly elected Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia's 
responsible government, Charles Coghlan, that the utmost 
priority must be given to the scheme by way of resources 
2 
and official support 
In the Commission's view, industrial education 
provided more scope for African rural development than 
mission academic education. Keigwin was persuaded by the 
Commission in 1924 to visit the two famous Black American 
Institutes of Tuskegee and Hampton at its expense in order 
1. Gray,, 2p. cit., p. 325. 
2. Kenneth J. King: Pan Africanism and Education 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), p. 236. 
Also see File Director of Native Development,, Folder: 
Mr. H. S. Keigwin, Southern Rhodesia 1919-1925, IMC/CBMS 
Archives, Box 1221. 
in's industrial educational 
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that he might study how the industrial education scheme 
was organised, taught and applied to rural developmentl. 
Keigwin was so impressed by what he saw at Tuskegee and 
Hampton that, on his return, he was more determined than 
ever before to develop the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo training 
programmes. Considerable government resources were spent 
on the two schools. In 1922, for example, government 
expenditure on Domboshawa and Tjolotjo was nearly half as 
much as that spent on all mission primary schools - E7,500 
2 
- compared to E16,000 spent on 856 mission schools That 
figure rose even further in 1924. Missionaries felt that 
much of this money could have been put to better use in 
those mission schools providing both industrial training 
(for teenagers) and academic education. 
However, from the opening of Keigwin's training scheme 
in 1922 up to 1926, only 228 trainees had enrolled at 
Domboshawa where Keigwin was Principal (as well as being 
the Director of the DND) . 
been enrolled at Tjolotjo. 
An even smaller figure had 
The training itself in these 
two institutes was described in the 1926 report of the 
Chief Native Commissioner as a major success. 
1. King,. pp. cit., p-236- 
Atkinson, op. cit., p. 103. 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 
1926, p. 15. For further reports on the development 
of industrial training at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, see 
Reports of the Director of Native Development for the 
Year 1932, pp. 1-2; 1933, pp. 5-9. 
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Experimental farming carried out by the agricultural 
demonstrators and farmers under training at Domboshawa 
resulted in a high maize yield according to the report. 
At Tjolotjo, similar experimental farming projects 
conducted on land belonging to local Africans in the Gwaai 
reserve were reported as producing an even higher maize 
1 
yield than that of Domboshawa For Keigwin and the 
government, this was evidence enough of the practical 
value of industrial training over academic education. 
If the training provided at the two schools was as 
popular with Africans and as successful as it was 
reported to be by the Director of Native Development, the 
fact that pupil response was very poor, despite a massive 
government campaign to attract large numbers for training, 
requires some explanation. Firstly, academic education 
introduced into African society a new element of social 
mobility and an escape from manual labour which pupils and 
parents were quick to perceive as lacking in industrial 
education 
2. Those pupils who went to mission schools 
found that three or four years of primary education 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 
1926, p. 16. Also seel Atkinson's discussion o4L the 
development of industrial education: Atkinson, 2p. cit., 
pp. 89-122 and S. C. Murray , op. cit., pp. 304-324. 
2. An interesting insight into this aspect of mission 
education and African responses is found in Fr. J. 0. 
Hea's Missionary Letters 1925-30, File SF11. Society 
of Jesus Archives. 
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brought within easy reach such popular, prestigious and 
well-paying professions as teaching, becoming a school- 
master, evangelist, court messenger or interpreter, or 
foreman on European farms, plantations or in the mines 
1. 
This increased the popularity of academic education. 
In the 1920s missionaries no longer had to go from one 
village to another looking for pupils, as they had to in 
the 1890s, when education had not yet achieved popularity 
and parents were suspicious of schools and reluctant to 
entrust their children to missionaries. Now parents 
queued at mission schools during the opening days in 
2 order to ensure that their children got places In 
government aided schools, enrolment rose shar-ply from 205 
in 1901 to 9,873 in 1910, and to 43,094 in 1920. The 
number of government sponsored mission schools also 
increased in response to the demand for education from 3 
in 1901 to 115 in 1910, and to 750 in 1920 
3. 
Parents took a special interest in ensuring that 
their children were taught academic subjects. An incident 
which occurred at the Roman Catholic mission of Kutama in 
1926 is a case in point. Parents, on hearing from their 
1. C/R/B Rev. John White to Oversease Secretary, 23rd 
June 1924, WMMS Archives, Box 828. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Franck, op. cit., p. 118 and S/M/R/B 1923-33 District 
Synod Minutes for 1926, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33. 
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children that they were being taught industrial subjects 
most of the time, approached the Principal and told him 
that: 
They definitely did not want their children to learn such things as agriculture, arts and 
crafts but simply and solely book subjects and 
that they did not want them to return to school 
unless they were sure that this was going to be 
the plan. 1 
This parental rejection of industrial education was also 
due to African suspicion that this education was intended 
by the white man to prevent Africans from advancing as 
fast as Europeans so that the latter could maintain a 
superior political, economic and social position. 
Hea explained: 
The trouble arises from the fact that they 
{parents} know something of white schools 
and think that white ascendency is due to 
different teaching in the schools and that 
there is a white conspiracy to keep the 
blacks down as underdogs .... They think that, if schools are run as they would like 
them, the black would become in one generation 
as the white .... 2 
As 
Industrial education was therefore looked down upon. 
Despite the practical skills acquired by those pupils who 
went to Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, their status in African 
Fr. J. 0. Hea Missionary Letters 1925-30, SB/K/1/26, 
22/1/26, File SF11, SJ Archives. 
2. Ibid. 
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society and amongst 'educated' Africans was low. Most 
pupils regarded enrolling for industrial training as the 
last resort and only for those who had failed to succeed 
in the formal school system, and most of them, therefore, 
shunned going to the two industrial schools. 
Secondly, an important factor which militated against 
the early acceptability of industrial education, particu- 
larly during the first decade of its establishment, was 
that those who graduated from Domboshawa and Tjolotjo 
found considerable difficulty in obtaining employment. 
The rural areas in which the graduate farmers and agricul- 
tural demonstrators were supposed to be of assistance in 
developing were so poor in resources and land productivity, 
because of population overcrowding, that they offered 
1 
little scope for productive farming Moreover, there 
were no government funds which could be invested in land 
development: neither was there any land nor agricultural 
bank from which the graduates could draw aid for farming 
projects. But, even assuming that such aid had been 
available, government policy of not readily selling 
1. For a detailed discussion of the effects of over- 
crowding on land productivity in native reserves, see 
Ken Brown: Land in Southern Rhodesia (Africa Bureau 
Press, London, 1959), pp. 6-10. Also see United 
Nations Commission 4/11 February 1978, p. 81 and 
R. MacGregor: Native Segregation in Southern Rhodesia 
(A Study of Social Policy), Ph. D. Thesis, London 
Universityr 1940, pp. 127-141. 
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productive agricultural land to Aff-ricans was still a 
serious obstacle to the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo graduates 
engaging in productive farming. 
Similar difficulties were experienced by those who 
trained as builders. Rural Africans did not require 
their skill because they were capable of building their 
own houses. Europeans in urban areas could not easily 
employ them because European trade unions were anxious to 
protect their members against African competition. 
Moreover, the quality of training African builders and 
other craftsmen were given at the two training schools was 
kept low deliberately in order to protect the job security 
of their European counter-parts 
1. Africans were further 
denied training in the more specialised trades such as 
plumbing, printing, metal work and engineering which 
provided ready access to well paying jobs in the urban and 
other industrial areas. Training in these trades was 
reserved for Europeans 
2 This policy was enunciated by 
Keigwin himself in 1924 in a statement of reassurance to 
whites that the Domboshawa/Tjolotjo training schemes did 
not threaten their economic interests. 
See T. S. Donough to Rev. J. H. Oldham, 15th August 1925, 
IMC/CBMS/Cj IMC/CBMS Archives {Africal, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224. 
2. T. Moyana: "Creating an African Middle Class: The 
Political Economy of Education and Exploitation in 
Zimbabwe", Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. 4, 
No. 7,, 4th March 1979, p. 327. 
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If a critic feels that this plan will be 
imperilling both his and the country's labour 
supply, he should feel assured that our policy 
far from decreasing the supply of labour should 
increase it both in quantity and efficiency. 
Our plan is to stimulate effort among the 
people, to put purpose into their lives and to 
develop simple skills in industries that do not 
offer direct competition with Europeans. 1 
The lack of opportunity for the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo 
graduates to apply their skills and training in both the 
rural and urban areas led most of them to seek teaching 
jobs in those mission schools which taught industrial 
subjects 
2 
alongside academic primary schooling. 
Most parentsf aware as they were of the poor job 
prospects for industrial school graduates, did not want 
to send their children for industrial training. They 
preferred to send them to academic schools because they 
knew that those children who went to academic schools 
stood a much better chance of getting the few white 
collar jobs available for blacks and earning consider- 
ably more money than the children who went to industrial 
schools and therefore did not obtain academic qualifica- 
tions. In many developing countries today, parents 
H. S. Keigwin: "An Educational Experiment", Southern 
Africa Journal of Science, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 1&2, p. 178. 
2. Moyana, 2p. cit., p. 327. 
0001, 
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are often unwilling to send their children for 
vocational education for similar reasons. 
In Southern Rhodesia, the industrial education issue 
was further complicated by the racial element which 
accounted for the provision of an inferior standard of 
training for Africans in order to keep them out of those 
jobs reserved for Europeans. This undermined Africans' 
chances of finding skilled employment in urban and 
industrial areas. For the reasons discussed, Keigwin's 
industrial training and rural development schemes found 
little African support. 
In this chapter so far the evolution of church and 
state policies on African education between 1890 and 
1923 have been discussed. The reasons for the conflict 
in policies, the rationale on which these policies were 
based and the nature of educational programmes that 
evolved from them have been examined. In the section 
which now follows a study is made of the development of 
church and state policies on African academic/primary 
education between 1923 and 1933. 
The development of church and state policies on African 
ac-ademic- primary education between 1923 and 1933 
From the time of the implementation of Keigwin's 
scheme, government policy towards African primary educa- 
tion became even less sympathetic than it had been in 
68. 
the past. After the country attained self-government 
in 1 3, there were many Europeans who felt that the 
government should take effective measures to control 
missionary educational policies and ensure that African 
education developed on lines approved by the state. 
European opposition to the government aiding mission 
African schools also increased. Highly influential 
right wing parliamentarians like Ethel Tawsie Jollie and 
the arch conservative Gilfillan were opposed, in principle, 
to the idea of the government financing any programme of 
African education. They were intensifying their campaign 
to get the government to stop providing grants to mission 
schools because they wanted missionaries to pay for their 
own educational work 
1. There was a second force - 
that of officals of the DNA (native and district commission- 
ers), who believed that mission education should not be 
encouraged because it had a bad influence on African youth. 
In the opinion of the Native Commissioner for Marandellas, 
"Native education (as carried through sectarian competition 
fwas} costly and fundamentally weak" because it gave the 
.2 African "a wholly erroneous conception of education 
He considered the popularity of mission schools as due to 
1. S. C. Murray, 2p, cit., pp. 308-309. 
2. See Report of 
Year 1928, p. 
the Chief Native Commissioner for the 
0 
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pupils "seeking freedom and licence from the social 
conditions rather than a desire for religion or 
education"'. 
In response to these pressures, the government took 
steps in 1923 to gain more control over African primary 
education. Several control measures were gazetted 
giving the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) and his 
assistants considerable powers over the running of mission 
schools. Under the new regulations, the CNC could, for 
example, withdraw altogether the lease of a mission 
school if he suspected or felt that the school's activi- 
ties "promoted feelings of ill will or hostility against 
the state .3. A local Native Commissioner (NC) could 
inspect a school at any time without prior notice to 
"check against subversive propaganda being taught or 
, 14 pupils being encouraged to disturb public peace In 
future no mission school could be opened unless it had 
obtained prior consent of the CNC. Also, all teachers 
had to have their character scrutinised and approved by 
See Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the 
Year 1923, p. 5. 
2. S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1923, WMMS 





the CNC prior to their being employed in any mission 
1 
school This not only interfered with the established 
procedures of running the schools, it also greatly 
frustrated missionary educational work by curtailing the 
missionaries' ability to operate freely. There were 
strong o jections to the new regulations from the SRMC 
because the procedure of obtaining government approval 
for every educational programme that missionaries wanted 
to undertake imposed serious restrictions on overall 
educational development. A representation was made by 
the Methodists in 1924 seeking the immediate withdrawal 
2 
of those regulations, but to no avail 
Furthermore, although the government did not 
terminate grants to mission schools as demanded by many 
whites, it became less willing to make the required 
increases in financial aid, thus hampering missionaries 
from maintaining their educational work and allowing for 
planned development to take place. This restriction on aid 
to mission schools by the government was despite the fact 
that Africans were making substantially high contributions to 
public revenue through taxes. For example, African tax 
revenue rose from E230,099 in 1924 to E328,370.12s. 8d. in 
S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1923, WMMS Archives, 
Box 1923-33. 
2. S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1924, WMMS Archives, 
Box 1923-33. 
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1925 11a rise of over E98,000 in one year. But, in 
return, the total increase in educational expenditure by 
the government on African schools for the same period 
amounted to only E8,670 
2 
and this was for a total African 
enrolment that had risen from 43,094 in 1920 to well over 
75,000 in 1925. This, as the Anglican Bishop pointed 
out in 1925, was inadequate to meet the needs of such a 
large enrolment 
3. 
Government fears that a wholly academic education 
would facilitate the growth of a class of Africans which 
would not only gravitate towards the professions but also 
engage in political activity was vindicated by the role 
of some notable educated Africans in the political 
sphere. This had the effect of making the government 
even less enthusiastic in assisting in the development of 
African primary education. Men like Twala, the founder 
of the Bantu Voters Association in 1923, and Maziyani, the 
Anglican school teachers and others assumed a significant 
role in organising urban black protest movements of that 
time. These men demanded the extension of franchise 
to more Africans, higher pay, better working and living 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 
'T polo* 
2. SPG. S/R General/C, D. 1925, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia 




conditions for urban workers and more educational facili- 
1 
ties for Africans The government regarded the role 
of such men as politically undesirable and felt that 
there should be an adequate check against the education 
system producing too many men of this type. The govern- 
ment's determination to force the predominance of industrial 
education in the African school curricula was indicative of 
its desire to direct African education away from the academic 
into the less politically and economically threatening field 
of vocational education 
2. As the 1925 Native Education 
Commission pointed out, an educated native was regarded as 
.3 a formidable rival to Europeans in every sphere of life * 
The SRMC attemDted to evolve a unified missionary 
response to what it regarded as a government policy 
designed, deliberately, to frustrate missionary work and 
undermine the development of African education. But the 
various missionary bodies were divided over the extent to 
which they should go in opposing government policy. The 
Wesleyan Methodists advocated defiance of the government 
and urged the other missionaries to recognise that: 
having come to the country and taken for 
ourselves the best of the land, and having put 
to use the riches of the country, let us 
realise that, in all fairness, we must 
discharge the only duty of the stronger 
towards the weaker -a duty which fortunately 
matches our own interests and provide for them 
fAfricans} the fullest opportunity to develop 
ýddk 
1. For a discussion of the role of some educated Africans 
in organising these protest movements, see Ranger (1968) 
(ed. ), 22. cit., pp. 88-109. For a further discussion of 
African protest movements, their objectives and 
organisation, see T. O. Ranger: The 7ý, -Frican Voice in Southern Rhodesia (Heinemann, London, 1970), pp. 68-87. 
2. S. C. Murray, 22. cit ., p. 332. 
3. Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Commissi--r. ac--c-inted 
to inquire into the matter of Native Education -'n a! -', its bearings in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia (Govt. 
1925),, para. 752. 
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to the utmost what they are capable of. 
1 
While the Anglicans agreed that missionaries should take 
a tough stand against the government in defending African 
interests, the new Anglican Bishop, the Right Reverend 
Edward Paget felt that, to take too militant a position, 
would be counter productive in two ways. Firstly, 
missionaries could antagonise their European congrega- 
tion from whom most churches received considerable cash 
contributions for their Christian and educational work 
2 
amongst Africans Secondly, the government might take 
a tougher stand against the churches and impose even 
more severe restrictive measures on their educational 
3 
work Some churches, such as the Roman Catholic, the DRC 
Ar to 
and the Salvation which supported government 
policiestwere unwilling to let the SRMC be seen by the 
white population as a defender of African interests and 
a mouthpiece for the expression of African political, 
economic and social grievances. These churches advocated 
a less militant approach to government policy. To maintain 
1. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 1924, No. 2, 
p. 15. Also see Paper read to the SR. MC by Mr. Orner on 
behalf of Dr. W. L. Thompson, on the need to educate 
Africans: Proceedings of the SRMC held in SalisbuEy 
30th May-4th June 1924. IMC/CBMS Archives JAfricaý, 
mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C, D, 1926, Bishop E. Paget to SPG 
Overseas Secretary, 13th March 19ý6, SPG Archives. 
3. Proceedings of the SRMC held in Salisbury 3rd May - 
June 4th 1926, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfricail, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224. 
The Roman Catholic Church joined the SRMC in 1920. 
74. 
unity amongst all the member churches, the SRMC had to 
adopt a less militant response to the government's 
attitude and policy towards African education. In any 
case, the churches could not afford to create a situation 
of open conflict with the government because they needed 
its political support and financial assistance for their 
work. 
Moreover, it was not the intention of the churches, 
even those like the Wesleyan Methodist which claimed to 
be progressive to antagonise the government which they 
supported and agreed with in many other spheres. They, 
for example, supported some of the government's blatantly 
racist policies which undermined African interests. This 
was clearly demonstrated by the open support the Methodists 
gave to the Land Apportionment Act, the pillar of racial , 
segregation and African under-development in Southern 
Rhodesia. Even before the LAA had been debated in 
parliament, the Methodist Synod not only welcomed it but 
wished it could be extended to other British colonies. 
Many of us have the greatest hope that our land 
segregation policy rather than promote racial 
strife, will be a supreme contribution to racial 
harmony and that Rhodesia will in the matter of 
land legislation between the black and white 
races set an example to some of our colonies that 
are tremendously in need of one. 1 
S/M/ R /B 1923-33,, District Synod Minutes for 1929, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1922-33. Also see Rhodesia Herald, 
18th January 1929. 
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A prominent Methodist official, the Reverend P. 
Hardaker, was convinced that the land policy was necessary 
in order to give the blacks an opportunity to: 
develop more naturally and gradually in their 
own sphere as too rapid African contact with 
European civilisation at this stage {couldl be 
a danger. 1 
Most churches, toot believed that many government policies 
were necessary to protect white interests and ensure the 
continuation of white rule civilisation and Christianity. 
Only the isolated voices of such missionaries as the 
Anglican Reverend Shearley Cripps were to be heard 
opposing government policies and challenging their 
2 Christian basis His Anglican colleagues, however, 
generally regarded him as a political embarrassment to the 
church and out of touch with the realities of Rhodesian 
politics 
3. 
Given the Methodist and Anglican support for colonial 
government policies, it appears paradoxical that they 
should have pursued educational policies which conflicted 
with that of the state but, in their view, the objectives of 
Proceedings of the SRMC held in Salisbury on 30th May - 
4th June 1924, Appendix V, IMC/CBMS Archives T-AfricaT- 
mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1926, Bishop 
to A. E. A. Sulston, 18th September 
Also see "Notes on Native Af fairs 
compiled by A. S. Cripps, 14th May 
Native Affairs, 1921, IMC/CBMS Ar 
3. SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1926, Bishop 
to A. E. A. Sulston, 18th September 
of Southern Rhodesia 
1926f SPG Archives. 
in Southern Rhodesia" 
1921, File: General: 
hives, Box lf2l. 
of Southern Rhodesia 
1926, SPG Archives. 
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their policies and programmes were consistent with the 
aims of their Christian work - to Christianise Africans, 
1 
educate them and aid their advancement They also 
believed that, by educating Africans and enabling them to 
adapt themselves to the colonial situation so that they 
could work and live under white rule with contentment, 
their policies contributed to the stability and security 
2 
of colonial rule They did not consider the political, 
economic and social consequences of educating Africans in 
the way the government did. 
One church, however, made clear that the aims of its 
educational policy were to educate Africans so that they 
could secure political, economic and social rights. The 
American Board for Foreign Missions surprised the govern- 
ment and other churches when its representative declared 
before the 1925 Native Education Commission that, besides 
aiming at raising the economic and social status of the 
African communities, Christian and non Christian: 
a large part of Utsj educational work {was} 
to train and educate natives to take their 
proper place in the body politic. The aim 
would be training the natives to fit them 
to get franchise and to take part in the 
administration of the country. 3 
1. C/R/Bj J. White to F. Noble, 6th June 1928, WMMS 
Archives, Box 828. 
2. This thinking was also reflected in the report of the 
1925 Native Education Commission. See Southern 
Rhodesia - Report of the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the matter of Native Education in all its bearings 
in the colony of S'outhern Rhodesia (Govt. Printer, 
Salisbury, 1925), paras. 695-698. 
3. See Mashingaidze, op. cit., p. 342. 
401% 
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The official went on further to explain that, to achieve 
the given objectives, the church taught in its schools 
"civics and methods of self government and {hadlalways 
done so" 
The church's views were, however, dismissed by the 
Commission as being influenced by the ideals of the 
American constitution which upheld man's equality. The 
government nevertheless took serious note of the church's 
political position and, for a long time, its educational 
activities were kept under the watchful eye of the Native 
and District Commissioners and Schools Inspectors in the 
Gazaland and Eastern provinces of Southern Rhodesia in 
2 
which it operated 
Although the SRMC decided not to take too militant a 
position with regard to the government's policy, it 
decided that missionaries should strive to gain more 
freedom in running their educational affairs and should 
also put more pressure on the government for more aid. 
Of equal importance was the decision taken at the 1926 
Conference that the churches should extricate themselves 
from working under the DND and the DNA, both of which, 
they believed, had no genuine interest in African educa- 
tion and were responsible for many of the administrative 
1. Mashingaidze, 22. cit., p. 342. 
2. See Kamusikiri, op. cit., Ch. 3. 
opý 
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problems confronted by missionaries in day to day 
1 
educational work 
The SRMC proposed to Premier Coghlan that a Depart- 
ment of Native Education (DNE) be formed to take over 
responsibility for Africans from the DND and the DNA. 
The SRMC believed that such a department, wholly committed 
to the organisation and development of African education, 
would take greater interest in its welfare than had so 
far been shown by the DND. The real issue, however, was 
whether the proposed DNE would be able to make positive 
changes in government policy and secure more support from 
the government for the development of primary education. 
Keigwin's resignation from his influential position 
in 1926 cleared the way for missionaries to put pressure 
on the government for the immediate formation of the DNE. 
But Premier Coghlan died in 1927 before the proposed 
department had been agreed on. He was, however, 
succeeded by a man who was sympathetic to missionary 
problems. H. U. Moffat, grandson of the famous London 
Missionary Society missionary who established the first 
mission school in pre-colonial Southern Rhodesia in 
1859, became Prime Minister in 1927. As a former 
missionary himself, he understood the nature of the 
Proceedings of the SRMC held 
I 
in Salisbury, 30th Ma 





problems confronted by missionaries in their educational 
work. 
Moffat approved the setting up of the Department of 
Native Education in 1927 but not without experiencing 
considerable parliamentary criticism from the Opposition 
and some of his more conservative ministers. They 
accused him of creating expensive and unnecessary dualism 
in the administration of African education and development. 
It was only after Moffat agreed to bring the DNE and DND 
under one directorship that parliament approved the DNE 
1 
in 1929 The two departments, however, had entirely 
separate responsibilities. The DND remained in charge of 
African rural development while the DNE became responsible 
2 for African education* 
The man who succeeded Keigwin and became Director of 
both departments was Harold Jowitt. A prominent educa- 
tionist from the Natal Province of South Africa, his 
experience in dealing with missionaries suited him well 
for his new job. But, like his predecessor, he also 
believed that African education should develop on agricul- 
tural and industrial lines. He also indicated his 
intentions to observe the recommendations of the 1925 
Native Education Commission that African education should 
3 follow the lines set out by Keigwin 
So C. . ',,, Iurra%r , Ll OP. cit., p. 
314. 
2. Ibid. 




To emphasise his preference for industrial education, 
he chose as some of his advisers and assistants the heads 
of Domboshawa and Tjolotjo. It is true, however, that, 
in comparative terms, he was less strict with the 
missionaries than his predecessor 
1. 
and attempted to 
solve some of their complaints. He made the gesture of 
co-operation by, for example, withdrawing some of the 
1923 regulations such as the vetting of teachers' 
characters by DNA officials and the constant threat of 
cancellation of school leases by the CNC if he felt that 
any school's activities were undesirable. He allowed 
missionaries more freedom to operate and make their own 
decisions in the administration and planning of their 
educational programmes2 although government approval for 
the establishment of new schools was still required. 
Apart from relaxing government restrictions over 
missionary educational activities, there was very little 
positive contribution made by Jowitt towards the develop- 
ment of African primary education. It is therefore not 
true to claim, as Mlambo does, that Jowitt was a 
progressive educationist in the sense that Garfield Todd 
3 
was in the 1950s In fact, under his directorship of 
1. Mlambo, 2p. cit.,, p. 77. 
2. S1 M /R/B 1923-33, District Syond Minutes for 1929, 
Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33. 
3. Mlambo,, 2p. cit., p. 77. 
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the DNE, African education suffered serious financial 
problems arising from the cuts he introduced in govern- 
ment educational expenditure between 1929 and 1932. At 
this time missionaries were requesting more financial aid 
to cope with a school enrolment that had more than doubled 
from 43,094 in 1920 to 107,122 in 1930 1, but Jowitt with- 
drew completely government grants to 231 kraal schools which, 
under the re-classification of schools in 1929, were 
considered ineligible for any further government assistance 
2. 
At least 9,000 pupils were affected by this cut in grants 
3 
and many of them who could not afford the cost of their 
education left school altogether. Others, as Mlambo 
himself pointed out, were able to remain in school only by 
paying for their fees through labour carried out during 
weekends and holidays 
4. 
In many cases, parents offered 
their services to schools in return for their children's 
education. This happened in many Methodist and other 
mission schools 
5. A further reduction in government 
1. Franck, op. cit., p. 77. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Development for the 
Year 1932, p. 5. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Mlambo, op. cit., p. 77. 
5. C/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 10th May 1930, 
WMMS Archives, Box 829. 
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grants to mission schools was made in the 1932-33 academic 
year. After that reduction, the government contribution 
to African education fell by 25% from what it was in 1926, 
leaving a total which only accounted for 10% of the full 
cost of running the African school systemi. 
Jowitt's action came as a great surprise to the 
missionaries: firstly, because they had not been duly 
consulted as promised and, secondly, because government 
expenditure on African education per pupil over the years 
was not so high as to warrant any reduction. The 
following table illustrates this point: 
Table 1.1. 
Government expenditure on African education throuqh the 
grants in aid system between 1901 and 1930 
Year Grants to No. of Schools No. of Pupils Amount per 
Mission Schools eligible for Grants enrolled Pupil 
1901 P-133 3 265 20.50 
1910 E2p780 115 9,873 F-0.25 
1920 29,467 750 43,094 EO. 22 
1930 248,436 1,422 107,122 F-0.65 
Thus, government expenditure amounted to an average of 
only EO. 40 per pupil per year -a sum which was inadequate 
1. Rev. T. S. Donohugh to Rev. J. H. Oldham, 15th August 
1929, IMC/CBMS/C, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africal, mic/fi 
99, Box 1221-1224. 
N. B. Jowitt was able to implement his policies despite 
Moffat's sympathy towards missionary educational needs 
because, under the Rhodesian political system, depart- 
mental power lay in the director rather than in the 
Minister. If the permanent head of a department was 
conservativer as in Keigwin and Jowitt's cases, the 
Minister in charge of the department, if he was liberal, 
found difficulty in implementing his policies. See 
Mlambo, 2p. cit., p. 77. 
2. Composed from Franck, 22. cit., p. 118 and Report oll' the 
Native Education Inquiry Commission 1951, p. 3. 
0* 
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to meet the demand for education by Africans - and this 
figure contrasted sharply with a government average 
annual expenditure of E15 per European pupil in village 
schools and E12 per head for those in farm schools in 
1 1908 
European education was given preference over African 
education by successive colonial governments since its 
establishment by the Catholic Dominican nuns in 1891. 
The BSA Co. took direct control of European primary educa- 
tion in 1908 and, since that time, considerable resources 
were spent on its development. In 1921, for example, 
the BSA Co. expenditure on 80 European schools with 5,408 
pupils was E187,831 or E34.15s. per head compared to less 
than E10,000 spent on 750 African schools with an enrol- 
2 
ment of 43,094 (This amounted to less than five 
shillings per head. ) In 1931, primary education was made 
free and compulsory for all white children up to the age 
3 
of 12 
At the secondary education level, which became commonplace 
for Europeans since its establishment by the Society of 
Jesus in 1903 (at which time the debate was 
1. Atkinson, op. cit., p. 57 
Mlambo, 22. cit., p. 74. 
3. L. H. Gann & M. Gelfand: Huggins of Rhodesia 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1964), p. 137. 
(George 
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still continuing as to whether or not Africans should 
receive a literary education), a number of scholarships 
were made available 
1 to enable children from low income 
families to attend school. Moreover, the structure of 
European primary and secondary education was designed to 
cater for children of different backgrounds, talents and 
abilities in both academic and non-academic spheres2. 
Missionaries did not object to the government spending so 
much money on European education but they (and in 
particular the Methodists) objected to the injustice of 
the government in reducing aid to the already under- 
financed African education even though Africans paid as 
much tax as European§. 
The bitterness felt by the Methodists (and indeed by 
the other missionaries) over the cuts in government 
grants to African education was strongly expressed in 1932 
by the Reverend Herbert Carter, current Chairman of the 
Methodist Synod and a leading official of the SRMC, in his 
letter to the Overseas Methodist Board in London: 
1. 
We are beginning to battle with government cuts 
old and new in the Native Develooment vote and 
shall probably be asking your assistance and 
that of the Methodist Lords and Commons to put a 
Lord Hailey: An African Survey -A Study of Problems 
arising in Africa South of the Sahara (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1945), p. 1224. 
2. For a discussion of the structure and development of 
European education during this period, see Atkinson, 




bit of pressure on at home. The rank injustice 
of cutting these grants when the natives are 
paying up their local taxes like Britons is too 
much to pass over and, if these local Politicians 
of ours, in mean minded deference to local public 
opinion, are going to penalise natives and their 
development in this way, they will have to learn 
that there is another public opinion overseas. 
Missionaries are being docked another three 
thousand fpoundsl this year which brings the 
cuts to 25% of the grants authorised by 
Government Notice 676 of 1926.1 
Though the large reduction in government grants 
imposed a heavy financial burden on missionaries, it had 
two main advantages. Firstly, by becoming less dependent 
on state aid and more on their own resources to maintain 
and develop African education, missionaries became more 
independent of government control in their educational 
affairs. They no longer feared financial reprisals if 
they ref used to co-operate with the government in 
implementing directives they disagreed with or had not 
been adequately consulted on. A good example of this was 
the way in which the missionaries made a very negative 
response to the 1932 government directive making it 
compulsory for all mission African schools of every type 
to provide industrial education 
2. The Anglican Education Ccmmittee 
declined to implement the directive until it had been 
C/S/R/B, H. Carter to F. Noble, 7th April 1932, WMMS 
Archives 834. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Development for the 
Year 1932, p. 6. 
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1 
debated and approved by the SPIAC The Methodists 
thought the directive irrelevant, since most mission 
schools were already providing industrial education as 
2 
part of the curricula In fact, the government lost 
much of the influence and control it had exercised over 
mission education while at the same time contributing a 
larger proportion of educational expenditure. Missionar- 
ies became relatively free to plan their educational 
programmes with little reference to the government. 
Secondly, the poor financial position of missionaries, 
due to the cuts, brought more aid from their overseas 
headauarters and other foreign and local organisations 
than prior to these government cuts. As a result, most 
missionaries were able to continue with their educational 
work, albeit with some difficulty. In the case of the 
Methodists and the Anglicans, they received enough aid 
from their headquarters to enable them to continue with 
educational development programmes more or less 
independently of the government. 
Between 1930 and 1933, the Methodists received from 
their London office some E10,000 towards the cost of 
3 developing two of their main schools E4,000 was 
SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1932, Bishop E. Paget to Rev. 
Gibson, 11th October 1932, SPG Archives. 
2. C/S/R/Bj H. Carter to F. Noble, 10th November 1932, 
WMMS Archives, Box 834. 
3. S/M/R /B 1923-33 District Synod Minutes for 1933, 
IVWIS Archives, Box 1923-33. 
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allocated for the development of upper primary education 
at Tegwani mission. The school was, as a result, able to 
provide more and better boarding facilities for pupils 
and enabled girls to be admitted to the school as boarders, 
1 
for the first time, in 1933 Anotheý E2,000 was 
allocated for the improvement of teacher training facili- 
ties, while the remaining E4,000 was assigned to 
Woddilove mission for the same purpose as that of Tegwani 
2. 
By 1933,, both these schools were amongst the most 
developed in the country, with a much higher enrolment 
3 than most schools The impact of government cuts, 
however, limited the range of educational expansion. 
The Anglicans received from the SPG Marriott Bequest 
Scheme nearly E14,000 for the development of primary and 
teacher training education at St. Augustinels, Penhalonga 
mission,, St. Patrick's, Gwelo, St. David's Bonda Girls' 
4 Mission and Faith's Rusape mission By 1934, when the 
SRMC met at Great Zimbabwe to review the current situation 
in African primary education, the Anglicans had four 
boarding schools providing a full eight year primary 
education 
5_ the second largest in number to the Roman 
S/M/R/B 1923-33 District Synod Minutes for 2933, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33. 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
4. SPG. S/R/D. Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 






Thus, the government's policy, instead of seriously 
undermining the development of African primary 
academic education as was intended, encouraged the 
contrary to take place. This was borne out by the fact 
that,, by 1933, the number of mission central and day 
schools providing Africans with a complete primary educa- 
tion throughout the country had risen to 35 
2 from 28 in 
1927 
3. 
The number of government aided African primary 
schools owned by the ten missionary churches and engaged 
in African education stood at over 1,432 and pupil enrol- 
ment at 107,122, compared to 750 schools in 1920 and 
4 43,094 pupils Having secured this tremendous progress 
despite very limited government support, missionaries felt 
sufficiently encouraged to go beyond the primary school 
level into secondary education. As will be seen in 
Chapter 2, the 1934 Meeting olf the SRMC marked the 
transition from primary to secondary education. 
There was a significant change in Catholic policy in the 
late 1920-30s when interdenominational competition for 
pupils persuaded them to provide academic primary 
education in order to attract more Africans to 
Catholicism. See Linden, pE. cit., pp. 29-34 and 
Fr. J. 0. Hea (SJ) Missionary Letters 1929-37, File SF/1. 
Society of Jesus Archives. 
2. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 
1935, p. 17. 
3. Rei3ort of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 
1927, p. 17. 
4. Franck, cit., p. 118. 
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In the present chapter an examination has been made 
of the evolutionary process of church/state policies on 
African education, academic and industrial. The factors 
determining these policies and the reasons which accounted 
for the differences in their objectives and programmes 
have been discussed and, from this discussion, it is 
evident that the problems which confronted the development 
of African education were largely due to the failure of 
the church and state to agree on the aims of African 
education. This prevented the evolution of a unified 
church and state policy and development strategy, both of 
which were necessary for the long term planning of 
African educational development. From the evidence 
in this chapter, it is clear that the Anglicans 
and the Methodists regarded the aims of African education 
as the socio-economic and intellectual development of 
African society. This, in their view, did not undermine, 
but rather enhanced, colonial rule and Christianity. 
Colonial governments, on the contrary, regarded the 
development of African literary education as a serious 
threat to European political, economic and social domina- 
tion. They viewed African advancement as a challenge to 
the white monopoly of political and economic power and 
this was evidenced by the insistence of successive 
governments on African education developing on vocational 
lines and in a different system from that of European 
education. The fear of African competition in all spheres 
90. 
of life prompted successive governments to pursue a 
policy designed to undermine the development of African 
1 
academic primary education This policy of protecting 
white colonial interests was , as will be shown in the 
next chapter, the major determinant of government policy 
on African secondary education and had considerable 
influence and impact on the development of missionary 
policies in that field. 




FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY 
POLICIES ON AFRICAN SECONDARY EDUCATION 
1934-1952 
Chapter 1 discussed the evolution of government and 
missionary policies on African academic primary and 
industrial education during the early years of Southern 
Rhodesian colonial history and the nature of educational 
programmes that evolved. This chapter discusses the 
evolution of church and state policies on African 
secondary education and their implications for its 
development during the period 1934 and 1952. 
Part 1 (1934-1938) looks at the transition from 
African primary to secondary education and the search for 
a policy and development strategy by missionaries and the 
government. Firstly, the ideological basis of the policy 
of Huggins' government on African education in the context 
of Southern Rhodesian colonial politics will be discussed 
and, secondly, following the framework of analysis 
developed in Chapter 1, the central issues which consti- 
tuted the debate for and against the introduction of African 
secondary education will be examined. 
Part 11 (1939-1945) discusses the introduction of 
secondary education and the policies on which it was 
founded. The objective is to identify the factors which 
I 
accounted for church and state co-operation in the 
92. 
development of secondary education during the war period. 
Also considered are the scope and limits for policy 
reform and educational innovation in a conservative 
colonial society. 
Part 111 (1946-1952) analyses developments in 
secondary educational policies during the post second 
world war period, as well as the attempts by the govern- 
ment to control policy and the resulting conflict between 
state and church policies. An assessment is made of the 
impact of that conflict on the development of secondary 
education and, in a concluding note, the overall policy 
situation by 1952 is examined. 
PART 
TRANSITION FROM AFRICAN PRIMARY TO SECONDARY 
EDUCATION AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY AND 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY BY MISSIONARIES AND 
THE GOVERNMENT 1934-1938 
The ideological basis of the educational policy of 
Hugginsl_government 
When the SPIIC met at Great Zimbabwe for its 1934 
conference, on its agenda were two important issues. One 
related to the need to improve church/state relations in 
the field of African education. This became particularly 
important during the period following the election to power 
in 1933 of an extreme conservative Reform Party government 
dop, 
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led by Godfrey Huggins. Huggins had already established 
his reputation in Rhodesian politics as an avowed racist 
and he became the leading proponent of the policy of 
separate racial development. 
There were genuine fears amongst even the more 
conservative missionary elements within the SRMC that 
Huggins' racial politics might impose even more severe 
constraints on missionary educational work than already 
existed. Almost all missionary churches were therefore 
anxious to be on good terms with Huggins' administration. 
Their primary objective was to seek the mutual co-operation 
of the government in developing African education. 
The second issue related to a proposal made by the 
Anglicans urging the churches and the government to 
provide facilities for secondary education for the 
significant number of African pupils reaching upper 
primary education and seeking opportunities for further 
academic education. This proposal, as will be shown 
shortly, aroused considerable debate between the SRMC and 
the government. 
Huggins came to power at a time of worldwide economic 
recession. The Southern 'Rhodesian economy was going 
through a difficult period with prices for farm products 
at their lowest level. European unemployment reached a 
record level in 1934 and whites, as a result, became more 
apprehensive of African competition than ever before. 
94. 
There were growing demands from the European population 
that the government should take effective steps to 
protect white interests against increasing African 
competition on the labour market. This competition came 
from two sources. Firstly, from the growing number of 
Africans acquiring a complete eight year primary school 
education in mission schools and then finding few avenues 
open to them for post-primary courses. Records show that, 
in 1931, the number of Africans completing upper primary 
education in mission schools stood at 1,012 
1 
and, by 
1932, the number reached 1,285 
2 
and rose to 1,309 in 
3 
1934 With the exception of a few who were accepted 
for teacher-training courses (numbers being restricted 
because of limited training facilities), most primary 
school graduates went to urban and industrial areas in 
search of blue and white collar jobs. 
Secondly, the growing number of Africans returning 
from South African schools with primary and secondary 
education qualifications afforded competition to Europeans. 
Others came back with skills in trades which, in Rhodesia, 
were a white monopoly. In addition, there were those who 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 
1932, p. 17. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 
1933, p. 17. 
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 
1935r p. 16. 
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acquired their qualifications through correspondence 
courses with private South African colleges. Although 
no figures are available to determine how many of these 
graduates there were in this period, there are constant 
references in Methodist archival sources to the growing 
European concern for the number of Africans qualifying 
from South Africa and coming on to the labour market 
10 
This concern was also apparent in the way European trade 
unions set about barring Africans from undertaking employ- 
2 
ment in the European job sectors In 1934, Stanlake 
Sam kange and, shortly afterwards, G. D. Mhlanga, both 
Rhodesian Africans, surprised whites by returning from 
South Africa with B. A. qualifications. Their educational 
attainment increased the European sense of insecurity 
because it demonstrated the extent of African ambitions, 
aspirations and caDabilities. 
There grew, therefore, demands from the white 
population for more government control of African 
education and the rate of African political, economic and 
social advancement, with a view to preventing the Africans 
from encroaching on the European position. These demands 
were expressed strongly by Huggins himself in a speech he 
delivered to parliament in 1934: 
1. C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 14th March 1933, 
WMMS Archives, Box 834. 
2. See D. J. Murray, pp. cit., pp. 215-220. 
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The European in this country can be likened to 
an island of white in a sea of black with the 
artisan and tradesman forming the shores and the 
professional classes the highlands in the centre. 
Is the native to be allowed to erode away the 
shores and gradually attack the highlands? To 
do so would mean that the leaven of civilisation 
would be removed in this country. The higher 
standard of life cannot be allowed to succumb. 1 
Huggins came to the office of premiership fully 
determined to foster white dominance and suppress all 
African attempts to encroach on white privileges. His 
first step towards achieving that objective was to swiftly 
outlaw inter-racial competition in every sphere of life 
through a policy of parallel racial development which he 
incorporated into his party's political ideology. This 
policy was based on the principle that the social, 
economic and political development of Africans must follow 
lines different from those of the white race. In Huggins' 
own words, the policy visualised the two races: 
living side by side yet apart, each working in 
his own area, not in competition with each 
other but complementary to it as in partnership. 2 
As part of the policy of containing African competition, 
a series of Acts were passed. In the economic sphere, the 
Maize Control Act of 1934 imposed severe restrictions on 
African maize production and access of African maize to the 
1. Gray, pp. cit., p. 154. 
2. Native Policy of 'The United Party of Southern Rhodesia' 




open market in order to protect European fa=.. ers Also, 
in resiDonse to European trade union demands for better 
protection of European jobs, Huggins passed the 1934 
Industrial Conciliation Act. This Act denied to all 
Africans many rights whatever their qualifications, legal 
labour rights (such as the right of access to skilled 
and professional employment, protection against unfair 
dismissal and denial of pension) and also increased the 
likelihood of those Africans already in employment in 
those areas designated as European losing their jobs without 
2 
recourse to the law The objective was to further 
entrench professional and skilled job sectors as European 
preserves. In addition, the 1934 Civil Service Act barred 
all Africans from entering key civil service jobs: they 
could only be employed as clerks or departmental messengers 
3. 
Most significantly, no African trade union organisations 
were permitted to operate. 
In the social sphere, the 1936 Native Registration 
Act further restricted African movement into white areas, 
areas which encompassed all urban and industrial centres4. 
The Pass Laws were more vigorously enforced under this 
Act with the objective of preventing Africans other than 
1. D. J. Murray, op. pit., p. 23. 
2. Ibid., pp-219-220. 
3. For a discussion of the structure and composition of 
the Civil Service, see Ibid., pp. 39-57. 
Ibid., pp. 238-239. 
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those reauired for unskilled labour or for snecific semi- 
skilled or skilled jobs from leaving their native 
reserves. Such a measure became necessary because of 
the practice of some Europeans who privately employed 
trained or skilled African at lower pay rates than they 
would have had to pay European workers doing the same 
job and having the same qualifications. The government 
moved swiftly to stamp out this practice by requiring all 
Africans visiting European areas to secure a special pass 
which allowed them to remain in such areas for a specified 
period (approximately 21 days), after which they had to 
return to their native reserve or face arrest and prosecu- 
tion for trespassing. 
Above all, the land segregation policy itself 
ensured that Africans remained in their designated areas. 
Those employed in European areas could not, by law, 
become permanent residents of those areas but were 
required to return to their native reserves when their 
services were no longer required by the employersi. 
Political measures were also taken to control the 
growth of the African electorate which, in 1933, stood at 
only 58 out of a total electorate of 28,5732. The 1937 
constitutional amendments made it even more difficult 
for Africans to acquire the franchise. Property qualif- 
ications, were altered in such a way that all African 
1. MacGregorj, op. cit., Ch. 2. 
2. Barber, ou. cit., p-8- 
-ddlMk 
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housing property on European land was discounted in 
computing the value of a person's propertyl. This was 
intended to orevent black urban workers and small 
businessmen from obtaining franchise. 
All these measures reflected the racial position or 
orientation of Huggins' government which formed the basis of 
its policy on African education. The government racist 
policies, by fostering and protecting white interests and 
supremacy, determined state policy on African secondary 
education as much as they influenced the policies of 
previous governments on African academic primary and 
vocational training. Huggins regarded the government's 
ability to control African education as essential to the 
preservation of white security. In his opinion, two 
safeguards were of paramount importance. Firstly, the 
government should be able to control or influence 
missionary educational policies in order to determine the 
structure and development of African education with the 
objective of ensuring that missionary aims in this respect 
were not in conflict with those of the government. 
Secondly, Europeans should receive the best education the 
state could provide in terms of equality and extent of 
opportunity because this would assist in legitimising 
1. Palley, pE. cit., pp. 286-300. 
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European control of the political institutions and 
machinery of governmentr as well as the professions and 
skilled services. Many Europeans were convinced of the 
effectiveness of the various forms of legislation that 
have just been discussed in protecting their dominant 
position in the colonial system but were aware that much 
depended on their children receiving a better education 
than that provided for Africans and on those differences 
in education being maintained. As mentioned previously, 
a similar view was adopted by Huggins himself and he 
reiterated this to parliament in 1937: 
*e** I will go a little further and say that it is only by allowing our race the very best 
education and bringing out the latent talents 
there maybe that we will enable our race to 
survive in Africa. I will go even further and 
admit that, although our youth may be able to 
play Rugby football and would protect their skin 
with differential legislation, they will not be 
able to preserve their white brain and if they 
are to survive it will be by nothing but by 
superior education. 1 
The attitude thus portrayed by Huggins was a significant 
pointer towards future government policy on African 
education and epitomised the rationale behind the 
government's approach to matters of African education. 
Quoted in C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 27th 
October 1937, WMMS Archives, Box 835. 
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Negotiations between the SRMC and the DNE for the intro- 
duction of African secondary education and the search for 
Po 
Signs of African aspirations to secondary education 
began to surface in the 19. 20s with isolated cases of 
pupils making their way privately to South African schools 
and others undertaking correspondence courses with South 
African colleges. The decision by the SRMC, at its 1934 
Conference, to urge the government to co-operate with 
missionaries in providing secondary education facilities 
for Africans locally was a recognition of the demand 
1 
which had become apparent For a growing proportion of 
African youth, the attainment of 'higher' academic quali- 
fications was seen as the only hope of escape from the 
rigours of manual work which awaited them in the mines 
and on white farms. It was regarded as the gateway to 
the much sought after white collar jobs and professions. 
Their faith in education was all the more reinforced by 
the success of their European counterparts (who had a 
better education) in securing better jobs. 
In historical terms, the 1934 Missionary Conference 
marked the beginning of the transition from African 
primary to secondary education. The churches decided 
that an initiative should be taken, with government 
Proceedings of the SRMC held at Great Zimbabwe, 21st 
- 25th June 19*34,, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfrical, mic/fi 
99, Box 1221-1224. 
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assistance, to proceed beyond the primary school level 
and provide the opportunities for further education sought 
by African pupils. No definite plans were laid down at 
that Conference but the Anglicans proposed that consulta- 
tions with the DNE concerning the issue should be sought 
as a matter of urgency. 
There were a number of reasons why the churches 
began to advocate the introduction of African secondary 
education at this time and not earlier. Firstly, the 
increase in upper primary school facilities, especially 
between 1927 and 1933 (as was discussed earlier), 
enabled more pupils to acquire a full primary education 
than in the past. As a result, the demand for post- 
primary academic education also increased to a point where 
it became necessary for missionaries to respond. There 
were fears amongst the churches that, unless provision was 
made for those seeking access to secondary education 
locally, a growing number of pupils would leave mission 
schools for South African schools with little guarantee 
that they would return to serve the church, or even 
remain as church members. 
Secondly, with primary education undergoing rapid 
development, the need for teachers with a more sound 
educational background became more pressing. The quali- 
fications of most African teachers in mission schools and 
their standard of teaching was so low that it militated 
against the achievement of the kind of expansion that was 
-. ddb 
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needed, particularly at the upper primary school level, 
to cone with African demand for 'higher' education. Very 
few teachers were capable of teaching efficiently in 
upper primary classes. In 1931, for example, of the 
1,965 African teachers in service, 660 had received an 
education below Standard 111,440 had attained Standard 
111,, 392 - Standard IV, 164 - Standard V and 194 - Standard 
Vi. Only 103 had qualifications beyond VI and these had 
been acquired in South Africa 1. Only these 103 teachers 
were qualified sufficiently to teach in upper primary 
classes and the existing lower teacher training course 
(PTL) only provided training for lower primary school 
teachers (i. e. sub standard A to III). The need to 
produce better educated teachers locally was, therefore, 
considered imDortant and the missionaries believed that 
secondary education would produce such teachers. A 
higher teacher training course (PTH), designed to train 
upper primary school teachers, was already under active 
consideration by the SRMC and the DNE and candidates with 
at least a two year secondary education were required for 
such training. 
Thirdly, most churches felt that the secondary course 
would also provide better candidates for the ministry to 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 
1932, p. 17. 
. 40, 
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cope with increasing Christian work, especially in the fast 
expanding urban and industrial areas 
1. Lastly, such 
education, it was felt by the missionaries, would provide 
sckool' 
with better long term prospects for employment. 
Because of the financial constraints confronting 
most churches as a result of the cuts in government grants 
to mission schools, the SRMC conceded that, by themselves, 
missionaries would be unable to finance successfully a 
secondary educational programme 
2. 
The plan agreed at the 
1934 Conference was that the government, which was least 
involved in primary education, should be urged to 
3 
establish one secondary school The role of the 
churches would be to co-operate in providing boarding 
facilities and in ensuring that the school was run on 
Christian lines. The Wesleyan Methodists, in particular, 
wanted the government to finance this programme because, 
as Carter argued, Africans paid taxes to the government 
and not to churches and had a right to receive their share 
of social welfare benefits in return 
4. Although the 
H. Carter to Secretary of the IMC, 28th May 1935, 
IMC/CBMS/C, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africal, mic/fi 99, 
Box 1221-1224. 
2. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Great Zimbabwe 21st ý 
ci 99, 25th June 1934, IMC/CBMS Archives JAfrical, mic/z 
Box 1221-1224. 
3. Ibid. 
4. C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to Overseas Methodist Secretar%',, 
12th March 1935, ; OIMS Archives, Box 1932-36. 
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Anglicans agreed that the government should be made to 
accept its share of the responsibility for African educa- 
tion, they argued that, if the gover=ent refused to 
initiate the establishment of African secondary education, 
the churches should do so in the interests of the students. 
The government was in no position to undertake such a 
programme. To begin with, it was not prepared to invest 
money in 'higher' education for Africans. Moreover, it 
was inconceivable that parliament, at this time of economic 
recession, would approve expenditure on such a scheme when 
it was not even prepared to meet the demands of primary 
education. Huggins himself, critical as he was of the 
socio-economic and political implications of providing 
Africans with 'high' academic education, was not, to say 
the least, enthusiastic about the government financing 
the establishment of African secondary education. 
Secondly, from the government's point of view, there 
were no employment prospects for African secondary school 
graduates in their own native reserves. There were very 
few industries requiring educated African manpower and, so 
long as the native reserves would not provide jobs 
commensurate with such a high level of education, there was 
a danger of African school graduates filtering into the 
106. 
Eurolpean job sectors. But, even assuming that some 
government departments or industrial sectors did agree to 
employ African high school leavers, the question remained 
as to how many of these could be employed without 
jeopardising the employment opportunities of their European 
counterparts 
1. Investigations made by the Methodist 
Education Committee in 1935 to assess the employment 
prospects, in different industries, of Africans with high 
school education revealed that only two industries - 
postal services and printing - were willing to accommodate 
a few Africans with secondary education qualifications. 
Even here there was a problem as those Africans who were 
accepted for employment would have to undergo a period of 
apprenticeship. No apprenticeship facilities were avail- 
to Africans and, therefore, none of the high school 
graduates could in fact take up employment in either of 
these two industrie s2. Over and above these obstacles, 
no white trade unions were prepared to allow Africans to 
be employed in the skilled job sectors which were a 
European monopoly 
3. For these reasons government 
officials took oains to dissuade the aovernment from 
approving the introduction of an education they believed 
1. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department, No. 16, 
1939, p. 102. 
2. S/M/S/R/B 1934-1939, District Synod Minutes -Al: or 1936, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1934-39. 
3. D. J. Murrav,, op. cit., p 




Thirdly, it was the opinion of most native and 
district commissioners that secondary education was 
unrelated to the African rural situation and African needs 
for develooment and would therefore have very little 
constructive role to play in the general scheme of rural 
uplift 
1. According to one native commissioner, there 
were no indications, either, that secondary education 
would make Africans more responsible or capable of apply- 
ing what they learned to solving the day to day problems 
of African society: 
The most that may be said of the educated 
native in this direction is his ability to 
propound confused ideas of western culture 
without any attempt to apply the underlying 
principles to the present development of the 
people. Nor is he apparently capable of 
indicating how the welfare of his kinsfolk 
can best be served, except by repeating 
'shilboleths' of educational needs as if 
literary instruction without ethical convic- 
tions should be a universal panacea for the 
careless masses. 2 
What most Europeans, including government officials, 
did not appreciate was the fact that African faith in educa- 
tion as the panacea for their problems was largely 
generated by the importance Europeans themselves attached 
to education as the prerequisite for entry to the 
professions and skilled services. Moreover, the fact 
fouthern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department, No. 16, 
1939, p. 16. 
2. Rhodesia Herald, 12th October 1934. 
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that whites gave considerable importance to the education 
of their own children made Africans regard education as 
the source of white power and wealth. As a result, they 
too wanted their children to acquire education. 
C. L. Curbutt, Huggins' racist Chief Native 
Commissioner, and a man who exercised much influence on 
the government on matters pertaining to African affairs, 
strongly opposed the suggested African secondary education 
scheme. His objections stemmed largely from an adminis- 
trative viewpoint. He felt that the presence in rural 
areas of unemployed youths with such an education would 
undermine "peace and social order and even encourage 
political activity amongst the rural massesill. He also 
felt that their presence in urban and other industrial 
areas would have a bad influence on the uneducated workers 
and encourage labour unrest2. 
A continuing trend in white political thinking which 
was an important factor in determining European attitudes 
towards African education can be discerned here. For 
instance, little consideration was given to African 
interests and their needs for advancement. The policy 
was to give paramount importance to white colonial 
interests. Another attitude deriving from such a policy 
was that Eurooean development was dependent upon the 
1. Rhodesia Herald, 14th November 1936. 
2. Ibid. Also see C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 
27th October 1937, WMMS Archives, Box 835. 
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suppression of African development and the maintenance of 
African society as a pool of cheap, unskilled, uneducated 
labour with no aspirations to rising above such a position. 
Any attempts by Africans to improve their political, 
economic and social position were regarded as a threat to 
white supremacy. 
The secondary education scheme, however, received a 
more positive response from the DNE than it did from 
Huggins or the DNA. This was because of the influence 
of its new director, D. J. Stark, who succeeded Jowitt in 
1935 following his resignation. A progressive director, 
compared to his two predecessors, Stark regarded the policy 
of suppressing African advancement and the development of 
African education as politically counter-productive. In 
his opinion, the only way the government could prevent 
simmering African frustration and discontent with the 
colonial system from assuming a virulent political form, 
was to co-operate with the churches and assist them in 
providing more educational opportunities for Africans. 
He also felt that government participation in secondary 
1 education would enable it to influence its development 
Moreover, he believed that European security depended on 
the government's willingness to improve African life and 
to convince them that there was a future for black people 
C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 3rd June 1936, 
WMMS Archives, Box 835. 
110. 
under white rule. He therefore urged the government to 
approve the establishment of African secondary education 
1 
and provide assistance to the churches 
Between 1935 and 1937, a series of consultations took 
place between the SRMC Executive and the DNE in an attempt 
to secure government approval for the initiation of 
African secondary education 
2. The government agreed in 
1937 that the matter should be more extensively discussed 
by missionaries and the DNE at the joint conference on 
African education scheduled for 1938. Throughout the 
period of consultations between the SP24C and the DNE, the 
Anglicans indicated strongly their intention to undertake 
secondary education by themselves if the government gave 
approval 
3. An element of inter-denominational competi- 
tion was already becoming apparent. 
The 1938 joint conference on African education 
The conference was convened by the DNE for the purposes 
of examining, with the churches, the current situation in 
African education. One of the objectives was to establish 
closer co-operation between the department and missionaries 
1. C/S/R/B., Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 3rd June 1936, 
WMMS Archives, Box 835. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C. D. 1936, Bishop E. Paget to Rev. 
Gibson, 11th March 1936. 
3. Ibid. 
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in the overall development of African education. In 
historical perspective, the conference had significant 
implications for the future of African education. 
DNE representatives came to the conference more 
willingly than in the past, to listen to and consider the 
problems confronted by the churches in the educational 
field. There were also indications from the DNE Director 
that his department was willing to co-operate with the 
missionaries in developing a common strategy by which to 
resolve some of the more pressing problems in primary and 
teacher training education 
1. 
But a more significant change in the DNE's attitude 
to African academic education was demonstrated by the 
readiness with which the DNE approved in principle the 
proposal of the SRMC for the immediate establishment of 
African secondary education. Instrumental in persuading 
the department to support the secondary education scheme 
were two influential officials of the SRMC - the Anglican 
2 Bishop Paget and the Methodist educationistr Rev. H. Carter 
Two points advanced by the SRMC representatives seem to 
have impressed the department so much as to secure its 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and the 
Secretary for Native Affairs for the Year 1938, p. 16. 
2. C/S/R/Bj H. Carter to F. Noble, 17th December 1938, 
WMMS Archives, Box 835. 
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support. One related to the difficulties faced by 
Southern Rhodesian Africans who wanted to obtain secondary 
education. At this time they either went to South African 
schools or undertook correspondence courses and, in both 
cases, the expenses were considerably high. The second 
was the responsibility of the department to care for African 
educational needs and to ensure that such opportunities as 
could be made available were provided 
1. The SRMC also 
indicated its willingness to co-operate with the department 
in establishing secondary education locally for Africans. 
In a statement issued jointly by the SRMC and the DNE, the 
extent of the latter's change of attitude towards African 
academic education and its support for the cause of African 
secondary education was clearly spelt out: 
It has been the concern of this Department as 
well as that of missionaries that there is at 
present no centre within the territory to which 
native students can go for a Junior secondary 
course .... It cannot be regarded as satisfac- 
tory that Southern Rhodesian natives should be 
forced to go to schools in the Union for a 
Junior secondary course. Still less satis- 
factory is it for Southern Rhodesian natives to 
attempt, as increasing numbers are doing, to 
take the Junior secondary course through 
correspondence schools in the Union of South 
Africa. The only solution to the problem 
therefore is to start a Junior secondary school 
course within the country. 2 
SPG S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia 
to Rev. Gibson, 12th November 1938, SPG Archives. 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and the 




The department's support for the establishment of 
African secondary education was, however, constrained by 
financial limitations. It could only provide mission- 
aries with such assistance as was sanctioned by parliament 
in the African development budget vote and given to it by 
the government. This means, in fact, that the department 
could do very little to assist missionaries in the initi- 
ation of African secondary education until such time as 
the government decided to provide more funds for that 
purpose. Although the government was persuaded by both 
the DNE and the SRMC to permit the establishment of African 
secondary education, it declined emphatically to provide 
any funds. As far as it was concerned, the churches could 
go ahead with the scheme if they could pay for it. No 
state aid towards capitation costs or teachers' salaries 
would be forthcoming. Moreover, the churches would have 
to recruit teachers by themselves and at their own expense 
1. 
In the circumstances, the DNE proposed to the SRMC 
that the best strategy for the development of the secondary 
education scheme would be for all missionaries, Protestant 
and Catholic, to pool their resources and to set up one inter- 
denominational school which would cater for students from all 
2 
mission schools This arrangement, in the opinion of the 
S/M/S/R/Bl 1934-39 District Synod Minutes for 1938, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1934-39. 
Ibid. 
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DNE, would make it easier for the churches to raise the 
necessary funds for the scheme. However, inter- 
denominational rivalry and clash of interests made such a 
plan difficult to implement. To begin with, missionaries 
could not agree amongst themselves on the character such 
a school should adopt. Moreover, no church was genuinely 
interested in spending its resources on the establishment 
of a school which would not serve its specific denomina- 
tional interests 
1. Each church was anxious to retain its 
pupils within its own sphere of influence and to ensure 
that they were educated under its observation. The SRMC 
had considerable difficulty in bringing the Roman 
Catholics and Protestants to agree to discuss the issue. 
The Catholics would not, as a matter of policy, agree to 
let their pupils attend a non-Catholic school, and would not 
2 
take part in such a scheme For their part, the 
Anglicans and the Wesleyan Methodists would also not 
accept an arrangement by which they had to work closely 
with the Catholics, neither did they regard it as accept- 
able that their pupils should be in daily contact with 
Catholic pupils 
3. 
The SRMC Executive tried unsuccessfully to make the 
two sides agree to co-operate. The Anglicans threatened 
to resign from the SRMC if they were forced to work with 
1. S/M/S/R/Bl 1934-39 District Synod Minutes for 1938, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1934-39. 
2. D. J. Murray, op. cit., p. 297. 
3. See SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bisholo of Southern 
Rhodesia to Mr. France I 13th September 1938, SPG Archives 
and S/M/S/R/Bl 1934-38 District Synod Minutes for 1938, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1934-38. 
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the Catholics 1, whilst the Catholics withdrew their 
membership of the conference altogether rather than agree 
to co-operate with the Protestants 
2. Given this 
situationr the joint plan failed to materialise and the 
SRMC decided that the establishment of secondary education 
should be left to the initiative of individual churches 
as was the case in primary education. 
By failing to maintain unity at this crucial time, 
missionaries placed themselves in a position of weakness 
with the government. Once divided, no one church alone 
could put enough pressure on the government to provide 
financial aid to African secondary education. Without 
adequate financial aid, it would be difficult for the 
churches to develop secondary education individually. 
Also, the lack of an agreed policy and strategy for its 
development could lead to similar policy clashes and 
conflicts between church and state as existed in primary 
education. 
Following the failure of the churches to reach an 
agreement over the joint plan, the Anglicans decided to 
make a lone venture into the field of secondary education. 
As will be seen in the next section, this initiative 
marked the foundations of Af'rican secondary education. 





FOUNDATIONS OF AFRICAN SECONDARY EDUCATION 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLICIES 1939-1945 
The Anglican initiative 
The decision of the Anglican diocese in 1938 to under- 
take secondary education without government aid was 
strongly criticised by the Wesleyan Methodists who were 
urging the postponement of this scheme in the hope that the 
government could still be persuaded to provide capitation 
1 
grants The Methodists felt that, once missionaries 
entered this expensive field without state aid, the govern- 
ment could argue that the churches were capable of 
developing African secondary education without its 
assistance 
2. 
The Anglicans, however, were disinclined to wait and 
were anxious to gain recognition as the founders of 
African secondary education. More importantly, the 
exodus of African pupils from the church to South Africa 
in search of. secondary education had become a distinct 
phenomenon which worried the Anglicans as well as the other 
churches. To retain their best pupils in the church, 
the Anglicans recognised the need for secondary education 
to be urgently provided locally. After a meeting of the 
Anglican Diocese Education Committee in 1938, the Bishop 
S/M/S/R/B 1934-39, District Synod Minutes for 1938, 




of the diocese, Edward Paget, wrote to the SPG Board in 
London expressing the reasons for the church's decision to 
start a Junior secondary course: 
The matter has been discussed by us and it is 
quite clear to us that secondary education for 
our people must be established at one of our 
mission centres. It is from these people that 
we shall be drawing our pastors, teachers, 
catechists and our ordination candidates, and 
secondary education must be given in a church 
atmosphere and with a definite church teaching. 
If we are not to establish secondary education, 
we are then likely to lose some of our best 
people,, through their desire for educational 
advancement .... and this would be disastrous both in our education and in our pastoral work 
in the future. 1 
In the Bishop's opinionr the dangers of letting the 
growing number of pupils leave for South Africa was that 
they became exposed to "a wholly alien environment" where 
they got 
false ideas about money and the like and were in 
danger of not returning and, if they did return, 
would be unsuited for the work we could offer 
them and discontented with the wages we could 
offer. 2 
The objective of writing to the SPG Board was to seek aid 
for the Junior secondary course scheme. 
Initially, the SPG Board was critical of the 
diocese's initiative on the grounds that it was ill planned 
and too expensive a project to be undertaken without 
SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. France, 
4th April 1938, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop E. Paget to Rev. 
Gibson, 17th July 1938, SPG Archives. 
I& 
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government assistance. Moreover, the Board was not in a 
position to provide adequate funds for this purpose 
because its resources were already committed to the 
running of primary schools in Southern Rhodesia and 
elsewhere in British Africa, particularly West Africa 
where the Anglicans had a large educational network. 
The problems involved in raising adequate funds for 
the project became apparent to the Anglicans. Although 
St. Augustine's. Penhalonga, the mission selected for the 
course was well developed for primary education, consider- 
able resources were required to provide the necessary 
facilities for secondary education. Estimates made by 
the synod education committee revealed that a capital sum 
of E4,000 was needed to provide classroom and boarding 
accommodation, together with other facilities, for an 
estimated Form I class of only 20 students 
1. 
To overcome the financial problem, the committee 
decided to negotiate a joint undertaking of the course 
A tv. 411 
with one British missionary society, the 
Community of the Resurrection (CR). The CR came to 
Southern Rhodesia in the early 1920s as a charity 
missionary organisation and was engaged in medical and 
Christian work mainly in the Eastern province of 
SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia 
to SPG Overseas Secretary, 22nd June 1938, SIPG 
Archives. 
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Manicaland. Though not previously engaged in educational 
work,, they were enthusiastic about participating with the 
Anglicans in the development of secondary education. 
Their strong financial position made them an ideal partner 
for the Anglicans 1, whose resources were diminished by 
their wide primary educational network. In an agreement 
reached between them in 1938, the CR offered to provide 
substantial financial and manpower assistance towards the 
scheme, provided the Anglicans were able to raise E500 
towards capital costs and commit themselves to providing 
E250 per year for four years towards the cost of maintain- 
2 ing the school 
fund raising scheme launched by the church raised 
E300 from the Beit Trust 3, and E250 from European Anglican 
church members. The SPG Board made a E200 grant from its 
4 Marriott Bequest fund plus an annual grant of E50 
Although the Board's contribution fell disappointingly 
short of the 21,000 requested by the church, the Bishop 
considered it a significant pointer towards the Board's 
L -, c& 
SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. 
France, 7th April 1938, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Bishop E. Paget to Rev. 
Gibson, 20th April 1938, SPG Archives. 
3. Ibid. 
4. SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Keble Talbot to Bishop of 
Southern Rhodesia, 12th July 1938, SPG Archives. 
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approval of the scheme considering that most Board 
officials were opposed to financing the secondary school 
course because they did not feel that secondary education 
was urgently needed. They preferred that any available 
money should be spent on improving primary education 
facilities and basic literacy programmes for both young 
1 
and old A further direct appeal by the Bishop to the 
Board Committee for aid in August 1938 succeeded in 
securing for the diocese the full support of the Board in 
establishing the Junior secondary course. The Board 
agreed to give the financial assurance sought by the CR 
and thus enabled preparations for the secondary school 
scheme to get under way. 
The CR advanced E2,000 towards capital costs and 
also appointed their most experienced administrator and 
former educationist in England, the Reverend A. Winter, 
to become Principal of the secondary school, in addition 
to being Head of the St. Augustine's primary school. 
The CR also appointed three of their men to the Junior 
secondary teaching staff 
3. 
Once these arrangements were completed, the construc- 
tion of the Junior school classrooms, student and staff 
SPG. S/R/General/C. D. 1938, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia 
to Rev. Gibson, 16th June 1938, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. S/R/General/C. D. 19381 Rt. Rev. E. Paget to Rev. 
Gibson, 10th August 1938, SPG Archives. 
SPG. S/R/General/C, D. 1938, Rev. A. Winter to Mr. France, 
20th November 1938, SPG Archives. 
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accommodation, got under way. By October 1938, the 
school committee had already applied for affiliation of 
the Junior course to the Cambridge school certificate. 
Due to the lack of science teachers and laboratory 
facilities, the committee decided that, for a start, 
the school would select for its curriculum mainly arts 
subjects. These included the English Language, Bible 
1 
Knowledge, Geography, History, Arithmetic and Mathematics 
Although it took two years for the Junior school to 
reach completion, once the administrative arrangements had 
been finalised, the first Form I class was in session in 
2 
early 1939 in provisional accommodation Despite 
pressure on the school committee from many Anglicans that 
the Junior school should be co-educational, the diocesan 
Synod ruled that the school would be only for boys and 
that arrangements would be made in the near future to 
establish a girls' Junior school. As a result, the 
first enrolment of six students was made up of boys only, 
all of whom were Anglican and had given an undertaking to 
Join the ministry or the teaching profession on completion 
3 
of their studies No non Anglicans were considered for 
SPG. S/R/General/C,, D. 1938,, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. 
France, 20th January 1939, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. S/R/D, Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 




admission because, as Bishop Paget explained, the church 
could not cater for students from other churches 
1. 
Though the intake was small, Anglican officials were 
pleased that the course had finally commenced and, in time, 
might become the leading centre of 'higher' education for 
Africans. When the second world war broke out, however, 
it became administratively difficult for the school to 
continue with the Cambridge school certificate courses 
(CSC). The affiliation with Cambridge had to be termin- 
ated and urgent arrangements made for a change of course 
2 to the South African Junior Certificate (SAJC) 
The success of the Anglicans in pioneering African 
secondary education did not abate the criticism of the 
Methodists who were convinced that, by proceeding to 
undertake the course alone, the Anglicans had seriously 
undermined the unity of the SRMC in -fighting for govern- 
ment assistance. Also, the Methodists felt that the 
Anglican's private venture would encourage other churches 
to separately enter into secondary education which the 
Methodists feared would weaken the unity the Protestant 
churches needed to guard against Roman Catholic penetration 
SPG S/R/General/C, D. 1939, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. 
France, 28th January 1939, SPG Archives. 
2. Atkinson, 22. cit., p. 119. 
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into every part of the country. For the Methodists, this 
Protestant unity became even more important after the 
Catholics indicated in 1939 their plans to start their own 
secondary schools in the near future. In his letter to 
the SPG Board, Bishop Paget explained what he considered 
to be the root cause of Methodist criticism of the 
Anglicans: 
There is no doubt that our initiating secondary 
education and our refusal to unite in this 
effort with the non-conformists has stirred up such 
jealousy and let loose their fury and opposition 
the Methodists are angry and fearful that we 
will not join them in opposing the Roman Catholic 
aggression. I feel confident that there is a 
move to divide our people and thus weaken our 
influence ... For some time, there has been active 
propaganda to belittle our position and claim 
equality with us. 1 
Growing disunity, not just between the Methodists and 
the Anglicans, but within the SRMC also, on the approach 
to secondary educational development, threatened to weaken 
V 
missionary influence on the government in matters of 
education. Despite these inter-denominational conflicts, 
the Anglicans continued to make good progress at St. 
Augustinels. The Principal's report, read on St. Mathias 
Day in 1940, to mark the first anniversary of the Junior 
secondary course, showed that enrolment had risen to 20 
2 
and was expected to double in 1941 Moreover, the fact 
SPG S/R/General/C D. 1939, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Baker, 
2nd May 1939, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG/Mash/Dl Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern 
Rhodesia for the Year 1.040, SPG Archives. 
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that the Anglicans had succeeded in establishing African 
secondary education without government assistance was a 
significant achievement. 
Although the lack of government aid militated against 
rapid expansion of the Junior school, there were some 
advantages. Anglican non-reliance on state aid made them 
independent of government control in planning for future 
developments and in determining administrative policy 
and curricula. They were also free to operate in 
secondary education without consulting with or seeking 
the approval of the DNE as they had to in primary educa- 
tion. But this freedom, as will be shown later, lasted 
only until the government became involved in African 
secondary education. 
Having discussed the Anglican initiative in the field 
of secondary education, it is necessary to examine the 
government's response and its implications for secondary 
educational policy and the development of secondary 
education itself. 
Changes in gover=ent policy and the i 
secondary educational development 
lications for 
This section examines the factors which prompted 
changes in the government's policy on African secondary 
education during the second world war period and the 
implications of these changes on the development of 
secondary education. 
125. 
Earlier on, a discussion of the attitude of Huggins' 
government towards the introduction of African secondary 
education revealed that its opposition was influenced, 
to a very large extent, by the socio-economic conditions of 
the years of economic recession and the need therefore 
to protect white interests. The outbreak of the second 
world war in 1939, however, created a new situation which 
necessitated a reconsideration, by the government, of its 
own position and policy on African secondar-,, r education and 4 
advancement. As will be seen, the socio-economic and 
political conditions of the war period led to a change in 
the government's policy towards African secondary 
education. 
In the first instance, the outbreak of the war 
created an upsurge in South Africa of hostile Afrikan. -rý 
nationalism which persistently supported Hitlerism and 
opposed Smuts' policy of co-operation with Britain in the 
war. With the Afrikaners on the side of Hitler, Huggins' 
government sought to have Africans in Southern Rhodesia 
as allies in the war. Huggins thought this could best 
be achieved through changes in his government's policies 
and attitudes towards the blacks. In his opinion, the 
first step towards appeasing the Africans and securing 
their co-operation was to stop legislating against them. 
During the wa* not a single anti-African law was passed 
and even the LAA was amended in 1941 in favour of 
Africans 
1. The Maize Control Act of 1934 was relaxed to 




allow African farmers to produce and sell more maize. 
Secondly, Huggins thought it was also important to 
attend to the Africans' most pressing needs and problems 
such as education, urban unemployment, housing, and 
working and living conditions. Steps were taken to 
improve the situation in these areas with particular regard 
to education and employment. 
Also, the war acted as a stimulant to the development 
of local industry and the revitalisation of the economy 
by barring the importation of foreign goods on which the 
country had previously depended 
1. To revive industry 
from the deep recession into which it had fallen, the 
government found that more trained and educated manpower 
was required, and as a result, the government felt 
compelled, for the first time, to encourage the training 
and education of Africans and their employment in skilled 
services. Moreover, the enlistment of 8,448 Europeans 
for the war out of a total white population of just over 
176,300 created a further shortage of skilled manpower in 
the various sectors of industry and increased further the 
demands for trained black manpower for those jobs which 
were previously reserved for whites. As Murray and 
Riddell pointed out, the war brought a new emphasis in 
government policies on advancing Africans for political 
1. Leys, ýý, cite, P-19. 
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and economic reasons. 
1 The underlying factor determin- 
ing the government's change of policies was fundamentally 
the same as before - to enhance white economic and 
political interests. The training and education of 
Africans for employment in industry was now seen as 
necessary but only so far as it was of benefit to 
Europeans by developing their economy and protecting 
their investments. 
The change in the government's educational policy 
was reflected in the measures the government took to 
encourage African education. In 1944, for example, 
Huggins raised government grants to mission African 
schools (academic and industrial training) to E140,000 - 
an increase of E47,000 over the previous year and a 
much bigger rise than ever given in the past. 
2 
Also,, 
for the first time, the government proposed to establish 
urban primary schools for blacks -a most significant 
innovation. 
An even more significant change in the government's 
educational policy was the government's decision in 1941 
D. J. Murray,, 2p. cit., p. 30 and Rodger Riddell: 
Education and Employment in Zimbabwe (From Rhodesia 
to Zimbabwe Series No. 9, CIIR Press, London, 1980). 
P. 10. 
2. 
Year 1944, p. 174. 
Report of 
3. Ibid. 
the Director of Native Education for the 
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to establish a state run secondary school for Africans 
with the stated objective of producing better educated 
Africans for apprenticeship training in industry and 
employment in the lower ranks of the Civil Service. 
It is argued by Atkinson, however, that the economic 
reasons given by the government for this change of 
policy - convincing as they may appear - are not 
sufficient in themselves to explain the timing of the 
government's decision to enter into the field of African 
secondary education. He sees the government's change 
of policy as, to a--large,, extent,, a carefully worked out 
strategy aimed at eventually gaining control over 
missionary policies on secondary education, overall 
development of secondary education itself and curricula. 
In conclusion he states that: 
.... having accepted the inescapability of an immediate move into the field of secondary 
education, officials were wary lest they should 
lose the ability to control the structure of 
the curriculum. Such an eventuality might lead 
to the reproduction in greatly exaggerated form 
of the curriculum problems encountered in the 
case of primary education during the earlier 
years of the century. African pupils might be 
engaged in courses of study which, on the one 
hand, were unsuited to the aim of raising the 
standards of African life and, on the other, were 
capable of bringing them into competition with 
Europeans in employment. 1 
This claim was later vindicated by the government's 
approach to the development of African secondary 
Atkinson, op. cit., p. 119. This notion was also 
shared by the Anglicans: see SPG. S/R/D, Annual 
Report of the Bishop of Southern Rhodesia for the Year 
I 62G Arcnives. 
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education. However, this does not imply that the 
economic and political factors were not important in 
determining the government's policy, but rather that 
the full explanation for this change in policy can be 
attributed to a combination of all the foregoing factors 
and not only these two in isolation. 
The plan by the government for its entry into 
African secondary education wasto seek the co-operation 
of the churches in developing a non-denominational 
school which would be organised and controlled jointly 
by church and state, 
1a 
plan similar to that proposed 
to the missionaries by the DNE in 1938. When this 
new proposal was presented to the SRMC Executive at the 
1942 Joint Conference with the DNE, it appeared attrac- 
tive and full of advantages. In the first instance, 
the missionaries regarded the proposal as. an opportunity 
to utilise government funds for their educational 
purposes. They also were of the opinion that a joint 
venture with the DNE would enable them to influence 
government policy more effectively. Moreover, the 
Protestant churches in the SRMC saw the plan as an 
opportunity to isolate the Roman Catholics and prevent 
them from gaining access to government funds for their 
proposed work in secondary education. The Methodists, 
however, did not support the idea that the churches 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1941, p. 26. 
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should contribute out of their meagre resources towards 
the cost of developing and running the proposed 
secondary school. Instead they wanted the government 
to take full responsibility for financing African 
secondary education, just as it did for Europeans, and 
in this way enable the missionaries to concentrate their 
efforts on primary education. It appeared to the 
Methodists that the DNEI insistence that the proposed 
new secondary school should be jointly financed by the 
state and the churches was nothing more than an attempt 
by the government to evade its full responsibility as 
it had done in the case of primary education. 
1 
However, at the 1942 SRMC and DNE Conference, the 
former's representatives decided that the churches 
would take advantage of the government's offer of 
co-operation. They felt that the joint plan was ideal in 
that itmade it possible for even the smaller churches to 
participate in developing secondary education as the 
financial contributions they would have to make were far 
less than they would otherwise have to make if they were 
to undertake secondary education by themselves. 
Moreover, the difficulties confronted by the Anglicans 
S/M/S/R/B 1940-45, District Synod Minutes for 1942, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1940-45. 
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in raising money for their Junior secondary course had 
demonstrated to other churches the magnitude of the 
problems involved in undertaking such a costly venture. 
The government's offer was therefore considered an 
advantage which could not be turned down, 
1 
Having agreed to co-operate, the DNE and the SRMC 
decided to appoint a board of councillors who would be 
responsible for planning and organising the establish- 
ment and development of the proposed secondary school as 
well as determining the policy and regulations by which 
it would be run. 
2A 
council of six was appointed to 
undertake these responsibilities: three of the 
councillors were nominated by the DNE and three by the 
SRMC. 3 The council was also given the right to make 
direct recommendations to the Minister of Education for 
any facilities or provisions which might be required 
by the school in the course of its development. In 
addition, they could directly refer to the Minister any 
matters of policy or administrative difficulties. The 
Proceedings 
I 
of the SRMC held in Salisbury in 1942, 
IMC/CBMS JAfricaT, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 




equal representation of the church and state on the 
school council was considered important by the churches 
because it assured them of an effective voice in 
determining policy and curriculum. 
Further discussions between the DNE and SRMC 
produced agreement on a wide range of issues relating to 
the character of the school, the administrative-and 
pupil enrolment policies and the selection of subjects 
for the curriculum. The school was to be non denomina- 
tional and, as such, would admit pupils from all 
mission schools purely on academic merit. 
1 The 
recruitment of teachers was to be the responsibility of 
the government which paid their salaries; conditions 
of service for teachers were also to be drawn up by the 
government. However, curriculum selection from the 
Cambridge school certificate courses and the formulation 
of administrative rules and regulations governing the 
school were matters to be decided by the board of 
councillors. 
2 once these preliminary arrangements 
had been completed, a site for the new school (named 
Goromonzi) was found in the Chinyika reserve near 





the SRMC held in Salisbury in 1942, 
IMC/CBMS JAfrica7, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
Ibid. 
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1942, p. 68. 
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for the site of the school and construction work began 
that same year - 1942 
1- 
with the government providing 
most of the capital for classrooms, school equipment 
and teachers' accommodation and the churches contri- 
buting to the cost of student accommodation. 
The government's decision to encourage the develop- 
ment of African secondary education and to participate 
in that process met with considerable opposition from 
the more conservative members of the government and the 
ruling party. They regarded the change in the 
government's policy as leading to the erosion of the 
basis of white security and the party's ideological 
stance on preserving the paramountcy of white interests. 
Influential party members such as J. H. Smith, the 
veteran parliamentarian, and others did not believe that 
the outbreak of the war had created a situation which 
the whites could not contain without African assistance. 
3 
They saw the government's support for African education 
and training as an encouragement to Africans to aspire 
to European positions and thus break up the long 
established white monopoly of the professions and 
skilled services and trades. In addition, such support 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1942, p. 68. 
2. Proceedings of the SRMC held in Salisbury in 1942, 
IMC/CBMS JAfrical,, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224. 
3. Leonard T. Kapungu: Rhodesia - The Struggle for 
Freedom (Orbis Publ. , New York, 1974) , p. 30. 
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was seen as encouraging the growth of the African middle 
class which Europeans regarded as the main threat to 
their political, economic and social dominance 
1. 
White opposition to the government gained momentum 
as many long-term party supporters became disillusioned 
with the new trend in government policies and a crisis 
was reached in 1942 when J. H. Smith, together with a 
significant number of influential party members, rebelled 
and formed a new party which they ironically called the 
2 Liberal Conservative Party This development in itself 
did not alter the course of Huggins' government immediately 
but it was indicative of European opposition to any change 
in government policy intended to improve the African 
position. The attitude of the opposition in fact 
demonstrated quite clearly the type of problem a white 
government could expect to confront, in the Rhodesian 
colonial system, if it attempted to reform policy in any 
sphere in favour of Africans. In particular, it made 
manifest the scope and limits for educational policy 
reform and innovation in a colonial society. As will be 
seen,, Huggins' refusal, during the war, to abandon the 
"reformist" trend he had initiated, had serious political 
consequences for him. 




The government had hoped that Goromonzi secondary 
school would be completed within two years from the 
start of its construction. However, the scarcity of 
building materials in war-time conditions delayed its 
completion and it was not until 1945 that the school was 
ready for use for the 1946 academic year and the first 
class of 50 boys from various mission schools were 
admitted to the Form I class 
1. 
Despite the promise to the government of co-opera- 
tion by the missionaries, some churches quickly became 
dissatisfied with the overall joint plan under which 
Goromonzi was founded. The reason for this was that 
it seemed to the churches that, although there were 
financial advantages in the scheme for them, there were 
also many serious disadvantages. Firstly, the 
missionaries discovered that they had very little 
influence over the selection of students from the 
various schools; for example, individual churches could 
not decide which of their pupils should be admitted to 
the secondary school, but the Anglicans could do so at 
their school. In fact the Anglicans could admit a 
student to their school if he was devoted to the church and 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1946, p. 19. 
N. B. 
Girls were not admitted until 1948 due to the lack of 
boarding facilities for them. 
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had the potential for a good catechist or ordinand. 
The fact that such a student may have had poor results 
in his Standard 6 examinations became unimportant. 
Other churches were not allowed to select pupils on 
this basis but were required to put forward for 
admission to Goromonzi only those pupils who met the 
required academic standards. 
Secondly, the Anglicans exacted an undertaking 
from those students they admitted to St. Augustine's 
to either serve the church or teach in an Anglican 
school at the end of their Junior secondary course. In 
this way, the church ensured that it benefited from the 
education it provided. Other churches were prevented 
from carrying out such a practice, again for the reason 
that the only criteria for admission to Goromonzi were 
the Standard 6 results. These churches di%-'A not 
benefit directly from the education they provided because 
pupils were free to pursue courses or professions of 
their own choice, with no obligation to the church to 
which they belonged. Thus, the churches were spending 
a lot of their resources on a scheme from which they 
stood to gain very little in terms of their specific 
denominational needs and priorities. 
Thirdly, as a non-denominational institution, 
Goromonzi did little to maintain a religious atmosphere 
and this situation worried some of the churches as it 
could lead to an undermining of the Christian influences 
137. 
which they had inculcated in their pupils throughout 
1 
their primary school years This concern was greatly 
aggravated by the fact that the staff appointed to 
the school were neither missionaries nor men with a 
proven religious background to whom the churches could 
entrust their pupils. All the teachers appointed, 
including the Principal, were professional educationists 
who had very little to do with religion in their work 
2. 
An issue which provoked conflict within the School 
Council between missionary and DNE representatives was 
the choice of curriculum. The church representatives 
wanted the school to provide a wider range of subjects 
than that offered at St. Augustine's and to include both 
academic and technical subjects so that students could 
leave school with some skills to offer industry. The 
3 Methodists were particularly vocal on this point 
To begin with, however, the DNE selected only academic 
(grammar school type) arts and science subjects, 
claiming that the school could not yet provide facilities 
for technical courses. To some extentf this was true 
A statement issued by the Seventh Day Adventists 
and quoted in H. Carter to F. Noble, 12th March 1946, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1948-1952. 
2. S/M/S/R/B 1946-47, District Synod Minutes for 1946, 




as the school had just started to operate. But the 
churches wanted commercial and technical courses to be 
introduced the following year, 1947, and the DNE could 
not give any guarantee that such courses could be 
implemented until the government had indicated a 
willingness to provide funds for their provision 
together with salaries for the necessary teachers. 
Overall, the missionaries began to feel that, if 
they had their own secondary schools, they would be 
better able to determine policy and ensure that 
secondary education was organised and run on the lines 
of which they approved. In addition, with their own 
schoolsf they stood to benefit from their educational 
work in terms of their specific denominational interests, 
as did the Anglicans. 
The Catholics, who had been planning their own 
secondary school since 1938, started such a school in 
1945. The Maiist brothers, Catholics of Canadian origin, 
initiated a Junior secondary course at their Kutama 
mission in the Makwiro district 
1. With the much feared 
Catholic competition in secondary education now a 
reality, individual Protestant churches began to make 
arrangements to set up their own secondary schools. 
The churches no longer wanted to operate with the 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1945, p. 222. 
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government and, in 1945, the Church of Christ (of 
Swedish origin) applied to the DNE for approval of a 
Junior secondary course at their main mission Dadaya, 
near the town of Mashabal. Since, in 1938, the 
government had authorised the undertaking of secondary 
education by the churches provided they could raise 
the necessary funds, it granted approval for both the 
Catholic and the Church of Christ schools with the 
proviso that government sanction must be obtained for 
the teachers to be employed at the schools. No 
government grants were to be made available but a 
subsidy was provided to cover part of the cost of the 
teachers' salaries. By early 1946, there were three 
mission African secondary schools with a total enrolment 
2 
of 130 boys and 17 girls 
Given the financial constraints facing the churches, 
this was both an encouraging and significant beginning 
in the field of secondary education. Of equal signifi- 
cance with regard to the war period developments in 
African secondary education was the support afforded by 
Huggins' government. Unfortunately this support was 
of short duration as, after the war ended in 1945, the 
government was faced with a new situation which prompted 
the withdrawal of its support for the development of 
African secondary education and a change in its policy. 
1. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 




CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND CHURCH POLICIES DURING 
THE POST WAR PERIOD AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION 1946-1952 
Changes in government policy 
The support of the government for African education 
and advancement and its overall policies during the war 
period had serious political implications for Huggins. 
European disillusionment with his government's African 
policies eroded Huggins' electoral support. The 
dissidents who had left his party in 1942 took advantage 
of the growing white opposition to the government to 
further discredit its position. Huggins' opponents 
presented his policies to the European public as a 
serious threat to white control of the key professions 
and services and therefore as a threat to white power 
in essence. 
The extent of white opposition to the government 
policies was made manifest in the 1946 General Election 
when Huggins' partyr which had controlled 24 of the 30 
parliamentary seats since 1933, lost 12 of their seats to 
the dissident Liberal Conservatives. As a result, 
Huggins was forced to enter into coalition with the 
1 
official opposition party, the Labour Party For 
1. Kapungur 22. cit, p. 31. 
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Huggins, this humiliating result represented a clear 
rejection by the whites of the policies his government 
had pursued throughout the war period and prompted him 
to change those policies. The political consequences 
of his war-time policies, from the point of view of 
his own standing and popularity amongst the white 
settlers, were indicative of the strength of the 
resistance of Southern Rhodesia colonial society to 
any policy changes and reforms likely to undermine white 
interests by seeking to improve conditions for Africans. 
The end of the war also brought new problems which 
demanded urgent government attention. The resettlement 
of ex-servicemen and the post war boom in white immigra- 
tion called for immediate financial resources and an 
effective policy to meet the needs of these people, most 
of whom sought employment without undue delay. (Records 
show that some 64,634 white immigrants entered Southern 
Rhodesia from South Africa, Britain and Europe between 
1946 and 1951. ) 
The high rate of white unemployment made it unnecessary 
for the government to educate and train Africans for 
skilled jobs. These were once again regarded as a 
European monopoly and the government changed its 
employment policies in order to ensure that whites found 
jobs first. While the government used European opposi- 
tion to socio-economic reform and African advancement to 
justify its change of policies after the war, to the 
1. Leys, a. cit., p. 74. 
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Africans this was a clear indication that their future 
under white rule was bleak. Their frustration grew 
and soon manifested itself in outbursts of violent 
confrontation with the government. Between 1945 and 
1948, there were nationwide strikes by urban black 
workers which nearly paralysed industry in every town as 
the black workers resorted to militant action in an 
endeavour to secure trade union rights so that they 
1 
could protect their job security The ruthlessness of 
the methods employed by Huggins to deal with this 
situation was in sharp contrast to the response that he 
had given during the war period to African demands for 
increased access to skilled jobs and better working and 
living conditions 
2. 
Also at this time, a change of government policy on 
African secondary education became apparent. Firstly, 
steps were taken to enforce government administrative 
authority over all mission secondary schools through the 
inspectorate department of native education 
3. A code 
of administrative procedures was circulated to the 
For a full discussion of the implications of post war 
changes in government policies and the 1945-1948 
strikes, see Roy Fitzhenry: Social Sources of the 
Politics of Resistance and Re; )ression in Southern 
Africa - the Case of Southern Rhodesia (M. Phil. Thesis, 
University of Southampton, 1970), pp. 320-325. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1945, p. 222. Also see S/M/S/R/B 1946-47, 
District Synod Minutes for 1946, WMMS Archives, 
Box 1946-47. 
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various missionary bodies whereby all churches were 
required to submit their plans for the development or 
establishment of secondary schools to the DNE for 
1 
approval before they could be implemented Besides, 
each school had to obtain DNE approval for its selected 
curriculum before it was adopted for teaching 
2 
1P 
DNE officials claimed that these measures were 
intended to provide for a uniform policy framework for 
secondary educational development 
3. 
The churches, 
however, saw the measures as an attempt by the govern- 
ment to determine and control missionary. policies as 
well as the administration, organisation and development 
of secondary education. The Anglicans believed that 
the government also wanted to control the curricula in 
order to ensure that African students did not gain access 
to higher technical, commercial or managerial training 
which, in turn, could lead to key industrial jobs 
4. 
Secondly, the government also began to take tough 
measures to control the expansion of Junior secondary 
I 
school networks at a time when more and more churches 
1. SPG. Mash/DS/C, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to Mr. 
A. E. A. Sulston, 30th October 1946, SPG Archives. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1945, p. 222. 
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1947, p. 17. 
4. SPG. DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. A. E. A. Sulston, 17th 
August 1947., SPG Archives, File 1947. 
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were indicating their intentions of engaging in 
secondary education. After two more Junior secondary 
schools were established in 1948 - one by the American 
Episcopal church at their Hartzell Mission near Salisbury, 
and another by the Seventh Adventists at Solusi Mission 
near Bulawayo 
1- the government announced its intention 
of restricting the number of Junior secondary schools 
2 that would be allowed to open in the future The 
government claimed that the reason for this proposal was 
that there were not enough jobs for the graduates from 
the existing schools. As Riddell pointed out, however, 
this was untrue considering the large number of jobs 
created in industry by the post-war economic boom and 
industrial expansion 
3. 
The churches were not prepared to accept this 
unilateral imposition of restrictions on the expansion 
of secondary education at this stage in its development. 
Their contention was that, since there were only five 
mission schools in existence to provide secondary 
education for the growing number of primary school pupils 
seeking entry into Form I. it was growth in this area 
that was called for and not restriction. In fact, 
secondary education in the mission schools was available, 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief 
Commissioner and the Director of Native Development 
for the Year 1950, p. 35. 
2. SPG. Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 16th 
September 1948, SPG Archives, Box 1948-50. Also 
see S/M/S/R/B 1948-49 District Synod Minutes for 
1948, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-49. 
3. Riddell, pp. cit., p. 10. 
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at this time, to very few students due to limited 
facilities and the inability of most students from low 
income rural families to pay the average annual tuition 
fees of between E5 and E7. 
Adding to the financial difficulties, no government 
grants were available,. Over and above these constraints, 
missionaries also lacked adequate numbers of teaching 
staff because most of their teachers had to be obtained 
from overseas at high expense. Faced with such 
insurmountable problems, the missionaries could see little 
prospect of effecting any improvement in the present 
provision of secondary school education and therefore 
felt they had a strong case for more, and not less, govern- 
ment co-operation and assistance in developing Junior 
secondary school provision. Thus, the government proposal 
to impose a ban on further expansion on such provision, 
together with its overall policy changes since the end 
of the war, aroused anger amongst the churches and led to 
conflict between the missionaries and the government. 
Anglican and Methodist res]Ronses to government policy 
The government attempts to control mission secondary 
educational policy and development %ere severely 
criticised by the churches. The Anglican Diocese 
Education Committee discussed at length the changes in 
government policy and, in 1948, resolved to oppose them 
-19W 
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for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the Committee felt that, since the 
government was not paving any grants to the missionaries 
for the work they were undertaking in secondary education, 
there were no grounds for its interference either with 
the developments in that field or by prescribing policy 
and regulations for the churches to observel. 
Secondly, the Anglicans resented the arbitrary manner in 
which the government imposed conditions under which the 
missionaries were required to operate. The policy 
agreed at the 1938 Joint Conference of the SRMC and DNE 
stated that all matters of policy relating to the 
organi-sation, administration and development of African 
education should be discussed adequately between the 
churches and the DNE. Any changes in policy required 
2 the mutual consent of both parties The government's 
apparent failure to observe this agreement caused the 
Anglicans to feel that they were under no obligation 
to accept any of the government's regulations, conditions 
or changes in policy which did not have the consent of 
the SRMC. 
SPG. Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 27th 
March 1948, Box 1948-50, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 8th 
April 1948, Box 1948-50, SPG Archives. 
sk 
147. 
In a memorandum prepared by the Anglican Education 
Committee in 1950 for a Commission of Inquiry appointed 
in that year by the government to examine the situation 
prevailing in African education, the Committee strongly 
criticised the government's attitude to the educational 
work of the missionaries. The memorandum spelt out the 
Anglican objections to the intended ceiling on the 
development of African secondary education and warned 
that this could lead to a confrontation between the 
1 
churches and the DNE In the view of the Anglican 
Committee, it was not true that there was an over- 
production of Junior secondary school graduates or that 
neither industry nor other employment sectors could not 
absorb these graduates. The 1948 secondary school 
enrolment figures showed that there were in the five 
existing mission Junior secondary schools a total of only 
329 students, compared to more than 2,000 whites in 
European schools 
1) 
. Of the 329 in Forms I and II, less 
than half were due to graduate and this figure, in the 
opinion of the Anglican Committee, was far too small to 
be regarded as an over-production and certainly did not 
justify the restrictive measures the government proposed 
3 to impose on Junior secondary educational development 
1. SPG. Mash/EX/DS/C, Memorandum presented to the 1950 
Commission of Inquiry on Native Education by the 
Analican Diocese of Southern Rhodesia 1950, para. 1 
(i), SPG Archives, File 1950-52. 
2. Ibid. 




Moreover, the Committee also believed that these 
graduates could easily be absorbed into industry if the 
government altered its employment policy to allow the 
various industrial sectors to employ them. The overall 
Anglican position, as defined in the memorandum, was 
that rigorous efforts should be made by the government 
and churches to increase secondary education provision 
1 
instead of attempting to limit it 
The Anglican position received the full support of 
the Methodists and the 1948 Synod Conference reacted 
angrily to the government's attempts to undermine 
missionary efforts. The Conference called upon the 
government to recognise that the overall development of 
African education depended upon the co-operation of the 
SRMC and the DNE and that no changes in policy could be 
made by either party without prior consultations with 
2 
each other In a strongly worded statement, the 
Methodists warned the government in 1950 against changing 
policies and prescribing rules and regulations for 
missionaries to follow without their prior approval: 
SPG. Mash/EX/DS/C. Memorandum presented to the 1950 
Commission of Inquiry on Native Education by the 
Anglican Diocese of Southern Rhodesia 1950, para. 2, 
SPG Archives, File 1950-52. 
2. S/M/S/R/B 1948-50, District Synod Minutes for 1948, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1948-50. 
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We are not a department of the civil service 
to whom regulations and instructions can be 
issued without prior agreement by our 
responsible leaders. 1 
The 1950 District Synod also warned that, in future, 
missionaries would refuse to co-operate with any 
government directives which were issued without their 
consent. The Synod also urged other churches to oppose 
the imposition of any restrictive measures on their 
work by the the government unless they had been asked to 
co-operate by the SRMC. Even the Roman Catholics, the 
traditional supporters of government educational policy, 
indicated their opposition to the government's intention 
to impose arbitrary upper limitation on the expansion of 
Junior secondary education 
2. 
It thus became apparent to the government that 
missionaries would not co-operate. In what appeared 
to be a flagrant show of disregard for the measures the 
government intended to impose, the Methodists began to 
prepare for the establishment of a Junior secondary 
course at their Tegwani Mission shortly after Huggins 
announced his intention to curb missionary educational 
3 
work in 1948 A secondary education committee was set 
S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1950, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
2. Ibid. 
3. S/M/S/R/B 1948-49, District Synod Minutes for 1948, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
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up by the Synod to prepare for the initiation of the 
course. In the report submitted to the 1950 Synod 
Conference, the committee urged the immediate undertaking 
of secondary education. The Reverend Hay Pluke, its 
Chairman, indicated that the Methodists would urge other 
1 
churches to intensify their secondary educational wor 
The establishment of the Methodist Junior course received 
considerable support from their London headquarters 
which contributed E5,000 towards capital costs. Some of 
the local Rhodesian companies which were interested in 
employing African secondary school graduates also gave 
financial support. The Standard and Barclay's Banks 
contributed E2,000 each and the Beit Trust also gave 
2 E2,000 With this aid, the construction of classrooms 
and student and staff accommodation began in the same 
year (1950), and although the work on these buildings 
was not completed until 1953, the first Form I class of 
21 boys and 9 girls was in session in 1951, with the 
Reverend Hay Pluke as Principal 
3. 
S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1950, 
Cap. P.,, WDIMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
Ibid. 
3. S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1951, 
Tegwani Training Institution Annual Report for 1951, 
p. 2, WMMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
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The combined opposition of the Anglicans, Methodists 
and the SRMC to government policy forced Huggins to 
concede two points. Firstly, he abandoned his plan to 
ban the establishment of more mission secondary schools. 
Secondly, he called for a meeting of the DNE and SRMC to 
discuss ways of resolving the differences between the 
missionaries and the government and to find a fresh basis 
for co-oDeration with each other. As a token of good- 
will to missionaries, the government set up a loan 
system from which the churches could draw up to E500 a 
year, half of which was not refundable, for the purposes 
1 
of promoting their secondary educational work It has 
been argued that part of the reason for this show of 
goodwill was that Huggins was trying to secure the 
support of the missionaries for his plan (which was 
already under the active consideration of the British 
government) to federate Southern Mhodesia with her two 
2 
northern neighbours, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
The objective was to create a larger community in which 
the whites would dominate and gain access to more of the 
wealth of the whole of the central Af rican region. 
Huggins knew that missionary opinion was influential 
S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1951, 
Notice NAG/FC, WMMS Archiv=-s, Box 1950-53. 
2. See Moyana, cit., pp. 327-329. 
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abroad and could lend more weight to his federal plan. 
But he could not obtain their support if he continued to 
antagonise them through his educational policies. The 
conciliatory measures he adopted in 1950 and 1951, such 
as giving missionaries more administrative authority in 
both primary and secondary schools, the loan aid system 
to secondary education and the increase in grants for 
teacher training seem to support the claim that he was 
trying to elicit missionary support for his political 
designs 1. He also considered such measures as 
expedient to gain African support for the proposed 
federation. 
The churches took advantage of the government's 
attempts to secure missionary and African support for 
the federal plan by demanding more state aid for the 
development of secondary education. They also took 
advantage of the government's compromising attitude to 
embark on further secondary education work. Three more 
mission schools were started: one was founded by the 
Catholics at Gokomere mission near Fort Victoria in 1951; 
a second was established at Zimuto mission, also close to 
Fort Victoria, in 1951 by the Dutch Reformed Church 
(which had previously maintained that it was too early 
for the churches to provide secondary education for 
S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1951, 
Notice NAG/FC, WMMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
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Africans); and a third school was established by the 
Brethren in Christ Church at Matopo mission, outside 
Bulawayo, in 1952. This brought the total number of 
1 African secondary schools in 1952 to ten Nine of 
these were mission schools with a total enrolment of 270 
boys and 28 girls in Form 1.154 boys and 28 girls in 
Form II and 59 boys and 9 girls in the Form III senior 
2 
secondary class 
The massive disparity between male and female 
enrolment was due to a number of reasons, not least of 
which were related to the sociology of African tradi- 
tional society. Most parents were not prepared to spend 
their limited resources on a girl's education because 
they believed that her place was primarily in the home 
and not in the professions. They saw little advantage 
in providing a girl with a higher education because, on 
marriage, she left her family and thus deprived it 
of any material benefits accruing from her education. 
Most parents therefore felt that, to educate a daughter 
beyond basic literacy was simply to enrich another 
family. As a rule, few girls reached the upper primary 
classes, let alone completing primary educationand 
those who did were mainly from families in professions 
Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Chieff. 
Native Commissioner and the Director of Na: Eive 
Develo ent for the Year 1952, p. 46. 
2. Ibid., p. 43. 
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such as teaching or in urban employment. Because the 
girls were so overwhelmingly outnumbered by boys, they 
found competition for post-primary courses very intense. 
The Anglicans and Catholics attempted to resolve 
this problem by providing separate schools for girls, 
at both primary and secondary levels, where there was 
no male competition and girls could go a little higher 
on the educational ladder than they could in a co-educa- 
tional school. In actual fact, however, those girls 
who obtained entry to a full eight year primary educa- 
tion course mostly opted for teacher training or 
domestic science and nursing courses. Very few 
proceeded to secondary education, partly from their own 
choice and partly because few parents were prepared to 
spare tuition fees for a girl's education at a secondary 
school, with the added cost of board, books and school 
uniform. A letter written by a girl at Goromonzi in 1950 
and published in the school magazine was indicative of 
parental reluctance to spend money on a girl's education. 
The girl recalled an evening when her father brought his 
friends home. As they sat by the firelight, one of the 
friends, on hearing that his host's daughter was about to go 
to Goromonzi, asked him: 
Have you turned a millionaire that you are 
thinking of sending your daughter to 
secondary school? You may as well throw 
your money in the Gambo river as waste it 
on your daughter. 1 
1. Quoted in Atkinson, 
. 
2p. cit., p. 120. 
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As far as boys were concerned, however, the situa- 
tion was quite different. Almost every parent - even 
the very poor ones - wanted to have their sons educated 
because they were the hope and future security of the 
family's comfort. Parents went to great lengths to 
obtain school fees for their sons' education. In some 
cases, they sold their cattle at the market place, or 
grain, to raise the necessary money. At other times, 
a parent would offer his services to a school and pay for 
his son's education through labour done 
1. Quite often, 
a student from a poor or low income family would offer 
his services to the school after classes, during week- 
ends and school holidays to raise the fees for his 
2 
education Considerable importance was attached to the 
education of boys because a son cared for the family 
when the father became too old to earn a living or died. 
Apart from material benefits, it was prestigious in 
African society for a father to have an educated son. 
A family with educated boys was very highly respected 
in the community. 
On the whole, the extent of secondary educational 
development by 1952, both in terms of the number of 
schools and enrolment was a significant achievemenent 
S/M/S/R/B 1948-52, District Synod Minutes for 1952, 
WMIMS Archives, Box 1948-52. 
Ibid. 
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for missionaries, considering the lack of government 
grants and policy constraints which confronted them in 
their work during this post war period. 
In terms of employment, a significant number of 
Junior secondary school graduates (approximately 
between 20 and 25%) went into teacher training courses 
and many of these had an undertaking with their 
respective churches to teach in their denominational 
schools on completion of their secondary education 
studies 
1. Most students found this arrangement quite 
acceptable because, apart from securing the education 
they needed, the undertaking guaranteed a secure job in 
a prestigious profession at a time when it was difficult 
to find employment in industry. Some banks did take 
Junior school graduates for junior clerical jobs. 
The Goromonzi school leaver record showed that, between 
1948 and 1951, at least 30 Junior school leavers were 
taken for employment by the Standard and Barclay's Banks 
2. 
A few of the graduates found employment in the clerical 
and lower ranks of the Civil Service as court interpreters 
or district and native commissioner assistants. Most 
3 
girls went in for teacher training and nursing education 
1. SPG. Mash/EX/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 
12th February 1952, File 1951-52. 
2. S/M/S/R/B 1945-52, District Synod Minutes for 1952, 




However, the majority of Junior secondary school leavers 
did not readily find employment in industry because most 
employers gave job preference to European school leavers. 
The foregoing discussion has examined the three 
stages in the development of government and missionary 
policies on African secondary education between 1934 and 
1952. The first stage examined the transition from 
primary to secondary education and the factors which 
influenced the foundations of secondary education and 
the policies on which it was established. Stage two 
discussed the foundations of secondary education and the 
evolution of the policies on which its development was 
based. Also studied were the factors which determined 
government support for the development of secondary 
education during the war period. Stage three looked at 
changes in government policy during the post war period, 
the conflict between state and church policies and the 
implications of that conflict for secondary educational 
development. 
A crucial dimension which now needs to be taken into 
account, because of its great impact and far-reaching 
influence on the evolution of the policies so far discussed, 
is the status and value placed on secondary education in 
the Southern Rhodesian colonial society. This was a 
highly significant factor in determining, firstly, the 
African demand for secondary education and, secondly, in 
M. 4 influencing government and I_Ssionary responses to that 
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demand and, consequently, the nature of their policies. 
The previous chapter showed how the high status and 
value accorded to formal educational qualifications in 
early Southern Rhodesian colonial society, from the point 
of view of employment, heightened African demand for formal, 
rather than industrial, primary education. However, as more 
Africans acquired academic primary education and threatened 
to enter in greater numbers the areas of European political, 
economic and social social control, the more urgent became 
the need for successive governments to restrict the numbers 
of Africans gaining access to those regions of power. This 
situation led to educational qualifications for gaining 
franchise, access to certain key professions and skilled 
services being periodically raised beyond the reach of most 
Africans. Evidence of this was in the revision of the 1899 
franchise qualifications in 1912,1928,1937 and 1953 
1. 
The more the qualifications were raised, the more 
Africans sought to acquire them in order to improve their 
political, economic and social position and mobility within 
the colonial capitalist system. This fact was demonstrated 
by the rise in the number of Africans who sought secondary 
and higher education in South Africa as early as the 1920s 
and 30s. From the time that secondary education was 
provided locally, demand for it became even greater and 
began to influence, and even determine, the rate at which 
missionaries expanded secondary educational provision. 
Huggins' policy, during the war period, of encouraging 
Africans to enter skilled and professional jobs stimulated 
1. See Palley, cit., pp. 286-300. 
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further the African demand for secondary education. 
In the Southern Rhodesian colonial systemr ridden 
with racial segregation and discrimination in every 
sphere of life, secondary or higher educa tional qualifi- 
cations became important to Africans as a means of 
acquiring positions of status and success. Such qualifi- 
cations became crucial in one respect - they legitimised 
the status acquired by those Africans who made the grade 
in school or were favoured in the process of educational 
selection and training in the formal school system. Those 
who failed in school or were rejected in the selection 
process did not achieve success or positions of status. 
Their failures were, therefore, also legitimised by the 
educational system 
In the circumstances, the demand for secondary or 
other academic qualifications, which provided access to 
the esteemed white or blue professions or other jobs of 
high income and status, became overwhelming. At Goromonzi 
alone, the Principal received in 1950,800 applications 
for only 40 Form I places, while, in 1952, Tegwani received 
2 
more than 400 applications for 35 Form I vacancies The 
linking of high status jobs and success in the political, 
economic and social spheres to educational attainment, 
strengthened the legitimation process. As a result, the 
African search for 'higher' education became intense. 
Harry Franklin observed that, from the late 1940s onwards, 
academic education became a passion for Africans: 
If one issue could be closer to the hearts of 
Africans than any other .... it is education. 
The passion for education is perhaps the most 
universal of contemporary African characteristics. 
1. This is a phenomenon which is a direct consequence 
of the formal school system, not only in a colonial 
situation, but also in any capitalist society. See 
Earl H? pper (ed. ): 
, 
Readings i the Theory of 
Educational_Systems (Hutchinson, London, 1971), pp. 
13-35 and Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis: Schooling 
in Capitalist America (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1976), pp. 102-112. 
2. S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1952, 
IOUIS Archives,, Box 1950-53. 
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This is the Political demand to which native 
politicians and colonial administrators must 
resoond .... This is the .... 
demand which 
conditions the African's search for a place to 
live and work. The European colonisers have 
diligently taught that education is the indis- 
pensable prerequisite to economic progress and 
political privilege. The African has come to 
wholeheartedly believe it. The cult of education, 
which began in Africa as a justification for white 
supremacy, has become the established black 
religion. 1 
As will be shown in the next chapter, the African demand 
for secondary education became more intense as they 
sought to gain access to more jobs and to the privileged 
European political, economic and social positions. The 
need to meet this demand led to the government and the 
churches evolving a common policy and strategy for 
secondary educational development. 
Overall policy situation by 1952 
From the overall discussion of the evolution of 
church and state policies on African secondary education 
during the period 1934 to 1952, it is possible to identify 
some of the main factors which accounted for the problems 
confronted in secondary educational development. These 
factors are important since they will provide the focus 
for discussion in the next chapter. Firstly, there was 
no uniformity of objectives in church and state policies 
to provide for a unified framework and strategy for the 
effective organisation, long term planning and develop- 
ment of African secondary education. Secondly, the lack 
1. Harry Franklin: The Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of 
the Central African Federation (George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1963), p. 95. 
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of adequate co-operation and agreement over policy 
matters, particularly during the post war period, 
militated against secondary educational development. 
The refusal of the government to provide grants for 
secondary educational expansion added to the problems 
of achieving the goals desired by the churches. Thirdly, 
there was little attempt to diversify the grammar school 
type of curriculum by the inclusion of technical, 
commercial and administrative courses which would have 
greatly enhanced the prospects of Junior school graduates 
of finding employment. Given the financial and admin- 
istrative constraints confronted by the missionaries, it 
is perhaps understandable that they were unable to develop 
such courses in their schools during the years of pioneer 
work in this field. But, the government policy of 
protecting white job interests was a factor which made it 
even more difficult for the churches to orient the curriculum 
to employment. Above all, the attitude and resistance of 
the white colonial society against any innovation or reforms 
in education, political, economic and social policies likely 
to favour Africans was another element which counted against 
the efforts of the churches to broaden their curricula and 
thereby improve the chances of African secondary school 
graduates benefiting from their education in terms of 
obtaining employment in the various industrial sectors. 
In summary, the major real obstacles to rapid 
secondary educational development were the racial attitudes 
and policies prevalent in the white colonial system towards 
African advancement. 
The following chapter will examine attempts by 
Garfield Todd and the mission churches to reform secondary 
educational policies, the rationale behind the reforms and 





THE DEVELOP14ENT OF GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY 
POLICIES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE 
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 
1953 - 1963 
Chapter 2 discussed the foundations of government 
and missionary policies on African secondary education 
and their overall implications for its development. 
This chapter examines the development of secondary 
educational policies under the conditions of multi-racial 
politics which prevailed in Southern Rhodesia during the 
years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953- 
1963). The central focus of the chapter is concerned 
with the strategies adopted by Garfield Todd and his 
successor, Edgar Whitehead, and the mission churches 
in dealing with the problems of secondary educational 
development in an essentially racist and conservative 
colonial society. The discussion will largely concen- 
trate on the reforms in government and missionary 
secondary educational policies, their objectives and 
impact on the development of secondary education. A 
major aspect of the overall discussion concerns the 
olýk 
163. 
scope and effectiveness of educational reform in aiding 
African advancement in a colonial society which was 
opposed to fundamental political, economic and social 
reforms. An attempt will be made to identify the 
limitations of educational reform in such a situation. 
In Part Ia brief look is taken at the politics of 
the period, with particular reference to the formation of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 and the 
concept of a multi-racialist partnership. An examination 
of this concept is essential to provide the framework for 
an analysis of the educational reforms introduced by 
Todd and the rationale behind them. 
Todd's attempts to reform some aspects of the 
Southern Rhodesian colonial system in the pursuit of 
multi-racialism come under scrutiny in Part II. 
Consideration is given to the objectives of these reforms 
and their implications. In the lengthy discussion which 
follows, the exact nature of the reforms introduced in 
secondary educational policies, their objectives, 
implementation and impact on secondary educational 
development together with their limitations in aiding 
African economic, social and political advancement, are 
examined in detail. 
Part III continues the above discussion of policy 
reforms under Todd's successor, Edgar Whitehead. 
Attention will also be paid to the political consequences 
for the goverriment of these reforms. 
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FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION 
The year 1953 brought about an important political 
development. Southern Rhodesia was federated with two 
of her neighbouring British colonies, Northern '-Rhodesia 
(modern Zambia) and Nyasaland (modern Malawi). The 
plan to federate the three colonies originated in the 
late 1930s as an attempt by Huggins and the British 
government to create a central African political and 
economic community which would strengthen white political 
control in this region and give Europeans access to more 
of the African central areas' rich natural resources 
1. 
But also, behind this initiative was the British 
government's hope that federation would: 
turn the governing white oligarchy in 
Southern Rhodesia away from the "apartheid" 
of the Nationalists in South Africa towards 
a more enlightened native policy. 2 
The process which ultimately led to the formation 
of this federation was initiated in 1945 by the British 
government, supposedly as an experiment in multi-racial 
partnership and co-existence. Such a scheme, it was 
argued, would: 
build a new dominion in Central Africa, 
welding together its people into one nation, 
unconscious of colour, or race of its 
communities 
and contribute towards racial harmony, justice and 
1. See Report of the Royal Commission on Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 1938-39 (1940), HMSO Cmd. 5949, and 
Palley cit., p. 334. 
2. David Alexander: 
' 
Liberals and Representation in 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia 1953-62 (M. A. Thesis, 





1. However, its white proponents - at home and 
abroad - were more interested in the political and 
economic advantages the federal scheme gave to Europeans. 
As will be seen shortly, when the federation came into 
existence, many aspects of it (in particular, the 
franchise policy) negated the very concept of multi- 
racialism, racial equality and justice for all as 
defined in the federal preamble. This franchise policy 
consolidated and legitimated continued white control of 
the state political apparatus and economic and social 
power. 
The federal plan met with considerable opposition 
from the emerging African Nationalist movements in the 
three territories concerned. Africans were deeply 
suspicious and resentful of the federation because of 
their fears that such a move would strengthen white 
2 
domination in Central Africa Their past experiences 
with Europeans made them distrustful of the federal 
politicians and the white community in general, and they 
were doubtful that federation would promote genuine multi- 
racialism. Africans were also sceptical that whites 
would refrain from racial discrimination and admit them 
1. See Faith Raven: Central Africa: Background to the 
Argument (Africa Publications Trust, London, 1960). 
p. 17; T. R. M. Creighton: The Anatomy of Partnership: 
London, 1960), p. 101; and Closer Association in 
Central Africa (1951), HMSO Cmd. 8411, para. 1. 
2. Barber, 22. cit., p. 16. 
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into white society and to those occupations hitherto 
considered to be a white monopoly. In brief, they 
could not "trust the white man to agree to share political, 
economic and social equality with blacks" 
1. 
African opposition to federation was more pronounced 
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where Africans feared 
that close association with Southern Rhodesia would bring 
them under the harsh racial laws and policies operating 
2 in that colony As Carter explained after a Methodist 
Synod discussion of the federation scheme in 1952: 
There {were) very few Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia and practically none in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland who favour{edl 
federation because they fearfedl that it 
{wouldl strengthen white power and repression. 3 
on the whole, the churches supported the idea of a 
multi-racial federal community because they believed 
that this would improve race relations and create 
4 
racial harmony, particularly in Southern Rhodesia The 
SP14rv, which combined with the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Missionary Conference in 1952 to form the Southern 
C/S/R/B,, H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 9th July 
1952, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-52. 
For a discussion of African opposition to federation, 
see Mason (1960). 22. cit., pp. 91-98 and 128-132. 
Also see Palley, op. cit., p. 338. 
3. C/S/R/Bj H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 9th July 
1952, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-52. 
4. Ibid. 
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Rhodesia Christian Conference (SRCC), thought that 
federation would provide a new opportunity for rapid 
African advancement under multi-racial partnership 
1. 
But the SRCC also believed that, apart from the socio- 
economic benefits federation would bring for Africans, 
it would strengthen European ability to prevent 
"irresponsible black nationalism and communist influence" 
from gaining ground in the three territorieS 
2 
.9 The 
Anglicans were especially vocal on the preservation of 
white civilisation and rule in Central Africa: 
Black people need European leadership for 
an undetermined length of time. It would 
be absurd to allow the basis of civilised 
white society to be destroyed by the shouts 
of black nationalists we are beginning to 
hear in this country. It would even be 
more absurd to give every raw tribesman the 
vote now. 3 
The Wesleyan Methodists also supported federation 
but they warned that, if the federal scheme was going 
to succeed,, it should not be forced upon the black people 
but should be implemented with their full support: 
If the British government forces federation 
on the three territories against African 
opinion, there will be little case left for 
C/S/R/Bf H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 9th July 
1952, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-52. 
2. C/S/R/Bf H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 7th April 
1953f WMMS Archives, Box 1953-57. 
3. SPG/Mash/EX/DS/C,, E. Paget toMr. Sulston, 12th 




refusing Malan {the South African premierl 
the protectorates of South Africa and the 
continent will see a blaze of revolt. 1 
The dire necessity of obtaining African support for 
federation was also emphasised by the Methodist Synod in 
1952. In its view, African suspicion that federation 
was a plan designed to increase white power over the 
black masses had to be overcome but this could not be 
achieved by promises of mere constitutional safeguards 
as the blacks were suspicious that "what a whiteman 
writes into a constitution today, he may erase tomorrow ,2. 
African fears could only be allayed through a demonstra- 
tion by the Europeans of a genuine desire to implement 
true multi-racial partnership. The first step to 
achieving this end was to remove racial segregation 
together with many of the racially offensive laws and 
policies: 
Our Africans would largely agree with Nkomo 
{a black nationalistl who said, remove the 
discriminatory legislation first, and then we 
will believe in partnership and look more 
favourably on the idea of the Federation. As 
we see it, to force federation on an unwilling 
6 million people is to postpone sine die, any 
prospects of partnership in any of the terri- 
tories. 3 
C/S/R/Bj H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 7th April 
1952, WMMS Archives, Box 1953-57. Also see S/M/S/R/B, 
District Synod Minutes for 1952,, WMMS Archives,, Box 
1950-53. 
2. C/S/R/Bj H. Carter to Rev. T. A. Beetham, 9th July 
1952, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-52. 
S/M/S/R/B 1950-53, District Synod Minutes for 1952, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1950-53. 
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However, little attempt was made to consult African 
opinion on federation by either the British government or 
the governments of the three territories. The widespread 
African opposition to federation went unheeded 
1, 
and 
did little to hinder the federation from coming into 
effect. After several debates in the House of Commons, 
together with extensive consultations between the 
British government and the white governments of the 
three territories 
2, 
the Central African Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence in 1953 
3. 
African fears that Europeans would not uphold 
multi-racialism were soon vindicated by the statements 
made by federal government leaders and politicians. As 
Creighton pointed out, it soon became apparent that most 
Europeans did not believe in true multi-racial partner- 
ship and objected to the kind of political, economic 
and social equality with Africans implied by the concept 
For a discussion of African opposition to Federation, 
see Mason (1960) pp. cit., pp. 91-98 & 128-132. Also 
see Nyasaland National Congress "Why we oppose federa- 
tion, our aims and objects", statement from Nyasaland 
Africans to the British Government, Members of 
Parliament and people, 18th January 1952: Mss. Afr. s. 
1321, Rhodes House Archives. 
2. Palley, cit., pp. 333-342; Robert I. Rotberg: 
The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa (Oxford 
University Pressr Cambridge, Mass., 1966). pp. 215-252 
& 258-302; Franck, 22. cit., pp. 20-50; Cyril Dunn 
Central African Witness (Victor Gollancz, London, 
1959)r pp. 89-95. 
3. See British Parliamentary Papers (1953): Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland - Commencement Order in Council 1953, 
August lr 1953. 
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of multi-racial partnership and co-operation on which 
federation was supposed to be based. Huggins, who 
resigned as Southern Rhodesia premier to become the first 
federal premier, publicly admitted that he did not 
believe there could be any real equality between the 
races. He regarded 'partnership' as a "blessed word" 
conveniently used for the purposes of securing local 
black and external European support for the federal 
scheme 
1. He believed that the only form of partnership 
that could exist between blacks and whites was the kind 
of relationship existing between "a horse and a rider" 
2. 
The Federal Party Congress defined multi-racial partner- 
ship as the "gradual extension of political rights to 
those who conform to civilized standards of behaviour and 
culture ,3, while Sir Roy Welensky, who succeeded Huggins 
as federal premier in 1957 regarded the term as meaning 
"close association but not integration between Europeans 
and certain Africans ,4. 
Address by the Hon. Sir Godfrey Huggins to the Royal 
Empire Society, 24th January 1952, IMC/CBMS Archives, 
Box 293. Also see Secretary for Council for World 
Missions to Prof. W. M. MacMillan, 24th August 1952, 
IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 293. 




Further evidence of the negation of the multi- 
racial partnership was demonstrated in the allocation of 
responsibilities between the federal and territorial 
governments. All aspects of European education, health, 
economic and social development, and administration were 
placed under the Federal government 
1 
which had more 
resources. African education, welfare and development 
became the responsibility of the territorial governments 
2 
which had less funds to cater for the large African 
population in each of the territories. Such an 
arrangement was a clear endorsement by the Federal 
government of the policy of separate racial development 
on which, for many years, Southern Rhodesian society was 
based, and was in direct conflict with the essence of 
multi-racial partnership, racial equality and justice as 
spelt out in the federal preamble. 
In terms of education, such a policy meant that 
Africans and Europeans continued to be educated separately 
but, most importantly, it also meant that, while European 
education became the responsibility of the federal state 
and received full state aid, African education in the 
three territories remained largely the responsibility of 
1. See Draft Federal Scheme: 
Commission (1952). HMSO, 
Report of the Fiscal 
d. 8672, paras. 16-19. 
2. Central African Territories - Comparative Survey o 
Native Policy (1951), HMSO, Cmd. 8235, para. 122. 
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the missionaries, just as it had in the past. 
Although this policy was racist and disadvantageous 
to African education in terms of access to the more 
plentiful federal funds, the exclusion of African 
education from federal responsibility proved beneficial 
in other ways. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
it saved African education from coming under the racial 
oriented policies of the federal government where 
Huggins' ideology still prevailed. Africans in these 
territories had resisted their incorporation into the 
federal scheme for precisely the reason that they did not 
want to become part of a repressive and racist political 
machinery, controlled largely by Southern Rhodesian white 
settlers. With Huggins as premier of the federation, 
blacks in the two territories feared that their welfare 
and development, if they were incorporated into the 
federal scheme, would be put severely at risk. 
Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were 
used to a less racist British colonial educational policy 
than that operating in Southern Rhodesia where white 
settler rule was effective. The first African secondary 
schools in both territories were government schools as, 
since the establishment of Munali government secondary 
school in Northern Rhodesia in 1938, the colonial adminis- 




development of African post primary education The 
Ministry of African Education was advised by an 
Advisory Board on which Africans were represented but 
this was never the case in Southern Rhodesia. Besides, 
Northern Rhodesian blacks were more readily accepted 
into the Civil Service and other administrative and 
professional jobs than blacks were in Southern Rhodesia 
2. 
Nyasaland had an even less racist colonial adminis- 
tration than her two neighbours and enjoyed a less racist 
educational policy. The colonial government was 
directly engaged in promoting primary and secondary 
educational work long before the Southern Rhodesian 
3 
government contemplated such action The Nyasaland 
colonial government was also comparatively more co-opera- 
tive with missionaries in their educational work than 
was the case in Southern Rhodesia. Capitation grants 
for African education were provided to mission churches 
.4 much earlier than in Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, Africans 
See W. V. Brelsford (ed. ): Rhodesia_and Nyasaland 
(Cassell, London, 1960)f pp. 501-504. 
N. B. 
However, both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had far 
less educational provisions for Africans than those 
which existed in Southern Rhodesia. The presence of 
a large body of mission churches, engaged in educa- 
tional work in Southern Rhodesia partly accounted for 
the disparity. 
2. Franck, pp. cit., p. 166. 
3. See R. J. McDonald: A History of African Education in 
Nvasaland (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 




in Nyasaland had access to civil service and professional 
and skilled jobs much more readily than in either 
Northern or Southern Rhodesia 
1, for the reason that it 
was colonial policy in Nyasaland to train Africans for 
administrative and professional services and to prepare 
2 them for eventual self rule (This was also the case 
elsewhere in British Africa, e. g. Ghana and Nigeria, 
where the white population was small in number and non- 
settler in the sense that whites in Southern Rhodesia 
were. ) But it was not the case in Southern Rhodesia 
where the white settler policy determined that the whites 
should dominate the administrative, professional and 
skilled services in order to safeguard the continuity of 
white supremacy and rule. Therefore, it was to the 
advantage of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland that their affairs, including education, 
remained under territorial governments, and they were 
consequently not as much directly affected by racist 
federal policies as they would have been if they had come 
under federal responsibility. 
Brelsford (ed. ), cit., p. 504 and Franck, 9'. cit., 
_p p. 168. 
2. See F. D. Lugard: 
, 
Report on the Amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration 
1912-1919, Cmd. 468, HMSO, London (1920),, pp. 84-85 
and Lord Hailey: Native Administration and Political 
Development in British Tropical Africa 1940-42, 
London (1942), paras. IV-VI. 
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Similarly, Southern Rhodesian Africans benefited 
from having their educational affairs remain under 
territorial government and missionary responsibility 
as before. In this way, they also escaped the direct 
influence of Huggins' federal policies. 
Under Huggins' successor, Garfield Todd, African 
education in Southern Rhodesia received considerable 
government support and underwent massive expansion. 
new educational policy introduced by Todd led to innova- 
tions in African education which would have been 
inconceivable under Huggins' regime. 
GARFIELD TODD: HIS POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES 
Todd was one of the few white liberal politicians 
in Southern Rhodesian history whose belief in genuine 
multi-racial partnership provided the framework for his 
government's political, economic and social policies 
and reforms. As will be seen shortly, his 'progressiveness' 
led to significant attempts by his government to reform 
some aspects of Southern Rhodesia's colonial system and 
educational policy. 
A farmer and former missionary from New Zealand 
turned politician, Garfield Todd became Prime Minister 
following the 1954 General Election in which his United 
Rhodesia Party won an overwhelming victory of 26 out of 
1 
30 parliamentary seats Like his predecessors, he was 
1. Alexander, a. cit., p. 11. 
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brought to power by a predominantly white electorate 
but, unlike his predecessors, he adopted policies which 
showed a significant departure from the doctrinaire 
racial politics of past administrations. Although he 
is sometimes criticised for the repressive measures 
1: Af rican nationalism 
1 
he adopted to contain some aspects o. "it 
is difficult to dispute the fact that Todd was in many 
respects liberal. 
To begin with, he advocated a policy of closer racial 
co-operation at the risk of antagonising his federal 
counterpart and the white electorate. Most importantly, 
he identified the basic sources of racial conflict in 
Southern Rhodesia and the federation as the lack of 
parliamentary representation for Africans, racial 
segregation and discrimination and deliberate suppression 
of African advancement, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. 
These were the aspects of Southern Rhodesian colonial 
society which Todd believed needed urgent reform if 
genuine multi-racialism was to exist. 
His approach to the issue of parliamentary represen- 
tal-ion for Africans was to broaden franchise and admit 
the African 'middle class' which his educational, social 
and economic policies were designed to enlarge. This is 
a very important Point because it was a major factor in 
1. See Alexander, op. cit., p. 9. 
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determining the educational reforms which Todd intro- 
duced. In other words, Todd's belief in genuine multi- 
racial partnership in government and in the social and 
economic spheres provided the rationale Jf'-or his educa- 
tional reforms. 
Todd considered African participation in the central 
political, economic and social systems as essential if 
they were to secure a place alongside Europeans. He saw 
this participation by Africans as necessary to safeguard 
white interests against radical black nationalism which, 
if allowed to have its way, could destroy the white 
future. At the same time he wanted to ensure that the 
future of Africans was p. -Lotected against the extreme 
right wing colonial politics which, if also allowed to 
proceed unchecked, could severely damage African interests 
and lead to further racial confrontation and, thus, to a 
political crisis. Todd believed that, if the two 
extremes were avoided, a truly multi-racial society 
could be established in Southern Rhodesia. Racial 
harmony could be achieved provided there was genuine 
reform of those aspects of the colonial system which 
were most offensive to Af-ricans. 
One of the areas to which Todd gave priority for 
reform was the franchise system because he considered that 
the injustice inherent in it provided a rallying point 
for African nationalism and opposition to white rule. 
It is important to examine the nature of the franchise 
9901, 
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system as it existed at this timeland the constraints 
which such a system imposed on African political advance- 
ment, before discussing how Todd sought to reform it. 
The strategy for achieving reform in this sphere was 
closely linked to educational reform owing to the fact that 
the franchise qualifications were based on education, 
income and property. 
Under the 1953 Constitution, there were in Southern 
Rhodesia two voters rolls - the 'A' roll and the 'B' roll. 
Under the 'A' roll (also known as the General roll), the 
requirements were so high that it was dif-Eicult for the 
majority of Africans to qualify for franchise. These 
requirements were as follows: - 
(1) E720 p. a. income and ownership of immovable 
property valued at E1,500 plus basic literacy to 
enable the applicant to complete the application 
form in English and without assistance. 
Or: - 
(2) E480 p. a. income and ownership of immovable 
property valued at E1.000 plus primary education 
(for Africans, Standard 6). 
Or: - 
(3) 2300 p. a. income and ownership of immovable 
property valued at E500 plus four years secondary 
education. 
Or: - 
(4) Minister of religion with university degree or 
0001j, 
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five years of training at a theological school or 
two years at the school and three years in service 
1. 
Condition 1 disqualified the majority of Afri, --ans 
who had basic literacy but fell short of the required 
income and property. Estimates made by the Federal 
African Affairs Board in 1956 revealed that the average 
income of Africans in employment in Southern Rhodesia 
was only E70 p. a. 
2, 
and also that they possessed little 
or no property of any significant value. Cattle, the 
African's only property of significance, were discounted 
in computing the overall value of property owned, as such 
property was movable. Acceptable property included 
such items as land, buildings or mines and other forms 
of stationary business, and this was deliberately 
designed to ensure that not many Africans could meet the 
required prLoperty qualifications. 
In the case of Europeans, however, even those with 
little formal education, such as farmers, policemen, 
road construction workers, forest personnel etc., were 
able to qualify as, under the country's wage structure, 
whites were guaranteed high salaries irrespective of 
either their qualifications or the nature of the job 
they performed. Colin Leys has shown that few Europeans 
1. Palley, op. cit., p. 392, footnote No. 2. 
2. Franck, 22. cit., p. 177. 
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in 1956 earned less than E720 p. a. and that most of- them 
owned or occupied immovable property valued at well over 
E1,500, since Europeans possessed most of the productive 
land and business enterprises in the country. The result 
1 was that the majority of Europeans qualified to vote 
Under Condition 2, most of the Africans who had a 
complete primary education also failed to qualify on 
grounds of income and wealth. The average annual 
income of a school teacher, educated to Standard 6, plus 
possession of a lower teacher's certificate acquired 
after two years' training, was only E120 and this fell 
2 far short of the required E480 The wealth of Africans 
in this category was negligible and, as a result, some 
3,331 of the teachers in service in 1955 
3 
were disquali- 
fied from registering under the 'A' roll. 
Under Condition 3, most Africans failed to qualify 
because they did not possess the required four years of 
4 
secondary education or the necessary income Virtually 
no African minister of religion had a university education 
as prescribed under Condition 4 and most African ministers 
1. Leys, 2p. citl., p. 222. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1956, p. 14, Table 3. 
4. See Report of the Franchise Commission 1957 (Govt. 
Printer, Salisbury, 1957), lines 704-709. 
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of religion from independent churches had no formal 
theological training and this meant that only a handful 
of those trained in mission schools could qualify. 
Conditions laid down under the IB' roll, also 
known as the Special roll, were much lower and were 
intended to enable s6me of those who failed to meet the 
'A' roll requirements to obtain franchise. As will be 
seen, however, not many Africans were able to register 
even under this roll. The conditions were as follows: - 
(1) E150 p. a. income plus immovable property valued at 
E500 plus basic literacy. 
Or: - 
(2) E120 p. a. income,, no property required but a two 
1 
year secondary education 
Given the fact that the average annual income of 
an employed African was only E70, the majority of 
Africans still failed to qualify under Condition 1. 
Although an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Africans with 
Junior secondary qualifications in 1953 could theoreti- 
cally qualify for franchise under Condition 2 and thus 
substantially increase the African electorate, the 
effectiveness of the IBI roll was pre-empted by the 
condition that the total number of African voters 
admitted to the electoral register under this roll could 
2 
not exceed 20% of the total electorate When that 
figure was reached, no more were admitted except through 
1. Palley, o1p. cit., p. 392, footnote No. 2. 
2. See Ibid. r pp. 415-416. 
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the 'A' roll. Moreover, constituencies were delimited 
in such a way that no more than one-third of the voters 
1 in one constituency could qualify under the 'BI roll 
Thus, even if many Africans succeeded in acquiring the 
qualifications stipulated under the 'BI roll, the growth 
and effectiveness of the African electorate was already 
pre-determined to such an extent that Africans could never 
constitute a substantial proportion of the total 
electorate, let alone vote Europeans out of power. 
On the basis of this franchise, virtually all 
Europeans could qualify for the 'A' role but the vast 
majority of Africans could qualify for neither the 'A' 
nor IBI rolls. Of those Africans who did qualify, 
almost all did so through the IB' roll. The result was 
that the electorate was dominated by whites. The 1957 
Tredgold Franchise Commission observed that, for an 
African to qualify under these conditions, he must have 
acquired the position of an agricultural supervisor, 
building overseer, clerk, interpreter, minister of 
religion, chief editor or journalist, medical orderly, 
building contractor, artisan or policeman, with not less 
than ten years' service or of the rank of non-commissioned 
officer, which was very rare indeed. An African 
department messenger did not qualify until his thirty- 
seventh year of service, or his eleventh year of service 
1. Franck, 22. cit., p. 186. 
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as a head messenger. An African nurse would qualify 
only if she were state registered. A teacher who had 
passed standard six and taken a two year primary 
teacher's lower certificate course would only qualify 
after many years of service. To qualify at the outset 
of his teaching career, he needed to have taken a two 
year secondary course, plus a higher teacher's certifi- 
1 
cate 
On the basis of this franchise, only 441 Southern 
Rhodesian Africans, out of a total black population of 
2 two and three quarter million, had the vote in 1953 
This was in sharp contrast to the 48,870 whites with 
franchise out of a total white population of 219,0003. 
The injustice of this system aroused considerable 
African criticism and become one of the prime targets of 
nationalist politics which crystallised with the formation, 
in 1955, of the Salisbury Youth League political organisa- 
tion by two of the early founders of black nationalism, 
4 James Chikerema and George Nyandoro 
Report of the Franchise Commission 1957 (Govt. Printer, 
Salisbury, S. Rhodesia, 1957), lines 690-706. 
2. Franck, 22. cit., p. 181. 
3. Creighton, 2p. cit., p. 103. 
4. Nathan Shamuyarira: Crisis in Rhodesia (Andre Deutsch, 
London, 1965), pp. 20-28. 
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Todd's first step towards reforming the franchise 
system was to set up an electoral commission of inquiry 
in 1956 to "consider and report on a system for the just 
representation of the people of the colony'll. The 
commission, which was chaired by Sir Robert Tredgold, 
recommended a series of changes to the existing 
franchise. These involved the introduction of a 
special franchise for Africans in which the income 
qualifications were lowered substantially to (a) Annual 
income of E240 plus literacy or (b) Standard VIII (i. e. 
Form II secondary education) and an annual income of 
E120 2. Educational qualifications remained largely 
unchanged because, according to the commission, with 
more education facilities being provided by the 
government, many Africans would be able to acquire 
enough education to enable them to earn the proposed 
3 
incomes and thus qualify In addition, the commission 
proposed that (a) in computing the value of a person's 
income, board, lodging and clothing, or any money 
received for provision for any or all of these, should 
be included 
4 
and (b) the income of a married man and 
his wife should be added together and the total should 
1. Report of the Franchise Commission 1957, lines 3-4. 
2. Franck, 2p. cit., p. 188. Also see Rhodesia Herald, 
15th August 1957. 
3. Report of the Franchise Commission 1957, lines 721- 
722. 
4. Ibid., lines 734-735. 
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be deemed to be the income of each, and that a wife 
should be deemed to occupy the same property as her 
husband 1. 
Such reforms, to say the least, horrified the white 
electorate who had voted Todd into power to preserve 
their political power. His declared intention in 1957 
to enfranchise at least 6,000 Africans during his 
tenure of office greatly surprised even his own 
government ministers 
2. 
Although the Tredgold Commission's 
recommendations were not implemented after Todd's fall 
from power in 1958, they represented a rare attempt by a 
white colonial premier to reform the colonial system, 
a system wherein he was supposed to preserve the status 
quo. For most whites the colonial system was the only 
one which could guarantee eternal white supremacy. To 
Todd, however, nothing short of incorporating many more 
Africans into the colonial government machinery could 
preserve the white future and, in this belief, he differed 
significantly from his predecessor who had placed his faith 
in unadulterated white power. 
Todd also emphasised the need for socio-economic 
reforms, stressing that, as long as the majority of 
Report of the Franchise Commission 1957, lines 736- 
738. 
2. Franck, 2p. cit., p. 186. 
or, 
186. 
Africans were poorly paid and discriminated against, 
the country would not achieve full development. His 
first initiative in the reform of these spheres was to 
formulate the Apprenticeship Bill and the New 
Conciliation Bill to enable Africans to be prepared for, 
and admitted to, skilled jobs as well as allowing them 
to participate in multi-racial trade unions But 
white opposition to both bills prevented their approval 
by parliament. Both bills were referred to a select 
committee and did not become law until Whitehead became 
premier. 
However, Todd succeeded in reforming wage structures 
in 1957 in order to give urban black workers higher 
wages. To the astonishment and anger of even some of 
his cabinet ministers, he raised the minimum wage for 
all urban African workers by as much as 30% 
2. H- also 
legislated for a variety of other reforms relating to 
land and urban African residences in a bid to create a 
home-owning African middle class and skilled proletariat3. 
A crucial aspect of Todd's overall reform strategy 




Alexander, pp. cit., p. 13. 
Franck, op. cit., p. 186. Also see D. J. Murray, 2p. 
cit., pp. 335-343. 
S/M/S/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1957, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
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that the expansion of educational opportunities for 
Africans was essential for the achievement of the objec- 
tives of his political, economic and social reforms, and 
the creation of a multi-racial society. He argued that 
more educational opportunities must be provided to 
enable Africans to acquire the acceptable European 
standards and, in this way, become incorporated into the 
central colonial, political economic and social 
machinery and institutions. For him, education was 
basic to the enlargement of an African middle class 
capable of sharing (with responsibility) rights and 
1 
privileges with Europeans Todd also recognised that 
the welfare of the country depended upon the maximum 
development and utilisation of the potential of every 
2 
citizen, black or white Moreover, he regarded the 
lack of education amongst blacks as one of the main 
reasons for their present level of serious under- 
development and frustration with the colonial system. 
It was therefore Todd's plan to promote massive African 
educational development in order to prepare Africans for 
professional, skilled and semi-skilled jobs in every 
possible employment sector and it was in the area of 
C/S/R/B/TAB, H. J. Lawrence to T. A. Beetham, 12th 
August 1957, WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
2. Alexander, p2. cit., p. 13. 
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African education that Todd effected the most signifi- 
cant and long term reforms. 
TODD'S SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL REFORMS: OBJECTIVES, 
STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS 1954-53 
one of Todd's more immediate tasks in seeking to 
develop African secondary education, which he felt had 
been seriously neglected by the previous government, was 
to review current government and missionary policies in 
the context of his multi-racial policies. His primary 
objective was to develop a unified church and state 
policy which was consistent with his belief in a multi- 
racial partnership. Such a policy would enable his 
government to co-operate with missionaries in securing 
the rapid expansion of African secondary education. As 
a former missionary himself, he was fully acquainted 
with the nature of the problems which confronted the 
churches in the educational f ield and it was his aim to 
directly involve the government in resolving these 
problems. In Todd's opinion, co-operation between 
churches and state was crucial to the achievement of 
effective planning, organisation, administration and 
development of secondary education for Africans. 
The first stage in the process of creating church 
and state co-operation was marked by the calling of a 
joint conference by the government of the SRCC and the 
DNE to seek ways of achieving such co-operation. 
00, 
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The conference discussed and agreed on collabora- 
1 
tion between both parties The government agreed to 
consider introducing a grants-in-aid system for secon- 
dary schools to ensure regular availability of funds for 
2 
missionary secondary educational work A Central 
Advisory Committee, similar to that created in 1942, 
was established and charged with the responsibility of 
investigating the needs of secondary education and the 
exact nature and extent of assistance the government 
3 
could provide The Committee was to submit its 
recommendations to the Director of Native Education. 
The Committee Report contained a series of 
recommendations which were of vital importance to the 
future of secondary education. It called for (1) close 
consultation between the DNE and SRCC on all matters of 
policy in order to ensure continuity in educational 
planning and development 
4; (2) provision by the 
government of capitation grants to enable the establish- 
ment of more primary and secondary schools5; (3) no 
6 
restrictions on the expansion of secondary education 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in Salisbury, 14th December 1954, 
IMC/CBMS Archives,. Box 292. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
Minutes of the Meeting ofthe Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in Salisbury, 15th December 1955, 
para. 4 (d) f IMC/CBMS Archives , Box 2 92 . 





(4) the administration and supervision of secondary 
schools to become the joint responsibility of the DNE 
and the SRCC 
1; (5) state scholarships to be made 
available to poor students by the government at both 
Junior and Senior secondary school levels 
2; 
and (6) the 
incorporation of technical and commercial courses in the 
secondary school curriculum, as was already the case in 
European schools. 
The ready acceptance of these recommendations by 
the government underlined the change of state policy. 
Most of the recommendations were incorporated into what 
became official government and missionary policy on 
African secondary education - the first Five Year Plan - 
announced by the DNE in 1956. 
The Five Year Plan as a policy framework 
The Five Year Plan was the outcome of the ideas 
developed by the DNE, the SRCC and the Central Advisory 
Committee. It covered several aspects of the develop- 
ment of African education, from primary to teacher 
training and secondary education, and provided the 
policy framework within which missionaries and the 
1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
e SRCC held in Salisburv, 15th December 1955, 
para. 0 
Ibid., para. 4(e) 
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government planned for this development. The 
objectives of this Plan were, firstly, to expand upper 
primary school provisions to enable more pupils to 
acquire a complete primary education 
1. This was to 
be achieved through increased government grants to 
mission churches. Secondly, teacher-training at the 
PTH level was to be expanded to provide more scope 
for Junior secondary school graduates to train for 
teaching in upper primary classes 
2. The intention was 
not just to provide employment for secondary school 
leavers but also to overcome the problem of a shortage 
of trained teachers in many mission schools as identi- 
fied by the 1951 Kerr Commission. Expenditure on 
teacher training was therefore to be increased 
3 
substantially during the period of the Five Year Plan 
The most significant developments were, however, 
envisaged at the secondary school level where one of 
the main objectives of the Five Year Plan was to ensure 
that every pupil who passed Standard 6 had the opportunity 
4 to acquire at least two years of secondary education 
This was to be achieved through unrestricted expansion 
1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in Salisbury on 13th December 1956, 
para. 4 (d) , IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. para. 6. 
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of the Junior secondary school network accompanied by 
the development of Senior secondary education 
1. The 
government was to become more directly involved than 
ever before in the expansion process through the 
provision of funds and administrative personnel who 
were to assist the missionaries in the day to day 
development work. One of the important innovations 
envisaged in the Plan was the introduction of indus- 
trial courses in schools providing secondary education. 
These courses were to be made available in two 
different ways: (a) either as part of the curriculum, 
in which case the students had the option to take or 
leave the courses or (b) they could form entirely 
separate diploma courses for those students with two 
or four years of secondary education who were inter- 
ested in training for employment in industry or business 
2 
offices Missionaries were to be free to decide on 
the introduction of the courses in their respective 
schools and to select, in consultation with the DNE, the 
academic courses they proposed to teach. The objective 
was to give missionaries freedom to determine and control 
their curricula in collaboration with the DNE. 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council o-jll--"' 





The Five Year Plan committed the government to 
heavy expenditure on African education, expenditure 
that neither the white electorate nor some members of 
the government were willing to accept. Placing the 
government in the forefront of educational development 
in terms of providing financial and manpower resources, 
as well as taking a leading role in planning and policy 
making, was a costly undertaking which had serious 
political consequences for Todd as the European tax 
payer did not want any of his money to be used for the 
advancement of African interests. Other unforeseen 
expenses made the undertaking even more expensive and 
objectionable to the European electorate. For example, 
once the Five Year Plan had been drawn up, it became 
necessary to re-organise the administrative system of 
secondary education to facilitate the effective 
implementation of the innovations envisaged. This 
involved the creation of a local Junior Secondary 
Education Board capable of running an expanding 
secondary school system and, in addition, to provide 
for the efficient organisation and administration of 
Junior secondary education. The Board was required to 
perform a number of functions. Firstly, it was to be 
responsible for designing the Junior certificate 
curricula from which the various schools would select 
the courses they wished to teach. Secondly, the 
ik 
194. 
Board was to set examinations and award certificates 
with the objective of terminating the existing affilia- 
tion of the local Junior school certificate to the South 
African secondary education system, and thus create an 
autonomous Junior secondary board which could establish 
local standards. Such a measure would also ensure 
that the local system was responsive to local conditions 
and that the examination standards were related to the 
teaching standards in the various schools. 
In 1956,, Todd successfully created an independent 
board for the Rhodesia Junior Certificate 1 by breaking 
the affiliation of the local Junior school certificate 
to the South African junior certificate board. The 
costs of establishing this board, financing it and 
employing the necessary personnel, ran into thousands 
of pounds and aroused further white discontent with the 
government policies. 
In order to ensure that the educational develop- 
ments and innovations contained in the Five Year Plan 
were implemented, and that the missionaries received 
the necessary aid and support, Todd took over 
responsibility for the DNE by appointing himself as its 
2 director in 1956 As Prime Minister, and Director of 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 




the department, he was in a much stronger position than 
previous directors to get his plans approved by 
parliament and to sanction more resources for African 
education. In the first year of the Five Year Plan, 
for example, there was a large increase in government 
expenditure on African education when E1,544,211 was 
sanctioned by parliament compared to E754,710 passed 
in 1951-52 - an increase of 105% 
1. 
With so much money at its disposal, the DNE made 
special grants totalling E301000 for the development of 
2 
new Junior secondary schools This was followed in 
1957 by the provision of capitation grants which 
missionaries had been seeking for secondary education 
since 1939. These grants amounted to E20,000 for 
each new secondary school being builtspread over a 
3 
period of five years A further proposal for 
E160,000 towards the maintenance of all of the existing 
4 
schools in the secondary sector was also approved 
Such large resources coupled with the progressive terms 
of the Five Year Plan provided the first real opportunity 
for the extensive development of secondary education. 
Franck., pp. cit... p. 118. 
2. Minutes of the Meetinq of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in Salisbury on 29th December 1957, 
IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
3. C/S/R/Bj MMS/TAB/B/H/Cj T. A. Beetham to J. H. 




Implementation of the Five Year Plan and theimplications 
for the develonment of secondary education 
Government policy received the acclamation of all 
the churches. The policy represented the kind of 
response and co-operation that the missionaries had 
sought for many years. More significant was the fact 
that, this time, the churches were actively involved in 
policy-making and were therefore implementing a policy 
the objectives of which they were all in agreement with. 
Co-operation between church and state encouraged local 
and overseas donors, interested in aiding African 
advancement, to provide further substantial assistance 
and this was of great value to the missionaries enabling, 
as it did, further expansion of secondary education to 
take place. 
I 
The Anglicans embarked on a full scale development 
of their secondary institutions in 1957 with the 
establishment of a second secondary school at Cyrene 
Mission, near the town of Plumtree. With the backing 
of 220,000 in capitation grants from the DNE 
11 E101000 
from the sale of church property in Salisbury 
2, 
and 
E2,000 from the SPG Board in London 
3, 
this secondary 
SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 262 A, General File 1957, Bishop of 
Southern Rhodesia to Rev. E. A. E. Sulston, 15th July 
1957F SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 262 A, General File 1957-58, 




school for boys made rapid progress in development. 
By early 1958, basic facilities were available to enable 
the first class of 40 Form I boys to begin their studies. 
Another boy's secondary school was begun at St. Bernard's 
Mizeki Mission, near Marandellas, in 1957 under the 
aegis of the Bernard Mizeki Trust 
1. This school was 
established as an experiment in non racial secondary 
education and, as such, received a special government 
grant of E30,000 to assist in its development 
2, 
and a 
further E10,000 from the Mashonaland diocese of the 
3 
church In addition, considerable financial aid came 
from multi-national companies which wanted to promote 
multi-racial partnership. The companies believed 
that non-racial education was a significant step 
towards the establishment of a multi-racial society and 
deserved assistance. The BSA Co., the Anglo-American 
Co. and the Rio-Tinto Steel and Zinc Companies raised 
E50,000 altogether to be used over a period of 15 years 
for the development of a full six year secondary 
education course 
4. This financial aid served a very 
useful purpose in assisting the rapid development of 
SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF263,, Finance File 1958-60, Rt. Rev. 
E. F. Paget to Rev. E. A. E. Sulston, 13th June 1958, 
SPG Archives. 
SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF263, Finance File 1958-60, Bishop 
E. F. Paget to Rev. E. A. E. Sulston, 19th March 1958, 
SPG Archives. 
3. Ibid. 
4. SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF263, Finance File 1958-60, 




the school. The incentive to quickly develop senior 
secondary education at the school came with the 
opening of the University College of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1957 and this provided new scope for 
Africans to acquire higher education 
1. 
The school, however, faced serious difficulties in 
implementing non-racial education. In the first 
instance, white farmers in the surrounding area 
opposed the integration of African and European students 
whatever the objective 
2. Secondly, the white 
community in general was opposed to multi-racial educa- 
tion because Europeans feared that, if such a scheme 
was successful, it would encourage false hopes of 
equality with whites in those Africans who attended the 
school. The Reverend Robert Grinham, under whose 
supervision the school was developed, observed in 1958 
that European parental opposition to Bernard Mizeki 
3 
school made it very difficult to obtain white students 
Indeed, when the school opened in 1960, not a single 
European student had applied for admission and all the 
4 first 70 Form I boys were African For many years the 
school continued to be African. Besides, the high cost 




R. Grinham to Mr. Sulston, 13th June 1958, SPG 
Archives. 
(Faber & Faber, London, 1960), p. 272. 
SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF261, Confidential Report., R. 
to Mr. Sulston, 2nd May 1959, SPG Archives. 
SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF263, Finance-File 1958-60, 
4. SPG. Mash/D/C/ TF. 261, General File 1960-62, 
R. Grinham to E. A. E. Sulston, 12th April 1962, SPG 
Archives. 
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of tuition and boarding which amounted to E60 per year 
1F 
and doubled to E120 per year in 1962 
2, 
made the school 
an institution largely for students from black middle 
class business families. The majority of African students 
could not afford the cost of attending the school. 
The Wesleyan Methodists concentrated on developing 
Tegwani school. Between June 1956 and June 1958 the 
school underwent extensive expansion which raised the 
level of secondary education from Form III to Form V31 
the complete South African higher school certificate and 
equivalent of the Cambridge school certificate (CSC). 
4 The school enrolment also increased from 110 to 204 
All this was achieved at a cost of E30,000, E15,000 of 
which came from the government 
5, E10,000 from the Overseas 
67 Methodist Board , and E5,000 from the Beet Trust 
Several schools were established by other denominations with 
the assistance of the government. 
SPG. /Mash/D/C/TF. 261, General File 1960-62, 
R. Grinham to E. A. E. Sulston,, 12th April 1962, SPG 
Archives. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C/S/R/B/TABr H. J. Lawrence to T. A. Beetham, 15th 
August 1958, WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
4. S/M/S/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1957, 
Teqwani Traininq Institution, PrinciDal's Annual 
Report 1957, p. l. WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
5. S/M/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1957, 





The government itself directly engaged in the 
development of secondary education when, in 1957, it 
established its second secondary school for boys at 
Fletcher, outside Gwelo 
1, 
and for the first time 
introduced secondary education for urban blacks. 
Another school was established in the Highfield African 
township of Salisbury in 1957 
2, 
with two more schools 
coming under construction in Bulawayo and Umtali towns 
3 in 1958 
By 1958, the number of African secondary schools 
had risen to 19 
4 from 11 in 1954, when Todd came to 
power (an increase of eight schools in four years). 
This was more than two-thirds of all the secondary 
schools established during the first 15 years of 
secondary education under Huggins' government. The 
increase in enrolment during the four years of Todd's 
premiership can be shown as follows: 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1957, p. 6. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 







in enrolment in African secondary schools 









F Total Increase 






258 36 294 719 159 878 584 
177 25 202 216 18 234 32 
46 1 47 88 3 91 44 
--- 11 2 13 13 
Such an increase within a four year period represented 
a substantial achievement and underlined the effective- 
ness of church and state co-operation in promoting 
secondary educational development. 
Further successes resulted from the Five Year Plan. 
The government introduced in 1957 a uniform curriculum 
at the senior school certificate level. This was 
carried out by making all senior secondary schools take 
the CSC courses and thus eliminating the practice whereby 
some schools offered South African Matriculation Board 
courses at the post Junior certificate level while 
3 
others offered CSC courses An advantage of all the 
Report of the Secretaryfor Native Affairs,, Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Develop- 
ment for the Year 1955, pp. 122-123. 
N. B. There was no Form IV class in 1954. 
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1958, pp. 17-18. 
3. Minutes of the Executive Council of the SRCC held 
at Goromonzi on 14th December 1958, IMC/CBMS 
Archives, Box 292. 
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senior schools taking courses from the Board was that, 
administratively, it worked out Cheaper for the DNE to 
organise high school examinations. moreover, such an 
arrangement facilitated the transfer of teachers and 
students from one school to another during the course 
of the school year. 
In addition to assisting with the development of 
formal secondary education, the government took steps 
to organise correspondence courses. After the 
creation of the Rhodesia Junior Certificate Board in 
1956, Todd re-organised the secondary education corres- 
pondence system by making the DNE serve as the local 
authority for the South African Education Department, 
through which courses were offered by several private 
1 
union colleges This arrangement, by providing 
facilities locally, had the advantage of making corres- 
pondence courses cheaper. The DNE provided students 
with printed lectures at subsidised rates and also 
acted as the post office for students' correspondence 
with the South African colleges. Indeed, now that most 
of the administrative costs of supplying study material 
and organising examinations (formerly borne by the 
South African Education Department) were covered by the 
DNE,, the overall cost of undertaking correspondence 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1957, P. 6. 
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courses became much cheaper. This enabled more 
Africans to undertake private studies and records show 
that in January 1956, before the changes were 
effected, about 184 subjects at the Junior certificate 
level were taken through correspondence courses 
1. By 
2 1958, however, this number had risen to 678 A similar 
increase was noted at the Senior school certificate level 
where numbers rose from ill 
3 
to 945 
4 in the same period 
showing that more students were now able to afford the 
cost of private studies. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the extent 
of secondary educational development under the Five 
Year Plan policy. At this stage, it is now important 
to consider the impact of these developments on African 
political, economic and social advancement with the aim 
of examining how far the development of African 
secondary education assisted in the achievement of the 
goals which Todd set out to attain when he introduced 
his reforms. The discussion centres on the limitations 















the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1958, p. 4. 
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and implications of educational development in an 
essentially conservative colonial system which was 
opposed to rapid A-frican advancement. 
Todd, in collaboration with the churches, 
succeeded in providing a significant proportion of 
Africans with secondary education. He impressed 
Africans so much in that respect that he was described 
by a leading black journalist in 1957 as the 
only European in the central African federa- 
tion whom the 7X2 million Africans in the 
territory might be persuaded to cast their 
susnicions aside for and follow in the multi- 
racial partnership. 1 
Stanlake Sam'Kange, one of the prominent intellec- 
tuals and politicians of the day, openly said of Todd 
that he had convinced Africans that he was a Prime 
2 Minister for them as well as for the whites 
However, the availability of more educational 
facilities for Africans did not guarantee them the 
social, economic and political advancement they sought 
and which Todd intended them to secure. Fundamental 
changes in the colonial system were needed but, despite 
Todd's attempts to effect such changes, the extent of 
his success was restricted by European opposition and 
his own fear of antagonising the electorate which had 
brought his government to power. In some cases 
1. Alexander, a. cit., p. 33. 
2. Shamuyarira, on. cit., p. 30. 
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parliament declined to ratify the reforms he proposed, 
as was the case with the industrial relations and land 
reform bills in 1957. The primary reason for 
parliament's rejection of both bills was that they went 
too far in seeking to give Africans more rights and 
this,, parliament believed, could undermine white 
privileged status and power. The failure to obtain 
parliamentary approval for the recommendations of the 
Tredgold franchise commission also pointed to the 
strength of white opposition to African political 
advancement. 
Another aspect o'. 1- colonial society which withstood 5r 
Todd's efforts at reform concerned the white racial 
attitudes which accounted for the high level of racial 
discrimination and segregation existing in Southern 
Rhodesia. Africans discovered that, desT)ite having 
obtained the necessary educational qualifications, this 
discrimination continued to place them at a serious 
disadvantage on seeking employment. Thus the euphoria 
amongst Africans generated by more educational oppor- 
tunities becoming available than ever before was 
tempered by the realities of post school unemployment, 
a reality which many Junior and Senior school leavers 
were already experiencing. 
The reasons for this situation can be divided into 
four categories: (1) the limitations of the secondary 
school curricula; (2) employment policy; (3) discrim- 
ination against educated A.,, -7ri, --ans by Europeans and (4) 
206. 
the failure by Todd to sufficiently reform the colonial 
system because the system would not permit him to do so. 
Limitations of the curricula 
The majority of African secondary school graduates 
could not obtain employment because they left school 
with no skills to offer industry. This was due to the 
fact that African schools did not attach importance to 
the teaching of industrial and technical subjects, 
despite the realisation of the DNE and the SRCC in 1954 
that these subjects were essential, bearing in mind the 
extent of the unemployment problem which faced past 
school leavers. The government therefore proposed that 
a number of vocational, technical and commercial 
courses be introduced in schools urgently, either as 
part of the curriculum or as fully fledged diploma 
courses for those pupils who already had secondary 
school qualifications but wanted to prepare themselves 
for employment in industry. 
(a) building and carpentry; 
The courses included: 
(b) business calculations 
for boys with a four year secondary education who 
wanted to become junior accountants in industry; (c) 
secretarial courses of one year duration; (d) book- 
keeping for those interested in office work; (e) 
typewriting and shorthand for those interested in 
1 
clerical and secretarial work 
Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1957, P. 6. 
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Goromonzi and Fletcher government schools took the 
lead in initiating the courses 
1, 
and some mission 
schools followed suit, including St. Augustine's, 
2.3 Penhalonga , and Tegwani One of the main weaknesses 
in the provision of the courses lay in the fact that, 
where the courses were integrated with the curriculum, 
they were not allotted the same teaching time as the 
academic courses. In addition, they were often offered 
as optional courses but still the overall emphasis in 
teaching was on academic subjects. Most teachers, 
because of their own academic background, did not hold 
non-academic courses in high esteem and thus tended to 
judge a student's intelligence mainly by his performance 
in the academic courses. Students did not, therefore, 
learn to value the importance of industrial education 
and the skills they could acquire by such study. Even 
in those schools which made a genuine effort to encour- 
age students to take industrial courses seriously, 
spelling out the range of employment opportunities 
available to those who acquired industrial skills 
4, 
there 
1. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1957, p. 6. 
2. SPG. Mash/D/C TF. 263, Finance File 1958-60, Rt. Rev. 
E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 11th November 1958, SPG 
Archives. 
3. S/M/S/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1957, 
Tecrwani Traininq Institution: Princioalls Revort 
for 1957, p. 2, WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
4. See SPG. Mash/D, Annual Report of the Bishop of 
Southern Rhodesia for 1957, SIPG Archives. 
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was another serious setback to the students' acceptance 
of the courses. 
Employment policy 
It was common knowledge amongst students that 
employment policy was very much in favour of those who 
had formal education qualifications, especially in the 
Public and Civil Service and other employment sectors 
offering white collar professions. Those who did not 
possess academic qualifications were not considered 
for service. For example, entrance requirements for 
such jobs in the Civil Service as adult education 
assistant, agricultural laboratory assistant, broad- 
caster, dispensary assistant or wireless operator, were 
1 
at least a Standard 6 education In practice, 
however, those applicants with Standard 6 education were 
often passed over in favour of those with secondary 
education. 
Even the wage structure in most professional 
services was directly linked to academic educational 
qualifications. For example, in the Civil Service 
the wage structure for Africans in graded services in 
1957 was as follows: 
Franck,, pp. cit., p. 166. 
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Table 3.2. 
Relationships between income and educational qualifica- 
tions for Africans in the Southern Rhodesia Civil 
Service in 1957 (1) 
Salary range 
Classification No. of Africans per month Qualification 
Grade A 4t911 £6,12s-£22.10s Std. 6 
Grade B 450 £17.10s-£40.14s Form 4 
Grade C 90 E27.2s-E55.8s Form 6 
ne 
(or 
.t Makere'r. ollege A 
Diploma or its 
equivalent) 
Similar relationships existed in most other professions, 
e. g. in the teaching profession, where academic back- 
ground, professional certificate held, and years of 
experience determined wage differentials of teachers 
teaching the same classes. 
Promotion was also dependent on educational qualifi- 
cations. For example, an African police constable with 
a Standard 6 education needed at least 20 years of 
service to qualify for promotion, but one with either 
Form II or IV education could rise to the rank of a 
non commissioned officer in only half that time. 
Therefore, from the point of view of better employment 
prospects, with associated improvement in income and 
Franck,, pp. cit... p. 167. 
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social status, most students Preferred to acquire 
academic rather than industrial qualifications. But,, 
even then, not all those who acquired academic qualifi- 
cations gained access to the professions because of the 
intense comiDetition for the limited jobs available - 
more often many industrial, managerial and administrative 
posts were simply not open to Africans, whatever their 
qualifications. White trade unions excluded Africans 
from many such posts and this white monopoly of jobs, 
plus the fact that, until 1959, apprenticeship of 
Africans in any industry was legally prohibited, worsened 
the unemployment situation for African high school leavers. 
The unemployment situation was even more acute for 
those Africans who failed to make the grade in school, 
or either dropped out or were denied educational 
opportunities by the selection process. They had neither 
the required level of formal educational qualifications nor 
skills to offer and therefore were unlikely to find employ- 
ment in the professions or other jobs providing high income 
in either rural or urban areas. Such Africans had to be 
content with low paying manual jobs in the mines or on 
farms, if indeed they could find them. Unfortunately 
there were very many Africans who found themselves 
faced with such a situation and many of these were 
dropouts from the school system, at both primary and 
ddk 
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secondary levels. The following table provides a 
guide to the extent of the problem of wastage in 
African schools: 
Table 3.3. 
"Wastagd'in African schools between 1947 and 1960 
Pupils Wastage 
Intake year Sub. A 1947 81,821 - 
Standard 11 1950 23,366 58,455 
Standard VI 1954 4,429 18,937 
Form 11 1956 1,888 2,541 
Form IV 1958 379 1,509 
Form VI 1960 15 364 
The number of African children who dropped out of the 
formal school system, and as a result failed to achieve 
their aspirations for social, economic and political 
advancement in the given Rhodesian colonial situation, 
is seen from the table to be extremely high. Of the 
81,821 pupils who enrolled in Sub Standard A in 1947, 
only 4,429 reached Standard 6, showing that 77,392 had 
dropped out during primary schooling. Of the 1,888 who 
reached Form II Junior secondary, only 379 got to Form IV, 
while a mere 15 reached 'A' levels. Put in another way, 
of an estimated 85% of African children who entered 
primary school in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s, only 
Patrick Keatley: The Politics of Partnership: The 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Penguin 
African Library, 1963) F p. 372. 
O%k 
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1% reached the tenth year of schooling, despite the 
rapid expansion of educational opportunities under 
Todd's government. Overall, approximately 80% of the 
children received schooling up to Standard 11,36% of 
this 80% reached Standard IV and 18% of the 36% completed 
primary education. Of those, only 4% reached Form IV, 
while only 1% of the remainder received a full six year 
secondary education (Form VI 
10 This meant that only 
a handful of African children who reached secondary 
education were, theoretically, within reach of the 
socio-economic and political aspirations they sought 
to achieve. Those who failed to succeed in the formal 
school system stood no chance whatsoever of attaining 
their goal. 
Discrimination against educated Africans in employment 
The small proportion of Africans who benefited 
from formal education by securing positions in the 
various professional services, and thus joining 
the ranks of the black educated elite and middle 
class, soon found that their socio-economic and 
political positions did not give them equal status with 
Europeans. In other words, despite having acquired 
1. Franklin, op. cit., p. 178. 
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the so-called acceptable standards of civilisation 
through educational attainment (which Todd hoped would 
admit them to European society and so create a multi- 
racial community), educated Africans found that they 
were not readily accepted by Europeans. Thev were 
discriminated against in employment and almost every 
other sphere of life. Their educational qualifications 
did little to change the attitudes and pre-conceived 
racist ideas of the white settlers towards Africans. 
Discrimination against educated Africans continued 
to be clearly evident in employment. If a white 
employer found a qualified African he wished to employ 
in a supervisory or administrative position, the 
European labour force walked out until his appointment 
1 
was withdrawn Even in the government Civil Service, 
discrimination was widely practised. In 1957, of the 
16,321 employees in the 32 Civil Service departments, 
only 3,757 Africans were graded, all being in the most 
2 junior positions. 8,206 were unestablished The 
senior posts were all occupied by Europeans and only 
they enjoyed secure tenure in the following grades: - 
3 
1. See Franck, 22. cit., pp. 167-168. 











Even some of the 1,227 unestablished whites held higher 
positions than some graded Africans. Moreover, Africans 
in government service, with the exception of those who 
were graded, were excluded from the terms of employment 
prescribed in the Public Service Act which specified 
that persons paid on an hourly, daily or monthly basis 
were, in the legal sense, excluded from the Public 
Service and had, for example, no right to claim pension 
funds after retirement from service 
1. But even those 
Africans who were within the terms of the Public 
Services Act, and were graded, found that their salaries 
were four to five times less than those of whites in 
the same grade, with the same qualifications, and doing 
2 the same job This was also the case in the salary 
scales of those in the teaching profession: for example, 
an African school teacher with four years of secondary 
1. Leys, 
. 
22. cit., p. 62. 
2. Franck, 22. cit., p. 167. 
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education, plus two years of higher Primary Teacher 
Certificate (PTH) training, earned between E15 to E20 
a month, while his European counterpart earned over E50 
to E70 per month 
1. Discriminatory wage differentials 
existed in all the professions. 
The refusal of white colonial society to accept 
educated blacks on equal terms and accord them the same 
political, economic and social status and recognition, 
undermined Todd's plan to bring the African middle 
class into the colonial system and use them to build a 
multi-racial society. Because they were rejected and 
discriminated against by the whites, the educated 
Africans learned to identify themselves with the under- 
privileged masses and to co-operate with them in opposing 
the discriminatory and oppressive colonial system. To 
a large extent, this explains why the early founders and 
organisers of modern African nationalism, such as 
Machael Mawema, Leopold Takawira, James Chikerema, 
Nathan Shamuyariral Joshua Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole 
and the current Prime Minister of what is now Zimbabwe, 
Robert Mugabe, were all formally educated people who 
became incensed by the racial discrimination which 
existed in Southern Rhodesia. Most of these nationalists 
were teachers and civil servants who sought to bring about 
S/M/S/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1958, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60. 
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more changes in the political, economic and social 
systems than Todd could, through intensive African 
opposition to the colonial system. 
The dilemma for Todd was that, while he agreed with 
some of the demands of the nationalists for racial 
equality, as Prime Minister he could not allow himself to 
be seen by the whites giving way to pressure from them. 
moreover, Todd disapproved of some of the more radical 
demands made by the nationalists such as 'one man, one vote', 
or universal suffrage, because he thought this would put 
the government into irresponsible hands and undermine 
the Icivilised' white standards. But, even if Todd had 
wanted to meet some of the justified demands, such as 
the elimination of white monopoly of the higher civil 
service and other key professional jobs in government 
and industry; the introduction of equal pay for equal 
jobs and qualifications; the right of Africans to full 
membership of trade unions; the abolishment of racial 
segregation; the passing of a law prohibiting discrimin- 
ation,, he was prevented from so doing bly the strong 
opposition of the white colonial society. The whites 
dominated the electorate, controlled parliament and all 
the institutions and instruments of power, and would not 
allow their privileged status and basis of power to be 
undermined by such radical reforms. 
Frustrated by Todd's inability to make sufficiently 
far reaching reforms, Africans resorted to intense, 
217. 
political activity against the colonial system which 
Todd's government represented. In an attempt to 
prevent radical black nationalism from undermining the 
colonial system, the 'liberal' Todd resorted to 
repressive political measures in 1957-58 when he banned 
the African Democratic Party and the African National 
Congress and detained some of the nationalists 
1. 
Todd was now faced with, on the one hand, severe 
criticism by the Africans for resorting to repression 
instead of taking decisive political action to redress 
their grievances and, on the other, mounting European 
opposition to the reforms he had introduced. The 
whites held Todd responsible for encouraging African 
political, economic and social ambitions to rise to an 
extent where they began to fight the system in order to 
reach their goals. They believed that each reform that 
Todd had introduced merely increased African demand for 
more reform. Moreover, many whites in Southern 
Rhodesia did not accept Todd's multi-racialism ideal 
and therefore did not think it was the responsibility of 
the whites to strive for African advancement since this, 
after all, threatened their own position. 
By 1957, Todd's popularity amongst the whites had 
fallen sharply. They regarded his policies and reforms 
1. See Loney, 
. 
2p. cit., pp. 101-102. 
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as a direct attack on white supremacy. His unwilling- 
ness to change his multi-racial policies proved 
politically disastrous for him. While the electorate 
opposition increased, discontent with his leadership 
began to mount within his cabinet. Yet, despite clear 
evidence of orchestrated white opposition building up 
against him 
1, there was little indication by Todd of 
his intention to reconsider his policies. In fact, he 
continued to promote them, as was evidenced in the 
preparations he made to ensure that the Five Year Plan 
was not interrupted by lack of funds in the eventuality 
of his being forced out of office. In a telephone 
message to the Reverend J. H. Lawrence, Chairman of the 
SRCC and Methodist District Synod in February 1958, he 
assured missionaries of his commitment to the develop- 
ment of African education. He informed Lawrence that 
he had made adequate arrangements for funds to continue 
to be available for African education whatever happened 
to him in the campaign that was building up against him 
within the white community and the Party. Lawrence's 
letter to the Methodist Overseas Secretary explained the 
content of the message: 
After a cabinet meeting, before the Party 
congress which voted against him, Garfield 
Todd telephoned (off the record) that he 
had taken steps to ensure that whether he 
1. Franck, 22. cit., pp. 191-193. 
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remained in power or not, the necessary 
funds would be available for African 
education. 1 
Towards the end of 1957, it was becoming clear from 
the extent of European opposition against Todd, that his 
days as Prime Minister were numbered. Opposition within 
the cabinet reached a crisis in March 1958 when the 
Finance Minister, backed by a number of Ministers, 
rebelled against Todd while he was on holiday, over- 
throwing him from premiership and party leadership and 
thus making way for his successor, Edgar Whitehead, 
whose leadership was endorsed by the Party Congress that 
2 
year 
Before the 1959 General Election, Todd tried to 
organise a break-away party in order to fight his way 
back into office. But his past record of 'liberalism' 
had destroyed his political career and, in that 
election, Todd's party was completely wiped out and the 
man who had come to victory with a land slide victory 
3 
now stood rejected by the electorate Such outright 
rejection of Todd and his policies and reforms was a 
C/S/R/B/TAB/LB, Serial 45L, para. 1368, J. H. Lawrence 
to T. A. Beetham, 11th February 1958, WMMS Archives, 
Box 1957-60. 
2. Barber, pp. cit., pp. 17-18. 
3. By 1959, however, the African electorate had risen 
to an estimated total of 2,300 from 441 in 1953. 
This was one of Todd's major achievements. See 
Leys, pE. cit., p. 232. 
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clear indication of the constraints and limitations 
confronting a progressive educational reformer 
operating in a colonial society which opposes change 
in the nature and policies of the system upon which the 
security and supremacy of that society depended. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION POLICY UNDER WHITEHEAD'S 
PREMIERSHIP 1958-1962 
6 
Edgar Whitehead's attitudes towards multi-racial 
partnership 
In view of the strength of the white anti-liberal 
reform protest which had ousted Todd from power, there 
were genuine fears amongst the churches and nationalists 
that his successor might reverse government educational 
policy and seek to undo the achievements so far effected 
1 
in African education There were also fears that the 
new administration, in an attempt to gain white support, 
might resort to measures aimed at slowing down the rate 
of African advancement 
2. The rejection of Todd's 
liberal policies, it was thought, had predetermined the 
nature of the policy of his successor. But, as will be 
seen, the new premier did not deviate from his 
See Minutes of the Executive Council of the SRCC 
held in S'alisbury on 29th December 1957, IMC/CBMS 
Archives, Box 292. 
2. The Bulawayo Chronicle, 22nd March 1958. 
opk 
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predecessor's multi-racial policies and maintained his 
educational policy. 
Edgar Whitehead was no stranger to Southern 
Rhodesian politics and was well acquainted with the 
conservative character of the country's white society. 
He had been a member of parliament since 1940 
1, 
and had 
held ministerial and ambassadorial positions under 
Huggins. During those years, his experiences of bad 
race relations and confrontation had convinced him of 
the need to promote multi-racial partnership. His 
inclination towards Todd's multi-racialism did not make 
him initially a favourite leader with the white 
electorate. In a by-election, at which he was trying 
to regain his parliamentary seat after a year's 
diplomatic service in Washington, as a Southern 
Rhodesian Minister attached to the British Embassy 
2 (1957-1958),, he was defeated by a candidate of a right 
wing party - the Dominion Party - led by the racist, 
Winston Field. Although he soon afterwards led his 
party to victory in the 1959 General Election, the 
margin was narrow. His United Federal Party captured 
17 out of 30 seats, with the remaining 13 being lost to 
the Dominion Party which advocated the adoption of 
policies similar to those pursued under South Africa's 
3 
apartheid system That narrow victory was indicative 
C. J. M. Zvobgo: "Southern Rhodesia under Whitehead 
1958-6211, 
, 
Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. 2, 





of the degree of resentment amongst many whites against 
any form of liberalism which threatened to undermine the 
dominance of the European position in Southern Rhodesian 
socle y. To some extent, this imposed constraints on 
how far Whitehead could pursue multi-racialism but, 
nevertheless, he began his work by introducing some 
reforms in the economic and social szheres which more 
than astonished his supporters and aroused strong 
criticism from the right wing conservatives. 
In 1959, Whitehead amended the Land Apportionment 
Act in favour of urban Africans. This gave them 
residential rights and, for the first time in colonial 
1 
history, the right to buy housing property In the 
same year, he reformed the Industrial Conciliation Act 
to give Africans trade union rights and the freedom to 
2 organise their own registered trade union movements 
He also opened apprenticeship training in all industrial 
sectors to Africans3 (also for the first time in 
colonial history). These reforms clearly showed that 
Colin Leys & Cranford Bratt (eds. ): A New Deal in 
Central Africa (Praeger Publ., New York, 1961), 
P. 100. 
2. Bowman, cit., p. 39. Also see, Shirley Williams: 
Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality (Fabian 
& Commonwealth Research Bureau, London, 1960), Series 
215, p. 14. 
African trade unions were, however, barred from 
engaging in political activity. 
3. Leys & Bratt (eds. ): op. cit., p. 100. 
. --Aý - 
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Whitehead was committed to multi-racialism and had no 
intention of undermining any of the reforms and limited 
progress Todd had effected as steps towards creating a 
multi-racial partnership. Like his predecessorr 
Whitehead believed that, to abandon multi-racialism, was 
to encourage the development of racial tension and a 
political crisis, both of which became a distinct 
possibility with the growing strength of African political 
ac-It-ivity. He saw continual reform as essential to 
averting such a crisis situation. 
Trends in secondary educational developments under Whitehead 
Whitehead had shown personal interest in Todd's 
policy on African education since the time it was 
developed and implemented. He was known to speak 
favourably of the Five Year Plan and, on assuming office, 
he assured the missionaries and the African political 
leaders that there wou-1d be no attempt by the government 
to go back on the Plan. 
Whitehead's first step towards promoting his 
predecessor's Five Year Plan was to seek the advice of 
the churches on how this could best be done. As a 
gesture of his government's commitment to the further 
development of African secondary education, Whitehead 
agreed to honour the requests made by the SRCC to the 
DNE before Todd's fall from power, and these comprised: 
oft 
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(a) an increase in capitation grants for primary and 
secondary education 
1; the provision of grants and 
students' scholarships to all mission schools on parity 
2 
(this having been a point of controversy between the 
larger and the smaller churches); (c) the establish- 
ment of more Junior secondary schools 
3 
and an increase 
4 in equipment grants for schools Whitehead also 
promised to financially support the establishment of at 
least one Senior secondary school in every district to 
provide Cambridge Higher School Certificate courses (HSC), 
leading to university education 
5. A plan was jointly 
drawn up by the SRCC and DNE to ensure that, in future, 
(a) at least 20% of all those pupils who successfully 
completed their primary education proceeded to secondary 
education; (b) at least 50% of all those who successfully 
passed JC were admitted to Senior secondary education 
(Form III); and (c) places would be provided for: 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held at Goromonzi on 29th December 1958, 
para. 22(4), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid. Also see Atkinson, cit., p. 137. 
4. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the S'RCC*held at Goromonzi on 29th December 1958, 
para. 22(l), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
5. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in Salisbury on 10th November 1959, 
para. 6(xi), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
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all those who at the Cambridge School 
Certificate examination proved that they 
had the academic potential to attempt 
Sixth Form work and thus prepare for 
university education. 1 
Equally significant was the government's agreement 
to consider the iinmediate establishment of a college 
to train African CSC and HSC graduates for teaching in 
secondary schools. This was regarded as of vital 
importance if adequate trained teachers were to be made 
available for the rapidly increasing number of Junior 
2 
secondary schools However, an even more important 
innovation was to be the establishment of an African 
technical college which would provide training in 
trades similar to those provided in European schools 
3. 
The SRCC welcomed the government's readiness to 
co-operate in promoting secondary educational work, 
especially in the face of white opposition to any 
further commitment of state funds to African education. 
After the 1959 meeting of the DNE and the SRCC, the 
new Director of the DNE, Mr. H. C. Finkle, approved a 
record expenditure on African education - E90,000 a year - 
to be spent on the development of primary schools, and 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held in 10th November 1959,, 
para. 6(xi), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. Also see 
ReDort of the Secretarv for African Education for 
Year_1965., p. 19. 
2. Report of 
Year 1959, 
3. Ibid. 




this was to be over and above the regular grants. This 
was intended to increase provision, especially at the 
1 
upper primary level 
The government wanted at least 60 new primary 
schools to be established each year until the end of the 
Five Year Plan 2. with the objective of enabling more 
African children to acquire primary education and there- 
after proceed to secondary education. 
Further grants were made to secondary education: 
over and above the E20,000 capitation grants made to 
each secondary school by Todd, a further E1601000 total 
grant was approved by Whitehead for further expansion of 
Junior secondary education and the improvement of school 
equipment 
3. 
Whitehead's policy led to further expansion of 
secondary education by the churches. The Anglicans 
established a girls' secondary school at St. David's 
Bonda Mission in 1959. Apart from government grants, 
this school also received considerable aid of up to 
E30,, 000 from the SPG Board, the Beit Trustees and some 
locally based multi-national companies which took a 
Relevant Information and Proceedings of the SRCC 
Meeting held at Salisbury in 1960,, p. 7, IMC/CBMS 





great interest in the development of African girls' 
education 1. Another Anglican secondary school for boys 
was founded at St. Mary's Mission in the Hunyani 
district of North Eastern Mashonaland. This school 
also received aid from the government and, in addition, 
E3,000 from the health department for the installation 
2 
of a water supply system The SPG Board, the 
Mashonaland diocese of the church, and some banking 
3 
companies contributed a further E10,000 A third 
school for girls came under construction at Nyamandlovu 
in the Gwaii district of in 1961, but not 
due to open till 1964 
4. 
A second attempt at non-racial secondary education 
was made at St. Stephen's College at Balla Balla in 
Matebeleland, at an estimated cost of E150,0005. The 
school was founded on similar lines to English public 
schools and was intended to provide first rate 
SPG. Mash/D/C/TF. 37, Finance File 1960-65, Budget 
Form (B),, para. 14, SPG Archives. 
2. SPG. Mash/D/C/TF. 37, Finance File 1960-65, Cecil 
Mashonaland to E. J. Trapp, 27th October 1962, SPG 
Archives. 
Ibid. 
4. SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 261, General File 1962-65, Bishop 
of Matebeleland to Rev. M. John, 28th June 1961, 
SPG Archives. 
5. SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 262, General File, Bishop of 
Matebeleland to SPG Overseas Secretary, 27th September 
1960, SPG Archives. 
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educational facilities and a complete six year 
secondary education. Financial contributions came from 
the government, which gave E20,000, while the Dulverton 
Trust in England contributed E15,000, and considerably 
more contributions from various business companies 
1. 
However, when the school commenced in 1959, the 
extraordinarily high fees of 2270 p. a. per student 
2 
kept Africans out. Even those from prosperous families 
did not apply for admission. For most Africans, this 
fee was beyond their means, especially when an equally 
good education could be obtained at low fee paying 
schools. Consequently no African student was enrolled 
3 
in 1959 - all the 40 Form I students were European 
Similarly, in 1960,1961 and 1962, not a single African 
enrolled. A letter from the school principal to the 
SPG Board in 1960 indicated that the school board was 
being kept under constant pressure by European Anglican 
and non-Anglican parents to maintain the high fees in 
4 
order to keep out Africans In fact, the school 
never became non-racial. 
1. SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 262, General File, Lord Arch. 
Bishop of Central Africa to SPG Overseas Secretary, 
4th October 1960, SPG Archives. 
2. Ibid. 
3. SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 262, General File, Bishop of 
Matebeleland to SPG Overseas Secretary, 27th November 




The Anglicans were criticised by their African 
congregation and nationalists for not being genuinely 
interested in promoting non-racial education. Proper 
conditions for non-racial education did not exist at 
the school: high fees discriminated against the 
Africans, the school admission committee consisted 
mainly of European parents and teachers, and the school 
Board of Governors was wholly white 
1. Also, the school's 
policy of close collaboration with European parents was 
seen as a reflection of the church's own support for 
racial segregation 
2. 
The Methodists started a second secondary school at 
Moleli Mission in the Makwiro district of Mashonaland 
3 in 1961, with the aid of E10,000 from their overseas 
board in addition to government capitation grants. 
Plans were also completed for the establishment of 
three more schools in 1964,1965 and 1966 at Woddilove, 
Sandringham, near Salisbury, and Kwenda Mission 
4. 
Many 
other denominational schools were also established in 
SPG. Mateb/D/C/TF. 261, General File, Rev. P. G. L. Cole 
to Mr. Barlow, 24th June 1963, SPG Archives. 
2. Ibid. 




between 1960 and 1963, particularly by the Roman 
Catholic societies. 
Also in the period 1960-63, the government embarked 
on establishing a series of new secondary schools of its 
own. A second school was opened in Salisbury in 1961. 
Another was set up in the Mzingwane township in Bulawayo 
and others at Mlezu, outside Bulawayo, and in the Ascot 
township of Gwelo. In all, by the end of 1962, there 
were 39 African schools run by 16 mission churches and 
10 which were run by the government, bringing the total 
to 49 with the following enrolments: 
Southern Rhodesia African secondary schooZ enroLments by the end 
of 1962 (Source: Rezý)ort of the Southern Rhodesia Education 













Up. VI Totals 
B G B G B G B G B G B G 
American Board 
Chikore 105 21 53 15 Ail 3 17 3 238 
Mt. Silinda 55 13 58 10 116 
AngLican Church 
Bernard 
Mizeki 63 - 74 - 45 - 182 
Cyrene 69 - 69 - 138 
St. David's 
Bonda - 72 - 50 122 
St. Mary's 
Hunyani 70 - 68 - 138 
St. Augus- 
tine's 61 19 60 16 33 4 29 5 227 
Breth. in Christ 
Matopo 34 40 41 16 23 8 18 2 182 
Wanezi 37 - 37 
i-. 7. of Christ 
Dadaya 55 16 53 16 140 

























Up. VI Totals 
B G BG 3 G B G B G B G 
D. R. C. 
Chibi 62 11 50 10 133 
Zimuto 52 21 44 27 40 8 25 5 222 
EvangeLicaZ 
ALLiance 
Mavuradonha 28 1 23 3 55 
L. M. S. 
Inyati 56 25 51 16 26 3 25 3 205 
WADS 
Moleli 35 - 35 - 70 
Tegwani 65 37 53 46 19 9 21 10 260 
Methodist 
Episc. Church 
Hartzell 56 21 55 13 29 7 24 5 210 
Mrewa 42 22 33 21 118 
Presbyterian 
Church 
Gloag Ranch 29 - 29 
Ingwenya 20 12 19 12 63 
R. C. Church 
Berejena 36 - 36 
Empandeni 73 - 48 16 19 - 156 
Gokomere 76 - 70 - 28 - 24 - 198 
Inyanga Sec. 36 - 33 - 26 - 19 - 114 
Kutama 99 - 61 - 29 - 20 - 209 
Monte Cassino - 74 - 44 - 26 144 
Mukaro - 70 - 51 121 
Regina Mundi - 60 60 
St. Mary's 
Wankie 32 3 23 4 62 
St. Ignatius 60 - 57 117 
St. Paul's 
Musami 62 9 55 4 25 - 155 
Triashill - 40 40 
SaLva-l-ion Ar-, Y- 
Mazoe 91 - - - 23 - 114 
Usher - 34 34 
S. O. i4 
Solusi 48 15 46 21 19 6 8 3 166 
Lower Gwelo 19 12 31 
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Secondary schooZ enrolments by the end of 1962 (Contd. ) 
Form Form Form Form Form Form Totals 
Schools I II III IV Lr. VI UP. VI 
B G B G B G B G B G B G 
S. A. GeneraZ 
Mission 
Biriri 24 8 22 7 61 
Undemonina- 
tionat 
Nyatsime 28 34 59 3 124 
Goverment 
Miezu 64 - 64 
Domboshawa 65 - 22 - 87 
Goromonzi 43 27 65 30 46 17 44 14 21 4 13 3 327 
Salisbury 
Sec. 91 37 83 32 22 2 267 
Highfield 
Sec. 113 58 125 45 30 - 371 
Ascot 89 22 ill 
Mzingwane 47 - 26 - 26 - 99 
Bulawayo 
Sec. 117 63 104 18 25 1 328 
Fletcher 65 - 62 - 76 - 62 - 20 - 20 305 
Sakubva Sec. 40 26 41 19 126 
TOTALS 2466 
1 
941 1867 580 630 94 336 50 41 4 33 3 7045 
0 
From the point of view of the objectives of the Five 
Year Plan, the establishment of such a large network of 
secondary schools was indeed a significant achievement by 
both the governments of Todd and Whitehead and the 
mission churches, and went a long way to bringing 
secondary education within the reach of Africans. But 
the basic problem of school leaver unemployment which had 
confronted Todd's administration remained upresolved. In 
fact the problem grew more serious with the expansion of 
rlý, 
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secondary education facilities as this meant that more 
Africans were leaving school with formal qualifications 
and finding no adequate employment opportunities in the 
urban and industrial areas. 
Another reason which contributed to the growing 
problem of school leaver unemployment was the lack of 
a concerted policy with regard to rural development, 
a policy which was necessary to create jobs for school 
leavers in the rural areas. A political reality of 
the Southern Rhodesian colonial situation was the fact 
that Africans were required under the Land Apportion- 
ment Act, and the separate racial development policy 
(neither of which Todd nor Whitehead were able to 
repeal) to live and work in their own areas away from 
white urban and industrial areas and, thus, these were 
the only areas open to them for development. Only those 
Africans required by European employers in the various 
industrial sectors were welcome in white areas. Of these, 
few were formally educated. Moreover, very few white 
employers wanted to engage a large educated African 
labour force because, apart from the fact that such 
Africans threatened white job security, their labour was 
costly. The vast majority of Africans employed in 
European industries had little formal education and were 
unskilled and preference was given to them over educated 
Africans as they provided cheap labour for various forms 
of unskilled and non-professional jobs. 
234. 
A study conducted by H. W. Roberts revealed that, 
in 1962,, of the 6,646 African workers in the manu- 
facturing industries in Salisbury whose educational 
qualifications were known, only 2.2% had Junior secondary 
education, 0.4% (31 persons) had CSC and only 13 had HSC. 
In the processing industries, only 0.8% had JC, 0.3% (21 
persons) had CSC and none at all had HSC 
1. The less 
educated Africans comprised the bulk of the labour 
force: for example, in the manufacturing industries, 
24% of the given labour force had less than two years of 
formal primary schooling, 10% had up to Standard II, 
22.4% up to Standard III and 41% to Standard VI. In 
the processing industries, 41.9% of the given labour 
force had less than two years of formal primary schooling, 
23% had up to Standard 11,27% to Standard III and 7% to 
2 Standard VI 
It is quite clear from these figures that very few 
African secondary school graduates were in employment in 
the main urban industries. The figures were even less 
3 in the smaller towns Thus, the majority of secondary 
school graduates were unemployed. 
1. H. W. Roberts: "Education and Training in Industry in 
Rhodesia"(University College of Rhodesia and 





Skilled jobs were made all the more difficult for 
African secondary school graduates to obtain becauser in 
many cases, white employers did not want to apprentice 
Africans. The legislation passed by parliament in 1959, 
at the insistence of Whitehead, did not alter European 
resentment against taking Africans for training. To 
illustrate the level of discrimination against the 
apprenticing of Africans in the various industries, 
records of secondary school graduates in apprenticeship 
training in major industries throughout the country for 
1962 show that, out of 436 apprentices, only 10 were 
1 Africans Similar records for 1963 show that, out of 
317 apprentices, only nine were Africans 
2. This 




raduiitEes in apprenticeshi 
I race in 1962 (3) 
) courses bN 
Industry Europeans Africans 
Aircraft 28 3 
Building 29 4 
Engineering 263 4 
Mining 98 1 
Motor trade 193 22 
Printing 120 - 
Railways 84 18 
Totals 915 52 
1. Reginald Austin: Racism and Apartheid in Southern 
Africa - Rhodesia (UNESCO Press, Paris, 1975), p. 49. 
2. Ibid. 
3. SPG/Mash/D/C/TF. 37, Finance File 1960-65, C. Mashona- 
land to E. J. Trapp, 28th March 1962, SPG Archives. 
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As can be seen, African apprentices were substanti- 
ally outnumbered by whites in every industry, with the 
result that the majority of secondary school graduates 
had little opportunity for training for skilled jobs. 
Employment figures for 1962 showed that, in the mining 
industry, 70% of the African labour force had no formal 
apprenticeship skills and 22% were semi-skilled. Only 
8% were in staff jobs. In the manufacturing industries, 
87% were unskilled, 10% were semi-skilled, 3% were 
1 
skilled and none were in staff jobs 
Another factor which put some apprenticeship courses 
such as engineering and mining out of reach of most 
African secondary school leavers were the qualifications 
required for entry. After apprenticeship of Africans 
was legalised in 1959, these industries deliberately 
raised qualification requirements by demanding the 
combination of CSC physical science subjects (such as 
physics, chemistry and mathematics) which was not yet 
2 
offered in most mission African schools In other 
cases, HSC qualifications were required and this 
excluded many applicants as few Africans had yet 
attained that level of education, facilities for HSC 
courses being very limited. Until 1965, only Goromonzi 
Roberts: pp. cit.,, p. 22. 
2. Relevant Information of the SRCC Meeting held at 
Bulawayo in 1960, p. 7, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
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and Fletcher government schools offered HSC courses. 
Most of the secondary educational development was taking 
place at the JC and CSC levels because the costs of 
setting up HSC courses were considered by the churches 
to be too high. The priority had been to expand the 
lower Forms and, therefore, few students had been able 
to obtain 'A' level qualifications. 
The unavailability of adequate employment 
opportunities and on the job training facilities for 
African school leavers resulted in most secondary 
school graduates opting for the teaching profession which 
provided relatively more jobs than the other professions. 
In 1962, the 18 mission schools providing higher teacher 
training courses for Africans with two years of secondary 
education had a total of 800 trainees in the first and 
second years of training 
1. But, as competition 
for training increased with the growing number of Junior 
and Senior secondary school graduates passing from 
schools each year, the yearly average intake of 450 
2 
teacher trainees became too small 
The government attempted to provide some solution 
to the school leaver unemployment problem by 
1. Report of the Director of Native Education for the 
Year 1962, p. 15. 
2. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held at Salisbury on 15th December 1962, 
JMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
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establishing, in 1961, a college of technical education 
for African school graduates with two or four years of 
secondary education. The Luveve Technical School was 
set up in the African township of Bulawayo to provide 
training in urban trades such as motor engineering, 
plumbing,, metal work, painting, brick-laying, radio 
1 
electronics, etc. The government hoped that these 
courses would enable those who received the training to 
find jobs in industry more readily. The college evoked 
an excited response from school leavers all over the 
country but, in fact, it only operated for two years. 
In 1964,, the right wing Rhodesia Front Party government 
closed the college down on the grounds that apprentice- 
ship had become non-racial and therefore the college was 
no longer needed. 
Even if the college had continued to function 
successfully, it is unlikely that the job prospects of 
those who graduated from it would have been any better, 
given the high level of European resentment against 
2 
employing skilled blacks Moreover, the policy of 
training African students solely for urban employment 
was fundamentally defective in two respects. Firstly, it 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of 
the SRCC held at Salisbury on 15th December 1962, 
IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. 
2. Austin: pp. cit., p. 49. 
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ignored the limited employment opportunities available 
for Africans in urban industries. Secondly, it overtly 
encouraged African school leavers to believe that the 
towns could meet their employment needs. This deceptive 
notion was reinforced by the lack of a government policy 
for the rural development and industrialisation necessary 
to provide jobs for school leavers in those areas where 
their services were most needed. In the absence of 
such a policy, the problem of school leaver unemployment 
remained unresolved and inevitably worsened. 
The socio-political implications of Whitehead's policy 
Whitehead's continuation of Todd's educational 
policy increased the provisions for secondary education 
for Africans but, at the same time, it also increased the 
problem of school leaver unemployment as more students 
passed from school. This created serious socio-political 
problems for the government as frustration from lack of 
jobs and security built up amongst both school leavers 
and their parents. This frustration and anger was 
directed at the colonial system which failed to provide 
adequate opportunities for socio-economic and political 
advancement which Africans had hoped to acquire on gaining 
educational qualifications. Discontent with the colonial 
system was fuelled by the high level of political activity 
existing at this time under the leadership of the 
OtL 
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nationalist Joshua Nkomo. The political repression 
exercised by Whitehead to control African political 
activity 
1, 
racial discrimination practised by the whites 
against both the educated and uneducated Africans and 
the effects of widespread unemployment, these and a 
variety of other factors culminated in serious social 
and political violence which engulfed almost all the 
cities and towns in the country between 1960 and 1963 
2. 
Throughout this time of violent uprising, which ended 
with the banning of all African political activity and 
the detention of nationalist leaders, African anger and 
frustration was vented not only against the white 
political system and institutions but also against 
colonial education, as was evidenced by the regular 
attacks involving the stoning and burning down of govern- 
3 
ment and missionary educational institutions 
Whitehead attempted to respond to the problem of 
African school leaver unemployment when, in 1962, he 
set up an education commission of inquiry to investigate, 
among other things, the possibility of making African 
1. For a study of political repression under Whitehead's 
regime, see Zvobgo, C. J. M. (1977): 22. cit., pp. 483- 
489 and Zvobgo, E. J. M.: The Role of Law as an 
Instrument of Oppression (Eltham, Australia, Alternative 
Information Centre, 197ý), pp. 27-31. 
2. Barber, 2p. cit., pp. 141-143. 
3. Several accounts of attacks on mission schools by 
students appear in SPG. Mateb/D/C TF. 262, General File 
1962-65, SPG Archives and S/M/S/R/B 1961-63, District 




secondary education more oriented towards rural employ- 
ment and development programmes which the government 
intended to initiate. The commission, chaired by 
Professor A. V. Judges, produced a report which became 
the basis of future government policy. The report 
recommended the creation of a second system of secondary 
education to specialise in vocational education and in 
this way provide secondary school pupils with skills 
1 
related to rural trades and development needs 
However, Whitehead's government did not have 
sufficient time to study the report and implement its 
recommendations before the December 1962 General 
Election. By 1962, the limited reforms Whitehead had 
implemented in industrial relations giving Africans trade 
union rights, the right of access to apprenticeship 
training and professional jobs and in education, evoked 
considerable white opposition against his government. 
Fear of the effects of these reforms and black nationalism 
on European political economic security, led to a campaign 
by extreme right wing whites who advocated the overthrow 
of Whitehead's government, the halting of all reforms 
and the restoration and preservation of eternal white 
supremacy in every sphere of life. 
1. Report of 
1962 (Gov 
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the Southern Rhodesia Education Commission 
. Printer, Salisbury, 1963), paras. 427- 
242. 
In the 1962 General Election, an extreme right wing 
Rhodesia Front party led by Winston Field, who had led 
the Dominion party at the 1959 General Election, 
decisively defeated Whitehead. This defeat underlined 
the limitation on how far any white government could go 
in reforming any aspect of the colonial system without 
antagonising the white electorate, which was essentially 
conservative. 
Whitehead found himself in the same position as 
Todd had when he fell from power. on the one hand, 
he was being criticised and attacked by Africans for not 
going far enough in his reforms and in creating a multi- 
racial society. On the other, he was being criticised 
and penalised by the whites for having gone too far in 
his pursuit of multi-racialism and in the reforms he had 
initiated. As Zvobgo points out, Whitehead's fall from 
power was due to the fact that he had pursued two 
conflicting political ideals: one represented a multi- 
racial partnership, and the other, preservation of white 
supremacy. He continued to sit astride these two stools 
1 
and ultimately fell between them 
The defeat of Whitehead represented a triumph for 
the 'right' and, as Barber observed, the rise of the 
1. C. J. M. Zvobgo (1977): 22. cit, p. 481. 
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extreme conservatives to power changed completely the 
1 future course of Rhodesian colonial history. It led, 
in terms of education, to dramatic changes in government 
and missionary policies on the administration and organ- 
isation of secondary education. 
This chapter has discussed the development of state 
and church policies on African secondary education under 
Todd's and Whitehead's administrations. It examined 
the impact of educational policy reform on secondary 
educational development and on African political, 
economic and social advancement. Also considered were 
the scope, limitations and implications of educational 
reform in a colonial society. 
In the next chapter it is intended to investigate, 
in the light of the rejection of multi-racial partnership 
by the whites, the exact nature of the changes which 
occurred in government and missionary policies on African 
secondary education, its administration and organisation. 
See Barber,, pp. cit., pp. 147-168. 
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CHAPTER 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIESt 
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN 
SECONDARY EDUCATION 1963 - 1971 
In Chapter 3 the attempts at educational reform 
under the regimes of Todd and Whitehead were discussed, 
together with their achievements, limitations and 
implications for secondary educational development and 
African socio-economic and political development. In 
this chapter are examined the changes in government and 
missionary policies and the administration and organisa- 
tion of African secondary education under the Rhodesia 
Front (RF) government. The intention is to try to 
explain these changes in the context of the RF govern- 
ment's ideology of separate racial development which 
replaced the multi-racialism of Todd and Whitehead and 
changed the direction of the politics of the colony. 
Particular attention is paid to ascertaining the exact 
nature of those changes which occurred in the policies on 
secondary education, its administration and organisation, 
and to assessing their overall implications for the 
development of African secondary education itself. 
Part I takes a close look at the transition from 
Whitehead's form of multi-racialism to the racial policies 
of RF goverment and the significance is noted of the 
OVA 
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major influence which RF political ideology had on the 
framework for secondary educational policy. 
In Part II the changes which took Dlace in the 
organisation and administration of African secondary 
education are examined in the light of the government's 
concept of African community development policy. 
Part III deals with the changes in secondary 
educational policies under the 1966 New Plan for African 
education which was formulated by the RF government. 
-t'rv 
This discussion falls intOA sections, the first of which 
examines the introduction of vocational secondary 
education for Africans and the rationale behind it, 
special attention being paid to dete=ining the exact 
nature of this education, student and parental percep- 
tion of it and its acceptability or otherwise in terms of 
employment and social status. The second section 
investigates the implications of the changes in educa- 
tional policy for the development of academic secondary 
education. 
Part IV deals with the availability or otherwise of 
opportunities for higher education for African secondary 
school graduates at the local university and concludes 
with a brief examination of employment prospects for 
African secondary school and university graduates. 
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PART I 
THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE RHODESIA FRONT 
PARTY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S 
SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
The coming to power of the Rhodesia Front Party at 
the 1962 General Election marked the return to a system 
of rigid racial segregation and separate racial develop- 
ment, just as had existed under Huggins' regime. 
The RF Party was formed in 1960 by D. W. Lardner Burker 
M. M. Patridge, W. Howman and other extreme right wing 
whites strongly influenced by Afrikaner thinking. Their 
main objectives were to unite whites against the 'liberal' 
policies and reforms of Whitehead's government which they 
regarded as having seriously undermined white supremacy; 
form a front against the growing strength of African 
nationalism which threatened to overthrow white rule (as 
had occurred in Ghana in 1957); and re-establish white 
supremacy. 
Winston Field, the man chosen to lead the Party had 
been the leader of the Conservative Dominion Party in the 
1950s and his strong opposition to any liberalisation of 
racial policies was well known. He came to power fully 
determined to implement the Rhodesia Front Party's racial 
political ideology. 
The Party's political ideology was clearly defined 
in its constitution and the most important aspects of this 
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constitution were (a) to ensure that the government of 
Southern Rhodesia would remain in resioonsible hands 
1; 
(b) to uphold the right. of each community in Southern 
Rhodesia to preserve its own identity, traditions and 
customs, while giving undivided loyalty to the country 
2; 
(c) to uphold the principles of the Land Apportionment 
Act 3; (d) to oppose compulsory racial integration and 
to uphold the right of gover=ent at all levels to 
provide separate facilities and amenities for the various 
racial groups to enable them to preserve their customs 
and ways of life 
4; 
and (e) to ensure permanent establish- 
ment of the European in Southern Rhodesia 
5. 
As is clearly evident from the RF constitution, its 
racial ideology was at variance with the form of multi- 
racial partnership that Todd and Whitehead had attempted 
to promote in Southern Rhodesia. The policy of main- 
taining a racially divided society, as emphasised in the 
constitution, provided the framework for all government 
"Extracts from the Rhodesia Front Party constitution": 
Rhodesia - The Background to the Present Conflict and 
Policy for the British Government (A Study Group of 
the Billericacy constituency of the Labour Party, 
1968) , V/2/3 (d) , para. 3. 
2. Ibid.,, para. 2. 
3. Ibid.,, para. 5. 
4. Ibid., para. 6. 
5. Ibid., para. 11. 
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policies - political, economic, social and educational. 
The return to racial oriented politics was seen by 
the RF to be imperative, especially after the break up 
2 
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 
Nyasaland became independent in that year to become 
Malawi, with Northern Rhodesia following suit in 1964 
to become Zambia. The whites in Southern Rhodesia 
were therefore alarmed and frightened by the possibility 
of black majority rule coming into effect in that colony. 
The refusal of the British government to grant the whites 
the independence they were demanding led them to adopt a 
defensive position by implementing repressive and racist 
policies 
2. 
From 1963, the RF government began to organise the 
country's political, economic and social systems into 
line with the objectives of the Party's ideology. Of 
the changes made, one of the most significant was the 
restructuring of the system of government, which appeared 
to separate African affairs and administration from the 
central government, to a system of local government 
For a discussion of the causes of the failure and 
break up of the Federation, see Philip Mason: Year 
of Decision - Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960 (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1960), pp. 102-141 & 216- 
244; Lord Alport: The Sudden Assignment (Hodder & 
Stoughton, London, 1965), pp. 68-82; and Sir Roy 
Welensky: 4000 Days (Collins Publ... London, 1964), 
pp. 86-136. 




(tribal councils) run by Africans on a tribal communal 
basis. Under this system, a significant proportion of 
the administrative and financial resnonsibilitv for 
African primary and secondary education, together 
with all aspects of African rural development and social 
welfare services, was placed under local governments 
while the central government retained overall political 
control. Responsibility for European administration, 
education, welfare services and development was retained 
1 
by the central government 
Although tribal councils had been in existence 
since the 1940s 
2, they were revived by the RF government 
to serve as the media through which implementation of t- 
its policy of rigid separate racial development and 
provincialisation could be carried out. Ian Smith, who 
took over the leadership of the RF Party in 1964 and 
became Prime Minister, referred to the new system of 
African 'self government' as a form of community develop- 
ment similar to that which existed in South Africa under 
the apartheid system. He defined the RF version of 
Community Development (CD) as: 
A. K. H. Weinrich: Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia 
(Heinemann, London, 1971), pp. 21-26. 
1) Ibid. 
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the process by which people of each community 
are given responsibility for their own 
development through communal organisation, 
formally and informally, for democratic planning 
and action. 1 
Under this system, local African communities were to be 
responsible for their own plans for development with 
maximum reliance upon resources found within their own 
areas supplemented occasionally with aid from the 
central government and other agents outside the communi- 
ties. They were to be responsible for all programmes 
of rural uplift, including land and agricultural develop- 
ment, industrialisation and communications. They were 
also to be responsible for establishing and maintaining 
social welfare services such as health and education. 
But the tribal councils, under which African communities 
were organised, did not have resources with which to 
undertake such programmes. 
Traditional CD in Africa has grave limitations in 
that it often asks the poor to solve their own problems 
and frequently the major problems such people have to 
deal with are not local in origin but are due to external 
factors arising directly from the nature of the central 
socio-economic structure. The local communities of poor 
people have neither the economic resources nor the 
political power with which to carry out rural development 
programmes and resolve their many problems and all that 
CD achieves in such cases is to shift the burden and 
1. Quoted in Mlambo, pp. cit., p. 56. 
ON-, 
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blame for failure to solve complex problems onto the 
1 
poor. 
In Southern Rhodesia, the CD proposed by the RF 
had far more grave limitations and implications for 
African political, economic and social development since 
it was perverted and racist in its objectives. In the 
first instance, it was a way of denying Africans access 
to the abundant resources in the European areas and 
the central government treasury. Such a measure was 
intended by the RF to ensure the availability of maximum 
resources for European development. Secondly, CD was 
a method of implementing the government's ideology of 
separate racial development. Thirdly, it was a means 
of ridding the central government of the responsibility 
for African development, thereby sanctioning the 
existence of poverty in African society which did not 
have the necessary resources to cope with the numerous 
problems of rural underdevelopment created by 
decades of colonial capitalist exploitation of the 
resources they originally possessed. The RF govern- 
ment's CD policy was also racist in the sense that it 
This is a common critique of traditional CD. See 
Ian S. Martin: "A Critical Discussion of the 
Community Development Approach in Adult Education", 
(M. Sc. Seminar Paper,, University of Edinburgh, 1978) 
and Keith Jackson: "The Marginality of Community 
Development: Implications for Adult Education" 
(Seminar Paper, Institute of Extension Studies, 
University of Liverpool, 1977) . 
0*, 
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did not apply to Europeans. Responsibility for thei. - 
overall welfare and development remained under the 
central government. Therefore, the RF's version of CD 
institutionalised separate racial development and had 
grave implications for overall African development. 
The CD policy provided the framework for the 
government's educational policy which missionaries were 
forced to adopt and formed the basis upon which the 
structure and administration of African secondary 
education was re-organised. The aim was to re-orientate 
the purpose and objectives of African secondary education 
into line with those of the political ideology of the RF. 
PART 
"7"-ORGANISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE 
OF AFRICAN EDUCATION 1963 - 1965 
The RF government's plan for African education under 
its brand of CD envisaged, firstly, the complete trans- 
ference of the responsibility for the development and 
administration of primary education from the churches to 
African local councils, with the objective of making 
people in each rural district develop their own education 
1 
in terms of their priorities for development The 
SPG. Mash/D/C/TF. 265, Cecil Mashonaland to Canon 
Kingsworth, 11th March 1963, SPG Archives. 
014, 
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councils were required to raise most of the money they 
needed to run primary education from local and other 
1 
sources outside the community In addition to the 
funds they could raise themselves, the councils were 
to receive supplementary grants from the central 
government. Those churches which were unwilling to 
hand over their rural primary schools to local councils 
were allowed to maintain and operate them but only on 
behalf of the community. However, in such cases, 
government grants or any other form of assistance 
provided for the schools would no longer be given 
directlv to the missionaries but would instead be 
channelled through the local councils which would 
determine how missionaries could use th: IM2 e 
Under the administrative changes, after 1967 no 
church would be allowed tc, open new primary schools in 
rural areas: only local councils could do so. However, 
the independence of local councils in determining 
primary educational development was restricted in one 
important area - they could not determine curricula. 
e, r, Comment on the Speech by the Minist, for African 
Education, Mr. Howman, to the Central Advisorv Board 
on Wedne'sday, May 8th 1963, Mateb/Education Minutes, 
File 97-F, 1960-63, para. 3, Council for World 
Missions Archives. 
2. Ibid.,, para. 
OTk 
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The decision on what was to be taught and how it was to 
be taught was entirely in the hands of the Central 
Ministry of Education 1. 
Central government control of the curricula under- 
mined and contradicted the very basis of the independence 
of local councils in determining their own affairs and 
making their own decisions. The reason why the central 
government kept control of the curricula was quite simply 
to ensure that curricula content and the overall objec- 
tives of African education did not conflict with the 
aims of government policies. 
At the secondary education level, a major innovation 
was introduced, partly in response to the recommendations 
of the 1962 Judges' Commission Report and partly as an 
element of overall government strategy which had as its 
objective the implementation of separate racial develop- 
ment. In future there were to be two different systems 
of Afri, -can secondary education: (1) academic secondary 
education (referred to as the Fl system), which was to 
remain under the joint responsibility of the government 
and the missionaries as in the past and (2) Junior 
vocational secondary education (referred to as the F2 
t- I' 
1. Comment on the STDeech bv the Ministw for African 
Education, Mr. Howman, to tI 
on Wednesday, May 8th 1963, 
File 97-F,, 1960-63, para. 6. 
Missions Archives. 
e Central Advisory Board 
Mateb/Education Minutes, 
Council for World 
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system), which was designed to train those pupils not 
admitted to the F1 system in rural and urban industrial 
trades and to provide them with theskills required for 
rural and urban develo=ent. This system, which 
required F2 school graduates to seek work in their 
respective communities, was intended in nart to 
resolve the problem of urban school leaver unemploy- 
ment and to promote the ideals of the separate racial 
development policy. 
The right to undertake F2 vocational secondary 
education was given to any agency capable of carrying 
it out. Missionaries, African councils and industrial 
companies were all encouraged by the central government 
to participate in the development of the scheme and 
were to receive some aid from the government for that 
purpose. 
The RF government plan for African education came 
under strong criticism by most missionaries, African 
school teachers and parents. From the churches' point 
of view, such a plan struck at the heart of their 
educational work and threatened to disrupt the compre- 
hensive system of primary education they had built up 
over the past 70 years. Taking into account the 
economic position of rural Africans, there was verv 
little evidence to show that they would be able to 
maintain and develop such an expensive and complex system 
ový. 
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of education with the limited financial and manpower 
resources available to them. The churches ffeared 
that the implementation of this plan would lead to the 
closure of many schools 
1, 
and they therefore resolved 
to urge the government to postpone the enforcement 
of the plan until a comprehensive discussion of its 
implications had taken place. The SRCC E-Executive 
met the Education Minister in 1964 in an attempt to 
impress upon the government to delay the introduction 
of the plan but to no avail 
2A further unsuccessful 
attempt to prevail upon the government was made by the 
3 
Methodist Synod . The government refused to negotiate 
the plan with the churches and was prepared to apply 
political pressure to those churches which refused to A. 
co-operate with its policy 
4. 
The African Teachers' Association also mounted a 
campaign amongst parents in an attempt to enlighten 
them as to the exact nature of the responsibility being 
thrust on them by the government. One of the aims of the 
Comment on the Speech by the Minist e-'Ir for African 
Education, Mr. Howman, to the Central Advisory Board 
on Wednesday, May 8th 1963, Mateb/Education Minutes, 
File 97-C, 1960-63, para. 6, Council for World 
Missions Archives. 
2. C/S/R/Bj A. M. Ndhela to H. O. Morton, 9th June 1964, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1964-66. 
3. The Place of Missions in African Education, Archdeacon 
Stopford's Memorandum ! 14th March 1966, Mateb: 
"Closer Co-operation in Educational Work", File 97-J 
1960-66, para. B. Council for World Missions Archives. 
4. Ibid. 
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campaign was to get the local councils to reject the 
responsibility for primary education by virtue of the 
1 fact that. they had no resources with which to run it 
The campaign succeeded in mobilising considerable 
parental opposition to the government policy but failed 
to deter the government, in any way, from carrying out 
its plans. By 1967, the transfer of all rural primary 
schools from missionary churches to local government 
was to be completed and, after that date, no church was 
to be allowed to engage in primary educational work 
except on behalf of the local communities. 
The nature of local governments and the structure of 
educational administration 
In 1964, there were 56 African local councils in 
2 
existence throughout the whole of the country Each 
council was organised under the titular headship of the 
tribal chief who was assisted by a host of other 
personnel, including the Chairman of the Council, the 
Secretary and his Deputy, the Treasurer and a European 
District Commissioner who was the overall Chairman of 
each council in his district. These officials 
constituted the Council Executive which was responsible 
S/M/S/R/B 1964-66 District Synod Minutes for 1964, 
Central Advisory Board Report, para. 8, WMMS Archives. 
Weinrich, 22. cit... p. 25. 
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for running the affairs of the community it represented 
including organising community development programmes 
such as land agricultural development, and maintaining 
social welfare services, i. e. health and education. 
Each local council had an education committee which 
took over from the churches the organisation and 
development of primary education and also had charge of 
1 
the new F2 vocational secondary school system This 
committee was also under the titular authority of the 
tribal chief but the actual management and organisation 
of education was carried out by the council secretary 
who also employed the teachers and paid their salaries 
from the funds sent to him by central government. for that 
I 
purpose. It was also the council secretary who 
collected school fees from pupils and who was responsible 
for the overall maintenance of the schools. Where new 
schools were neededf it was his duty to make the necessary 
recommendations to the district commissioner through the 
2 
chief 
The secretary was assisted by a schools supervisor 
who, under the previous administrative system, functioned 
as the schools manager, and it was his duty to supervise 
Comment on the Speech by the Minister for African 
Education, Mr. Howman, to the Central Advisory Board 
on Wednesday May 8th 1963, Mateb. /Education Committee 
Mi'n-u-Tesr File 97-K, 1960---73F para. 7, Council for World 
Missions Archives. 
2. Educational Developments in Southern Rhodesia, File 
97-J, 1960-66 Council for World Missions Archives. 
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classroom work. Above the schools supervisor was the 
education officer who was appointed by the government 
to co-ordinate the work of education secretaries of 
the various district councils and that of the schools 
supervisors 
1. Right at the top of the educational 
hierarchy was the Provincial Educational Officer whose 
task it was to co-ordinate the work of the supervisors 
and education officers throughout his province. He 
alone could give the final approval for the establishment 
of new primary and F2 secondary schools and this was an 
indication of the strength of central government control 
over the way local governments conducted their affairs. 
Moreover, it was the Provincial Education Officer who 
had the power to determine local government educational 
policy and curricula 
2 
or even to reject plans drawn up 
by local councils for educational development if he felt 
that their objectives were in conflict with the overall 
central government political, economic and social 
strategy for the implementation of its policy of separate 
3 
racial development 
Educational Developments in Southern Rhodesia, File 
97-J, 1960-66 Council for World Missions Archives. 
2. Comment on the Speech by the Minister for African 
Education, Mr. Howman,, to the Central Advisory Board 
on Wednesday, May 8 1963,, Mateb. /Education Committee 




Fig. 4.1: Summary of the administrative hierarchy of 
educational personnel under local governments 
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scrutinises all development programmes) 
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(Head of local government) 
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As can be seen from Fig. 4.1. the position of the 
Chief and his African Council Secretary in the educa- 
tional hierarchy reveals their limited power in the 
overall administration and organisation of African 
education. If effective decentralisation had been 
intended, the Chief and the Council, together with 
members of the whole community, would have been placed 
in a position of much greater political authority. The 
hierarchical structure, however, reveals the illu -S tory 
nature of a system of decentralisation in which Africans 
overtly were given responsibility for rural and 
community development, when in fact they were without 
either power or sufficient economic resources. The 
central government had thus, in fact, shifted on to 
the poor African local communities responsibility for 
the financial burden for community development. Faced 
with few resources to implement a development programme, 
the local communities could make little progress and the 
government were quick to grasp the opportunity, firstly, 
to blame the lack of effective and rural development on 
the African people themselves and, secondly, to reinforce 
the internalisation of the racist conceDt of black 
inferiority amongst both blacks and whites. 
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PART III 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON SECONDARY EDUCATION 
1966 - 1971: IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSIONARY POLICIES 
AND SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The 1966 New Education Plan and its implications 
The foregoing discussion has investigated the nature 
of the changes introduced by the RF government in the 
administration and organisation of African education and 
the administrative machinery under which the new F2 voca- 
tional secondary education was to develop. It is now 
proposed to examine the changes in government and 
missionary policies on secondary education under the 
1966 New Plan for African education which was announced 
in the Rhodesian parliament by the Education Minister 
in 1966. The implications of these changes for the 
development of secondary education will also be studied. 
As pointed out earlier, the most significant aspect 
of the RF government policy was the creation of a dual 
system of secondary education comprising Fl (academic) 
and F2(vocational) systems. It is now the intention 
to examine the exact nature of the changes in policy and 
their implications for the development of the two systems 
of secondary education. 
Soon after declaring unilateral independence from 
Britain in 1965 
1, the RF government began to implement 
_p 
1. See Barberr pp. cit., pp. 295-305 and Loney, 9. cit., 
pp. 146-151. 
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its separate racial development policy much more 
intensely as the colony's politics moved closer to the 
South African apartheid system. In the pursuit of 
their objective, the government announced radical changes 
in the overall secondary educational policy in 1966. 
Under the new policy, referred to as the New Plan for 
African Education, in future, only 121-2% of all African 
children passing from primary school each year would be 
allowed to proceed to F1 academic secondary education 
1. 
This figure was arrived at by the Education Ministry 
through a controversial study, which had been conducted 
by the Department of Education of the University of 
Rhodesia, to determine the proportion of African 
primary school graduates capable of coping with the 
2 
rigours of academic secondary education successfully 
The Ministry readily adopted the figure of 12ý, % because 
it was convenient from the point of view of the overall 
government strategy to divert a large section of African 
school leavers from academic to non academic education. 
In addition, such a figure helped to justify the 
government's plan to reduce its expenditure on African 
secondary education. 
1. 
for the Year 1*966,, p. 3. 
Annual RelDort of 
2. See G. Mills: "Junior Secondary and F2 Secondary 
Schools in Rhodesia", a paper prepared for the Faculty 
of Education, University of Rhodesia, March 1974,, 
pp. 17-18. 
the Secretary for African Education 
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In practice, the 1232-% who were to be allowed to 
proceed to Fl education had to obtain a minimum of 75% 
marks average in Standard 6 English, Arithmetic and 
General Knowledge examination. Even if more than 12ý% 
of those who took the Standard 6 examination obtained 
the necessary 75% averagethe F1 secondary schools were 
1 
only allowed to accommodate the stipulated 121--% 2 
With regard to the new F2 Junior vocational 
secondary schools, 373-2% of all primary school leavers 
were allowed to attend these schools to receive 
industrial training 2 in trades considered relevant to 
their rural or urban environment and needs for 
development. The remaining 50% of all those who 
successfully completed primary schooling were left with 
no access whatsoever to any form of post primary educa- 
3 
tion within the formal school system, contrary to 
previous practice when it was possible for those who 
failed to gain entry to secondary school in any one year 
to re-apply for admission the following year. This 50% 
4 
were encouraged to undertake private studies 
S/M/S/R/B 1964-66, District Synod Minutes for 1966, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1964-66. 
2. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the, Year 1966, p. 3. 
3. Ibid. 
4. S/M/S/R/B 1964-66 District Synod Minutes for 1966, 
Comments on the Ministerial Statement on the Future 
Policv on African Education made in the Rhodesian 
Parliament on 20th April 1966, WDLMS Archives, Box 
19 '04-66 . 
Ak 
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Equally drastic were the changes in the government's 
financial policy towards overall African education which 
reduced government educational expenditure from 8.6% of 
1 
the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1965 to 2% in 1967 
The cuts were even more severe in primary education which 
had previously enjoyed 70% of the total education budget 
2 
but lost much of its allowance on transfer to African 
local councils. 
In deciding on these policy changes, whereas it 
had been the practice in the past to consult the 
churches, the RF government showed little interest in 
seeking the approval of the churches. Indeed, the 
Education Ministry made policies and decisions which 
were in accordance with overall government policies and 
implemented them with or without missionary approval. 
Thus, the policy-making machinery was fully under 
government control. 
I* 
Church response to this lack of consultation by 
4 the government was reflected Ln a deep resentment. 
The proportion of students allowed to proceed from 
primary to either F1 or F2 schools was a matter which 
provoked strong disapproval of government policy. 
F. Rich: "The Economics of African Education". 
Rhodesia Journal of E'conomics,, Vol. 1. No. 1,, 
August 1967, p. 19. 
2. M. R. Murphree: 
' 
Education, Race and Employment in 
Rhodesia (Artica Publ., London, 1975), p. 47. 
. do, 
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The churches felt that they should have been given 
sufficient scope to use their own discretion on 
admission limits to their schools depending on the 
particular circumstances with which they had to deal. 
For example, if in a particular year, Standard 6 
results were exceptionally good, the churches wanted 
all those pupils who merited admission to F1 schools to 
be allowed to avail themselves of the opportunity and not 
to be barred by an arbitrarily imposed ceiling 
1. 
Also,, the decision by the government to leave 50% 
of primary school leavers with no opportunity at all 
for further education was regarded by the churches as 
wrong and bound to have disastrous consequences for 
2 the advancement of many Africans It was felt by 
almost all the churches that the new policy would cause 
more frustration amongst Africans and further increase 
racial tension. But the churches were only too aware 
of how little they could influence government policy, 
unlike before when they were actively involved in policy 
S/M/S/R/B 1964-66, District Synod Minutes for 1966, 
Cap F. WMMS Archives, Box 1964-66. 
2. Ibid. Also see SPG/Mash. /D/C/TF. 267,1960-77 File, 
Secretary for Mashonaland Diocese to Rev. Canon 
Kingsworth, 22nd September 1966, SPG Archives. 
. 999t. 
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and decision-making processes. The practice of mut-ual 
co-operation between state and church no longer existed. 
In fact,, the government went so far as to warn that 
those churches which refused to co-operate with its 
policies could face political recriminations or 
penalties. 
Implementation ofthe 1966 New Educational Plan: 
Development of F2 Junior vocational secondary education 
1966-1971 
Vocational education is not necessarily inferior to 
academic education and current debate on educational 
reform in developing countries has emphasised the need 
to reorient curricula to meet the specific development 
requirements of the countries concerned 
1. As the 
limitations of academic education in terms of employment, 
together with its lack of relevance to these development 
needs, has become more apparent (particularly with 
regard to the high levels of the educated unemployed 
and rural underdevelopment), so has an awareness of the 
need to encourage vocational te-chnical education 
2. 
1. P. Williams., cit., pp. 11-24; Ronald Dore: 
The Diploma Disease (George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1976)r pp. 101-116; Julias Nyerere: Education for 
Self Reliance (Govt. Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1967), 
passim. 
2. See Education for Development: Report on Educational 
Reform in Zambia (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1976) and 
Rural Vocational Education in Tanzania, Report on a 
Research by the Christian Council of Tanzania, 27th 
June 1977 (Dar-es-Salaam, 1977), pp. 40-48 & 175-185. 
Also see K. Lindsey: "Rural Education and Under- 
development: Aspects of the Politics of Education", 
a paper prepared for the UNESCO/IIEP Seminar on 
Planning Problems in Rural Education, 13-17th October 




Such awareness unfortunately is not often matched by 
a determination to develop more appropriate rural 
development strategies as such a move would be likely to 
threaten the position of those currently benefiting from 
existing socio-economic structures, and those who benefit 
are usually the ones with high academic qualifications. 
In Southern Rhodesia, it was the settler government which 
did not want to encourage effective rural development, 
since a rapid improvement in the African socio-economic 
position was regarded as a threat to the political, 
economic and social security of the white settler 
community. 
The problem of school leaver unemployment and 
rural underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia had been of 
major concern since the 1950s both to Africans and to 
previous governments. In these circumstances it would 
seem reasonable to suppose that the RF government's 
policies on F2 vocational secondary education and rural 
development would have been welcome to Africans, aimed 
as they were at solving these problems. But, on the 
contrary, strong opposition to the government's policies 
emerged from pupils, parents, teachers and even some 
missionaries. The reasons for this negative response, 
particularly to the policy on F2 vocational training, 
require explanation and, to assist in finding this 
explanation, it is necessary to discuss the nature of F2 
Junior secondary education. 
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(a) The nature of vocational secondary education and 
the rationale behind its implementation 
Vocational secondary education was developed by the 
RF government to serve two basic functions. Firstly, 
it facilitated the implementation of separate racial 
development by training 37ý% of the yearly primary school 
output of African pupils in trades and professions which 
would enable them to work and live in the areas 
designated for them under the Land Apportionment Act 
1 
away from whites Secondly, it was intended to 
provide a partial solution to the problem of urban school 
leaver unemployment. By directing a greater proportion 
of pupils who were allowed to proceed beyond primary 
education away from academic education and into 
vocational training, it was hoped that many African 
school leavers, could be prepared for rural employment. 
An important distinction was made, however, between the 
types of skills and trades which were taught to rural 
and urban Affrican pupils in the F2 schools as considera- 
tion was given to the skills most suited to their 
respective environments. 
Rural pupils were to be trained in such trades and 
professions as farming and agriculture, basket weaving, 
Rev. Canaan Banana: "Provincialisation - Rhodesia 
Front Design of Deepening Apartheid". Moto (Gwelo), 
26th May 1972. 
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carpentry and building. These were the trades to be 
taught to boys whereas, in the case of girls, they were 
to be trained in dressmaking, cookery and other 
1 
domestic science subjects The selection of courses 
for rural pupils was based on the rationale that they 
provided training in those skills most needed for rural 
and community development programmes. It was also 
presumed that, under the community development scheme, 
local councils would develop those rural industries 
which would most readily provide employment for the 
graduates from the F2 schools. Another presumption 
was that the councils would be able to provide graduates 
with loans to enable them to launch their own self- 
employment programmes. 
Such presumptions ignored the economic constraints 
with which the local councils were faced. They did not 
have adequate sources of income for their various 
community and rural development programmes which included 
the construction of roads and bridges, clinics and first 
aid posts, water supply systems and cattle dipping tanks 
and the promotion of animal husbandry schemes, the 
development of agricultural land and the running of 
primary education. To fund their programmes, they had 
Annual Report for African Education for the Year 
ended 31st December 1969, pp. 7-8 and S/M/R/B 1967-70,, 
District Synod Minutes for 1967, Report of the 
District Education Committee, 12tE October 1967, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
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to depend largely on loans obtained from the central 
government. The only local sources of income open to 
the councils were profits from the sale of beer in 
council beer halls and taxes levied on the adult males 
in the community. Between 1962 and 1967 the revenue 
raised from such sources by 76 local councils rose 
from E124,726 to just E438,684 1, a sum which was inadequate 
to maintain the basic social welfare services let alone 
provide funds for development projects. Faced with 
these financial constraints, the councils were in no 
position to initiate the industrial development necessary 
to provide F2 school graduates with employment. For 
the same reasons, they were unable to provide loans to 
individual graduates to enable them to start self- 
employment schemes. In the absence of adequate grants 
from the central government, local councils found them- 
selves quite unable to develop their communities adequately. 
In the given circumstances, parents became aware 
that those children who undertook vocational secondary 
education would become disadvantaged in a number of ways. 
Firstly, they would be unlikely to find employment in 
the rural areas. Secondly, they would find it very 
difficult to obtain jobs in towns because their training 
1. Weinrich, op. cit., p. 26. 
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and trades were designed for rural employment. Thirdly, 
they would be unable to enter administrative or clerical 
jobs in urban areas because they lacked academic 
1 
qualifications Parents were therefore unwilling to 
send their children to F2 schools as they were of the 
opinion that an unemployed F1 school graduate was better 
off than an F2 graduate because his prospects of 
2 
employment were higher 
Urban children, on the other hand, were trained in 
the trades which were in demand in the existing urban 
industries. These included motor mechanics, book- 
keeping, secretarial courses, typing and shorthand, 
3 upholstery, plumbinq, tailoring and leatherwork Thus, 
urban children who graduated from urban F2 schools had an 
advantage over their rural counterparts in that a 
significant proportion of them did succeed in finding 
employment, for the most part in industries in the smaller 
towns such as Gwelor Que-Que and Gatooma where rapid 
4 industrial expansion was taking place 
S/M/S/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1968, 
Cap F, VIMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
2. Ibid. 
3. S/M/S/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1969, 
Report of the District Education Committee,, WMMS 
Archives, Box 1967-70. 
4. G. Mills, op. cit., pp. 34-39. 
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Overall, however, F2 school graduates from both 
the rural and the urban schools were more disadvantaged 
than the graduates from F1 schools. To begin with, 
the-average white employer regarded an F1 school graduate 
as being more intelligent than his F2 counterpart. 
This widely held belief amongst white employers originated 
from the Europeans' own preference and respect for formal 
educational qualifications and this predilection for 
academic skills carried with it the assumption that an 
F1 school graduate could cope better with low level 
administrative, professional or skilled jobs, given a 
little in-service training. The central government's 
attitude to F2 secondary education did little to 
improve this situation. The Minister of Education, in 
a speech to parliament, explained that only in certain 
limited trades would the two year Junior vocational 
course ever lead to the possibility of a trade 
apprenticeship. For the more skilled trades, only 
those with an academic secondary educational qualification 
would be given the opportunity for apprenticeship: 
It is the children from the senior secondary 
schools who should have the priority in the 
technical training required to produce 
skilled tradesmen. 1 
With the government publicly advocating the superiority 
-C of academic education over vocational training, most 
Minister for Education, Senate Debates, Vol. 1, 
14th August 19701 Cols. 370-371. 
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parents refused to send their children to F2 schools, 
even if that was their last chance for more education. 
Another factor which undermined the credibility of 
vocational secondary education and militated against its 
early acceptability was the fact that it was recommended 
by the 1962 Judges' Commission and thereafter implemented 
by the Rhodesia Front Government as a course for the 
less intelligent 37ý2-% who failed to make the grade into 
1 
the F1 schools The identification of pupils in the 
selection process as belonging to this 3732-% caused great 
distress to parents as this implied that their children 
were failures in the formal school system. Moreover,, 
the policy of restricting admission to F2 schools to 
only those who had been rejected by the F1 schools 
further reinforced the conviction of most parents that 
2 
vocational education was only second best 
To date, vocational education has not been regarded 
as favourably as academic education in developing 
countries. People have tended to identify affluence, 
influence and status with formal education. Politicians, 
professional men, leaders of business and industry very 
often have a formal educational background. 
1. Summary of Points in the JudS[es' Commission Report 
for consid'eration*by' Matebeleland School*_Managers 
and Principals, p. 3, File A/97,1965.. Southern 
Rhodesia Educational Development Council for World 
Missions Archives. Also see Report of--4, --he Southern 
Rhodesia Education Commission 1962 (Govt. Printer, 
Salisbury, 1963), paras. 427-436. 
2. See Millst 2k. cit., p. 37. 
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Given a situation where state policy advocates the 
superiority of academic educationr it is not unreason- 
able that the public should develop a negative attitude 
towards vocational education. They are aware that it 
does not lead to the socially and economically 
prestigious professions and white collar jobs. They 
will therefore want to ensure that their children go to 
F1 schools. An incident which occurred in 1969 at the 
Anglican Mutero F2 school in the Gutu tribal trust land 
demonstrates the strength of parental opposition to 
vocational education. A boy with a third class pass 
in Standard 6 was admitted to the school but his father, 
on hearing the news, was far from happy and wanted him 
out of the school because, as he asked the Principal, if 
his son could not go to St. Augustine's, what could 
Mutero do for him? 1 
This was not an isolated case. There was widespread 
parental opposition to F2 schools 
2 because they lacked 
the status accorded to F1 schools which admitted the 
supposedly intelligent 1232-%. The high rating of academic 
secondary education, implicit in government policy, made 
SPG/Mash/D/C/TF. 550, File 1969-70, Mashonaland Diocese 
Report for 1969, SPG Archives. 
2. Ibid. For a further discussion of parental 
opposition to F2 vocational education, see Mills, 
2p. cit , pp. 20-30. 
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parents regard brain work as superior to handiwork. 
Parents whose children were admitted to F1 schools were 
regarded as more fortunate. moreover, because teachers, 
headmasters and other educated Africans did not send 
their children to F2 schools, rural parents took that as 
a further indication of the worthlessness of vocational 
education 
1. 
(b) Development of F2 vocational secondary education 
The development of F2 secondary education was 
constrained by a number of factors amongst which finance 
was the most serious. When the F2 scheme was officially 
launched in 1967, the plan of the central government was 
to have at least 300 F2 schools within the next ten 
years 
2. It was hoped that, if private agencies joined 
the programme alongside the churches and the local and 
central governments, even this target could be exceeded. 
The local councils, however, which were expected to play 
a leading role as this was part of their rural develop- 
ment programme, were seriously constrained by their 
financial position. 
The central government offered to provide grants of 
up to E10,000 to every local governmentl mission church 
3 
or private agency for each F2 school they initiated 
Summary of Points in the Judges' Commission Report 
for consideration by Matebeleland School Managers and 
Principals, p. 3. File A/97,1965, Southern Rhodesia 
Council for World Mission Archives. 
2. Murphree, a. cit., p. 47. 
3. Ibid. 
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The problem was, however, that these were development 
grants and were conditional on applicants first raising 
by themselves the necessary capital to cover the cost of 
1 building and equipping schools This half hearted 
approach towards the establishment of the F2 system by 
the central government made it difficult, especially for 
local councils, to initiate such schools. 
In the first place, no local council could raise 
adequate capital costs for a school, overburdened as 
they already were with the financial costs incurred in 
developing the various programmes enumerated earlier. 
Their financial plight was further worsened when they 
resumed responsibility for primary education. As 
pointed out earlier, the local councils did not have 
industries from which to obtain the necessary substantial 
revenue, as they were caught up in a vicious circle and 
did not have funds to set up the necessary industries in 
the first instance. Neither could the councils obtain 
external financial assistance for their projects as such 
projects were considered by the international community 
to be creations of an illegal racist regime. Having 
declared unilateral independence, Rhodesia was isolated 
from the international community and money lending 
agencies. United Nations sanctions made financial 
1. Murphree, 2p. cit., p. 47. 
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dealings with the outside world (with the exception of 
South Africa) difficult. Without external aid, most 
councils found that the costs required to establish and 
equip F2 schools were well beyond their means. 
Most churches were also reluctant to invest large 
resources in the F2 system: firstly, because they 
feared that they might eventually be forced to hand over 
the F2 schools to the local councils, as had already 
occurred in the case of primary schools. They wanted 
to be reassured that this would not occur 
1. Secondly, 
they were uncertain about the viability of the F2 system 
in a situation where there were insufficient funds for 
rural development and the necessary industrialisation 
to create employment for the large body of F2 school 
graduates expected to pass from the schools 
2. Thirdly, 
some churches (in particular, the Methodists and the 
Catholics who, after the declaration of illegal indepen- 
dence,, became the most outspoken critics of RF policies), 
considered the objectives of the overall CD plan, of 
which the F2 system was an integral part, to be racist 
and for this reason initially did not wish to co-operate 
in its development. The 1969 Synod Conference strongly 
criticised the F2 system because of the ideology on which 
1. S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1967, 
Cap F (i), WMMS Archives,, Box 1967-70. 




it was based The Synod regarded the government's 
unwillingness to inject adequate resources into the 
community development scheme as indicative of its lack 
2 of genuine commitment to rural development 
Other churches, including the Anglicans, urged 
missionary participation in the scheme as they thought 
that,, to refrain from providing F2 secondary education, 
would leave many more primary school leavers with no 
3 
scope for post primary education 
Another problem which arose at the initiation and 
early development of F2 secondary education was that 
of teacher recruitment. When F2 schools were first 
established, they were not registered with the Ministry 
of Education. In other words, they were not considered 
part of the officially recognised formal school system. 
In the circumstances, the recruitment of teachers and 
payment of their salaries was the responsibility of 
the private agencies concerned 
4. The lower status of 
F2 schools meant that most teachers were unwilling to 
serve in them and, moreover, those teachers who did take 
up employment in F2 schools found that they could not 
become members of the Rhodesia African Teachers' Associa- 
tion because their schools were not yet officially 
1. S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1969, 
Cap F (10), WM. MS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
2. Ibid. 
3. SPG. Mash/D/C/TF. 550, File 1969-70, Mashonal and Diocese 
Synod Report for 1969-70, 20th March 1970, SPG Archives. 
4. S/, %I/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1967, 
Report of the District Edu cation Committee, Cap F, 
; JMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
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registered with the Ministry of Educationi. The result 
of this exclusion from the Teachers' Association meant 
that F2 school teachers did not enjoy the same condi- 
tions of service as their counterparts in the Fl system. 
For example, they did not qualify for government 
pensions or promotion or transfer to Fl schoo, S2. The 
low status accorded to F2 school teachers in comparison 
to those in F1 schools made it difficult initially for 
3 F2 schools to obtain adequate teaching staff Partly 
because of this shortage of teaching staff, there were 
no F2 schools in operation between the years 1966 and 
1968 and it was only after the establishment of an F2 
teachers' college at Umtali in 1968 to train and award 
the teachers a recognised certificate, accompanied by 
a revision of conditions of service (giving F2 school 
teachers equal status and benefits as F1 school teachers) 
and the official registration of F2 schools with the 
Ministry, that some African senior secondary school 
graduates began to consider training for service in F2 
4 
schools 
S/M/R/B 1967-70 District Synod Minutes for 1967, 
Report of the District Education Committee, Cap F, 
W14MS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
4. S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1969, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
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Because of the factors discussed above, the F2 
school system made a very slow start and also received 
a poor response from the public. From the time of 
the announcement of the New Education Plan in 1966 until 
1969, only 11 F2 schools were established and only 461 
students had registered for training 
1. This enrolment 
was far less than the 3732-% of yearly primary school 
leavers which was the anticipated intake. In an attempt 
to boost the number of F2 schools, the central government 
decided, in 1969, to provide capital loans to all 
agencies which were interested in undertaking vocational 
secondary educations 
2. 
At the same time, the central 
government decided to also establish its own F2 schools 
for urban Africans. The loan system did enable more 
agencies to engage in F2 secondary education but the 
improvement in the development of the system was not as 
spectacular as the central government had anticipated. 
Between 1969 and 1971, ten more schools were established, 
3 bringing the total between 1966 and 1971 to just 21 
This means that, during the first five years of the 1966 
Plan, only 21 had been established which was less than 
Marion O'Callaghan: 
of a Conquest Societ 
Information (UNESCO 
33. 
Southern Rhodesia: The Effects 
on Education, Culture and 
ress, Paris, 1977), p. 67, Table 
2. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year ended 31st December 1969, p. 5. 
3. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year ended 31st December 1971, p. 4. 
282. 
10% of the 300 schools originally planned to be 
operational in ten years' time. 
The distribution of the schools was as follows: 
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As the above table shows, out of the 145 local 
councils in existence in 1971, only three (African 
Council, African Council plus Consortium and Gazaland) 
had undertaken F2 secondary education and they had 
established only one school each. The remainder of 
the local councils had been prevented from participating 
by severe financial constraints. Missionary interest 
in F2 secondary education was low and, of the 15 mission 
churches engaged in African secondary education, only 
four had undertaken vocational secondary work and 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year ended 31st December 1971, p. 4. 
POIL 
283. 
established nine schools. of these, four were Anglican 
1. 
The extent of low public response to the course was 
evidenced by the fact that only 3,807 students were 
enrolled in the 21 F2 schools in 1971. This enrolment 






Enrolment in F2 Junior Vocational Secondary 






Boys Girls Total 
323 246 525 424 538 280 2,337 
191 121 349 228 407 183 1,470 
Totals 514 367 874 653 945 463 3,807 
The first year enrolment of 2,337 was below 30% of 
the 3732-% of primary school leavers expected to enter 
3 
vocational training in 1971 As Mills pointed out, 
most parents kept their children at home rather than let 
4 them enter F2 schools Linden accounts for the low 
public response to both the F2 system and the CD it was 
intended to serve as being largely due to the fact that 
1. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year ended 31st December 1971, p. 4. 
2. Ibid. , p. 22., Table 6 (a) . 
3. S/M/R/B 1971-73, District Synod Minutes for 1971, 
District Education Committee Report, Cap F, WMMS 
Archives, Box 
4. Mills, 2p. cit., pp. 12-14. 
aft. 
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rural people identified the whole scheme as a RF 
government design to entrench separate racial development 
and promote "community underdevelopment". They regarded 
the philosophy underlying the scheme as racist and 
1 
repressive of economic and political development 
(c) The 1966 Policy and its implications for Fl academic 
secondary education 
People's misgivings about F2 secondary education 
increased the competition amongst students for admission 
to F1 secondary schools. This was particularly evident 
amongst rural children who feared the high probability 
of not finding employment in the rural areas if they 
undertook vocational training. With the intake into F1 
schools being reduced to 12ý, %, the competition became 
even more fierce. 
There were differences in the responses the 
churches made to the government on the matter of 
arbitrary imposition of a ceiling on admission to F1 
schools. On the one hand were the Wesleyan Methodists 
and the Catholics who sought overall missionary boycott 
of the government policy. The Methodist Synod debated 
the issue at length at its 1966 Conference and the 
decision taken was that the churches should not co-operate 
with the government in implementing the 1966 Policy until 
1. Linden,, op. cit., p. 75. 
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it had been discussed by all the Churches, African 
1 parents and teachers The Catholics, whose traditional 
support for white colonialism changed radically in the 
1960s and 70s 
2, joined ranks with the Methodists in 
opposing the implementation of government policy 
3. 
On the other hand were the Dutch Reformed Church, 
the Seventh Day Adventists and other traditional allies 
of colonial rule who remained among the staunchest 
supporters of the RF government during the years of 
illegal independence. They adopted the stance that the 
churches should not make political decisions concerning 
4 government policy and advocated co-operation Between 
the two extremes were the Anglicans and the SRCC Executive 
who tried to evoke a response from the churches which would 
not lead to direct confrontation with the government. 
The Anglicans argued that the churches would lose in 
any confrontation with the RF administration and it was 
therefore best to seek discussions of the policy issue 
with the Ministry of Education 
5. This decision was 
S/M/R/B 1964-66, District Synod Minutes for 1966, 
Comment of the Report of the Central Advisory 
Committee on the Future of African Education in 
Rhodesiar WMMS Archives, Box 1964-66. 
2. See Linden, 2R. cit., pp. 156-176. 
3. S/M/R/B 1964-66, District Synod Minutes for 1966, 
Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box 1964-66. 
4. Ibid. 
5. SPG. Mash/D/TF. 38, File 1966-67, Diocese of Mashonaland 




upheld by the SRCC Executive. One of the most difficult 
problems for the churches, and one on which they remained 
divided, was the response they should give to the 
government, if, as was almost certain to occur, the 
Ministry refused to change its policy. In fact, the 
Ministry made it plain that government policy was not 
negotiable. 
Although the churches could not agree on what action 
to take, there were certain aspects of the new policy to 
which they all objected, such as the arbitrary imposition 
of a rigid ceiling on admission to F1 schools and the 
heavy reduction in overall government expenditure on 
African education. A point which raised further bitterness 
amongst the churches was the elimination from the school 
system of 50% of all pupils completing primary school each 
year. Most of these children were aged between 14 and 16 
and were unable either to find employment or alternative 
avenues for further training. The churches felt that 
such a policy was morally and politically indefensible 
and not worthy of their support. It was the rural 
children who suffered most from this policy. Failure 
on a child's part to proceed beyond primary education 
and obtain the necessary qualifications to enable him 
S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1967, 
Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
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to get a job, meant that he had to continue to be 
materially supported by his parents who were not in 
regular employment and had spent their scarce resources 
on his education largely in the hope that they would 
benefit from it when he entered employment. Children 
whose parents were in regular or part-time employment 
or generated income from small business activities in 
the urban areas did not suffer as much from the immediate 
effects of unemployment if they failed to proceed 
beyond primary education, because their parents were 
better able to support them until they found some 
unskilled job in industry. 
The lack of concern on the part of the central 
government with regard to the disastrous implications of 
its policy on African children and the future of Africans 
as a whole, aroused considerable anger amongst many of 
the churches. In a memorandum prepared by the Methodist 
Church in 1968 it was made very clear to the government 
that its attitude and unwillingness to reconsider the 
1966 Policy was having disastrous consequences for African 
.4 
education and the churches would no longer sit back in 
silence: 
The education system for Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia under the new policy has become such 
a depressing example of separate and unequal 
facilities between the races that it is no 
longer possible for missionaries to remain 
silent. 1 
S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1968, 
Memorandum prepared for the Secretary_for African 
Education by the District Synod of the Methodist 
Church of Southern Rhodesia, 3rd April 1968, WMMS 
Archives, Box 1967-80. 
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The Synod Confference warned that the churches might be 
driven into a situation of conflict with the government 
unless some significant changes in its policy were made. 
The government, however, was uncompromising and unmoved 
by the appeals for change made by various churches. It 
flatly turned down a call made by all the churches in 
1 
October 1968 for a non-racial approach to education 
It also turned down the motion that the schools should 
use their own discretion in determining Form I enrolments 
2. 
All attempts by the SRCC to negotiate on the 1232-% ceiling 
mark were dismissed by the Ministry of Education. With .L 
all leading African politicians either in detention or 
prison, the government suppressed African opposition. 
A further worsening of relations between the RF 
government and the churches occurred in 1968 when the 
full effect and extent of the government policy began to 
emerge. Not only had the government reduced F1 admission, 
it also planned a complete ban on the expansion of the 
Fl system by government aided bodies as from 1969. This 
3 
was a direct reference to the mission churches In 
S/M/R/Bj 1967-70 District Synod Minutes for 1968, 
Cap F. WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
2. Ibid. 
S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1968, 
Report of the Meeting of the District Education 
Committee held in Salisbury on 12th October 1968, 
WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
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addition, the government was also to withdraw completely 
the capital grants to 'A' level courses 
1. This clamp- 
down on mission educational work came as a blow to any 
prospects that missionaries may have had for the future 
development of secondary education under the RF 
government. 
The overall effects of the RF government policy 
soon became apparent in the decline of the rate of 
growth of secondary education which is particularly 
noticeable when comparing the pre and post 1966 develop- 
ment of the F1 school system. 
Table 4.3 . Rate of growth of African seconda between 1962 and 1971 (2) 
Type of 
School 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Govt. 8 10 12 14 16 16 15 15 17 17 
Mission 33 39 47 61 71 75 75 82 83 83 
Total 41 49 59 75 87 91 90 97 100 100 
The table shows that, whereas between 1962 and 1966 
the number of government schools doubled from 8 to 16, 
between 1966 and 1971 there was an increase of only one 
school. Similarly, on the missionary side, between 1962 
S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1968, 
Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70. 
2. Compiled from Annual Reports of the Secretary fo 
African Education for the Years ended December 3Tst, 




and 1966 the nuniber of secondary schools rose from 33 to 
71 but between 1966 and 1971 the overall increase was 
only 14. In fact, after 1970 no new mission secondary 
schools were established. 
The slow increase in the rate of growth of F1 
secondary education after 1966 and the imposition of the 
12ý% admission ceiling resulted in a slow rate of increase 
in the secondary school intake. This can also be 
shown by comparing pre and post 1966 intake figures at 














% increase over 
preceding year 
2,819 280 11.03 
3,407 588 20.86 
4,108 701 20.58 
5,478 1,370 33.35 
6,137 659 12.03 
6,699 562 9.16 
6,754 55 0.82 
7,450 697 10.30 
8,486 1,239 16.63 
As the table shows, between 1962 and 1966, the 
increase in FI intake nearly doubled from 2,819 to 5,478 
O'Callaghan, cit., p. 651 Table 29. 
Af ri can secondý 
between 1962 an 
school Form I intake 
1970 (1) 
No. of pupils 
in Form I 
ddp-ý. 
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but, after 1966, the increase was much smaller rising 
from 6,137 to only 7,450 in 1969. The sharp increase 
in 1970 enrolment was accounted for by the double 
output from primary schools in 1969 as a result of the 
shortening of the primary school course from eight to 
seven years. But, even then, it was a much smaller 
intake than the pre 1966 yearly average intake from 
single primary school output. 
The 12ý, % who were selected to proceed to F1 
academic secondary education were not guaranteed a full 
four year secondary education. Limited places for 
Form III were available as a direct result of the 
reduction in government grants to missionary secondary 
schools from 1969 onwards (amounting to Rhodesian 
$22,050 in 1970-71)1, and when natural wastage was taken 
into account also, only a small proportion of the 
initial F1 enrolment were able to reach Form IV. An 
even smaller proportion were able to acquire a full six 
year secondary education as shown in the following table. 
Table 4.5. Wastage in Fl seconda 
1966 and 1971 (2) 
Year Form Enrolment 
1966 1 6,137 
1967 11 6,021 
1968 111 2,062 
1969 IV 1,967 
1970 Lr. VI 187 
1971 Up. VI 183 
Dropout rate in figures 






1.0'Callaghan, r 22. cit., p. 32. 
2. Compiled from Annual Reports of the Secretary for African 
Education for the Years ended 31st December 1966 (p. 18, 
Tab le 6 (a)), 19 68 (p. 2 4,, Tab le 6 (a)), 19 69 (p. 2 7) and 
1971 (p. 25) . 
schools between 
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Taking the 1966 enrolment as lon., the table 
shows that 98.1% reached Form II in 1967. The figure 
fell to 33.6% in Form III in 1968. Only 32% of the 
1966 Form I enrolment reached Form IV, while a consider- 
ably smaller proportion (3%), reached Lower VI. Only 
2.9% obtained a full six year secondary education. The 
situation can be seen even more clearly by the shape of 
the educational pyramid in Fig. 4.2. 
Fig. 4.2 : ENROLMENT IN AFRICAN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1971 
(1) 
Upper M1 183 
1 Secondary 26 077 3,911/o 
Lower 226 
Primary 639 043 96.1*/* 
Total 665 120 100,0 0/0 
Form 2 525 
Form M3 203 
Form ]I,, Gr. 9 9580 
Form I. Gr. 8 10360 
Grade 7.49054 
Grade 








Scale: imm: 500 Pupils 
Murphree,, op. cit., p. 25. 
N. B. Enrolment for Forms I and II includes F2 students. 
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As is quite apparent, the pyramid is broad based at 
the Grade I level of primary school but narrows drama- 
tically to 10,360 at Form I level. From the Form 
level, the pyramid rapidly tapers until it almost reaches 
a point at the Upper VI level. This situation can 
largely be attributed to the imposition of severe brakes 
on the overall development of secondary education. Places 
for secondary education became fewer and could not cope 
with the growing primary school output. There was, 
however, another contributory factor in that admission 
requirements for Form III and the Lower VI were so high 
that it was difficult for most students to attain them. 
At the Form II level, a student had to obtain six credits 
(i. e. 66%) in six subjects to qualify for entrance to 
Form III. At the Form IV level, a student also needed at 
least a 66% marks average in six subjects to be considered 
for admission. These grades were considerably higher than 
those required of white students. The 1962 Judges' 
Commission admitted that the requirements were unnecessarily 
high and examination standards often unrelated to teaching 
standards in schools. For these reasons many students 
were prevented from proceeding to Form III or Lower VIl. 
See Report of the Southern Rhodesia Education Commission 




ACCESS OF AFRICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL LEAVERS 
TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THE COLONY 
The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
opened in Salisbury in 1957 as a non-racial federal 
institution but, during the years of Federation, African student 
representation was very small. Of the first intake of 
1 71, only 8 were Africans By 1959, there were 32 
Africans (including two women) as against 134 non 
African students in the university 
2 
and, in 1960, there 
were just 38 black students out of a total student body 
3 
of 168 
There were two major reasons for such a small 
representation of African students in the university. 
Firstly, there were very limited facilities for 'A' level 
education for Africans in all the three territories. 
In Southern Rhodesia there were only two schools 
(Goromonzi and Fletcher) providing 'A' level courses for 
Africans. Northern Rhodesia had just one school 
(Munali) and Nyasaland also had one school at Dedza 
at which Africans could obtain 'A' level courses. In 
consequence, very few black students were able to enter 
university. 
1. Mason (1960), op. cit., 
2. A. J. Hanna: The Story 
(Faber & Faber, London, 
3. Ibid. 
p. 169. 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
1960), p. 272. 
Ag* 
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Secondly, there was considerable pressure from 4, --. 'qe 
white community on the university administration not to 
let African representation increase too rapidly. Some 
white parents regularly wrote to the university 
threatening to send their children to South African 
universities if there was no adequate control over the 
number of blacks admitted to the local universityl - 
In fact, during the initial planning of the university, 
the whites strongly advocated two separate colleges - 
one for blacks and the other for whites. This proposal 
was rejected by the federal government when the univer- 
sity sponsors in Britain refused to provide the 
E1,400,, 000 needed to set up the university unless it 
was going to (a) admit students of all races on an 
equal footing and (b) allow the students to work and live 
2 
on the same campus 
After the break up of the Federation in 1963, the 
university lost its federal status and became the 
University College of Rhodesia. Although, theoretically, 
the university remained free of government control, the 
RF government's racial policy had significant influence 
on the university administration's attitude towards the 
admission of Africans. At this stage, it is intended 
to examine some of the problems which, under the RF's 
,, olicy, confronted 
African secondary students racial p 
1. Rhodesia Herald, 12th March 1959. 
2. Creighton, a. cit., p. 171. 
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trying to gain access to university and, thereafter, to 
study the problems encountered by those Africans with 
'A' level education in their attempts to enter university. 
African university graduates were considered by 
the government, and most whites, as the real threat to 
Europeans in the higher professional services and, for 
this reason, it was government policy to try to restrict 
the university intake of Africans. The government 
attempted to achieve this end by several measures aimed 
at containing the number of Africans able to acquire 
'A' levels. Firstly, under the 1966 Policy, Form I 
admission was reduced. Secondly, government grants to 
existing schools for the purpose of 'A' level courses 
were withdrawn in 1969, which effectively reduced the 
places available on HSC courses to intending students. 
Thirdly, Africans were stopped by the government from 
taking 'A' level courses at private polytechnics. One 
example of this was at the Salisbury Polytechnic, where 
a large number of Africans were engaged in 'A' level 
science courses (which, unlike Arts subjects, could not 
be undertaken through correspondence courses) - this was 
closed to Africans in 19691 
In addition to the foregoing measures, a special 
qualifying examination, through which many Africans 
qualified for university entrance, was discontinued in 
1. Creighton,, op. cit., p. 171. 
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1970 by the then Principal of the University, Mr. ýIiller. 
One member of the University Council considered the 
I qualifying course as a "very considerable waste of moneyll 
and he further argued that it was not the duty of the 
1 
university to do the work of the schools In a 
parliamentary debate on the issue, one speaker, Mr. Ryan, 
made the same point: 
I do not think that it is the purpose of a 
university to train students and make them 
fit for admission to that University .... There are sufficient applicants from the 
schools and from all sections of society of this 
country without having to go the peculiar device 
of setting up a pre-University course in order to, 
if one might use the vernacular, drag some 
of these students by the hair of their heads in 
order to stick them in a classroom at the 
University, to try and instil some further 
knowledge into them. 2 
One black member of parliament strongly urged the 
continuation of the course: 
When you consider the fact that a large 
number of our people are not able to get to 
Sixth Form level owing to certain circumstances 
beyond their control, and that because of the 
realisation of that the University is offering 
them this opportunity to carry on with a degree 
of work, then I think we should not put diffi- 
culties in their way and bar their course 
towards the higher examination that they can 
do because of the fact that they are mature men. 3 
1. Rhodesia: 
1967, col. 
House of Assembly Debates, lst November 
1. 
2. Rhodesia: House of Assembly Debates, 2nd November 
1967, col. 1001. 
3. Rhodesia: House of Assembly Debates, lst November 
1967, col. 961. 
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Despite this appeal, the course was terminated, thus 
closing the door to many Africans who wished to enter 
university. 
Notwithstanding the government Is attempts to 
exclude Africans from university, a significant number 
of African students found entry to 'A' level courses 
in mission schools, as well as the two government 
schools at Goromonzi and Fletcher. Consequently an 
upward trend in the number of Africans gaining 'A' level 
education became apparent in the 1960s and 70s (when 
compared to the 1950s) and Table 4.6 illustrates this 
phenomenon. 
Table 4.6. Increase in 'A' level enrolment in African 
secondary schools between 1964 and 1971 (1) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Lower VI 58 110 156 155 188 184 187 226 
Upper VI 35 56 94 148 139 180 180 183 
Totals 93 166 250 303 327 364 367 409 
Accompanying this increase in enrolment was a 
corresponding increase in the number of students qualifying 
for admission to the university (two 'A' level passes were 
required for entry). In 1967, for example, out of 146 
African students who sat for the Cambridge Higher School 
Certificate, 103 qualified for admission 
2. In 1-0.69, of 
1. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year 1971, p. 25, Table 14. 
2. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the Year 1967, p. 12. 
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qua. Liziea i: or university entrance-. Similarly, in 1971, 
the 178 candidates who took the examination, 132 
145 out of 174 who took the examination, obtained the 
required two 'A' level passes and qualified for admission 
2 
A number of difficulties, however, prevented a 
very large number of those who qualified for university 
entry from taking up their places and the most serious 
of these was the lack of adequate financial assistance. 
Some grants were available from the university for the 
aid of poor students and these were provided by some 
private bodies such as the Christian Council of Rhodesia, 
the P. John Trust, the Schimmelpennink-Campbell Education 
3 Trust and the University Service The distribution 
of the grants was the responsibility of the university, 
however, racial bias in the awarding of the grants quite 
evidently favoured white students. The very character 
and composition of the University Councilwhere one-third 
of its members were nominated by the government, allowed 
racial bias to continue. 
Some scholarship boards operated on strict racial 
lines: for example, the Rhodesia Masonic Lodge, required 
1. Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
2. 
3. 
for the Year 1969, p. 13. 
for the Year 1971, p. 11. 
Annual Re 
O'Callaghan, cit., p. 101. 
rt of the Secretary for African Education 
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that applicants be children of British subjects of 
European descent. Others, like the Gordon Milne 
Bursaries, required that applicants be children of 
members of the Salisbury all white Caledonian Society. 
The Goldsmith's Company of London offered postgraduate 
scholarships but only to people of a United Kingdom 
parentage. The Chanelick Solomon grants were only 
for male Europeans, while the Three Feathers scholar- 
ships were also restricted to people whose parents were 
1 
both of European descent 
A detailed study of the scholarships awarded in 
1970 revealed that the government made a total allowance 
of Rhodesian $330,000 in the form of grants, loans and 
bursaries, to university students. Of this amount 
$(R)162,, 000 was given to white students, while Africans 
2 
received a total of $(R)142,000. Of the scholarships 
which were allocated on the basis of 'A' level results, 
42 were given to whites and 32 to Africans. The 
largest award was made to those Africans who committed 
themselves to teach for three years after university 
study. Such Africans were given 122, with 89 to their 
3 
European counterparts. But few grants were given to 
Africans who wanted to join the Civil Service. Only two 
4 
such awards were made compared to the 50 given to whites. 
Of the 29 bursaries awarded by companies and private 
1. O'Callaghan, 
2. Ibid., p. 102. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
op. cit., 0.101. 
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foundations in 1971,18 were awarded to whites, 9 to 
1 
Asians, and only 2 to Africans 
The racial discrimination practised against Africans 
in the allocation of grants, as described above, coupled 
with the lack of adequate facilities for 'A' level educa- 
tion for Africans, caused the university to be a 
predominantly white institution. In 1960, African 
enrolment was only 38 out of a total student body of 
2 168 By 1967, the number of Africans had risen 
significantly but was still less than half that of the 
number of Europeans: 211 Africans compared to 432 
3 
whites As Martin Loney pointed out, had it not been 
for the assistance provided by the World University 
Service, and the Christian Council, not more than 200 
4 African students would have been at the university 
By 1971, African representation stood at 40% of the 
5 
total university enrolment 
The degree of racial inequality in terms of educa- 
tional opportunity was further evidenced by the fact that, 
while white students were given considerably more 
1. O'Callaghan, oD. cit., p. 102. 
2. Hannah, op. cit. , p. 272. 
3. Commonwealth University Year Book 1968, p. 2186. 




resources to study at the local university than blacks, 
they were also provided with government funds to study 
at South African universities which were closed to black 
Rhodesians in 1966 1. In 1967, government overall 
expenditure on 603 white Rhodesian students in South 
2 African universities amounted to well over E131,000 
No grants at all were made to Africans for study outside 
Rhodesia. 
Scope for employment for F1 secondary school and 
univers-ity graduates 
One of the factors which played a major part in 
limiting the employment opportunities for African F1 
secondary school leavers during the first five years of 
the RF government policy was, as mentioned earlier, the 
lack of adequate scope for school leavers to enter 
apprenticeship training in the various industries. 
Without this essential training, most jobs in industry 
remained outside the scope of the majority of school 
leavers 3. The European employers' preference for 
training white school leavers precipitated the problem. 
The vast majority of white employers wanted a less 
1. See Statement by A. P. Smith (Minister of Education) 
to the House of Assembly, House of Assembly Debates, 
1st November 1967, col. 939. 
2. O'Callaghan, op. cit., p. 98. 
3. Rodger Riddell: Education for Employment in Zimbabwe 
(CIIR, London, 1980), p. 56. 
am 
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educated, cheap, unskilled labour force and this -reduced 
school leaver opportunity for readily finding employment. 
The 1969 Census figures revealed that 45% of the blacks 
in self or wage employment had never been to school: 13% 
had a Standard III education and 36% had a complete 
primary education 
1. These were employed largely in 
menial jobs in the mining and agricultural industries 
or urban manufacturing industries, or as domestic 
servants. Only 2% of those employed had Form II 
2 
secondary education and less than 1% had Form IV In 
all, between 1966 and 1969, less than 50 Africans had 
3 
received apprenticeship training for skilled jobs 
A Zimbabwe manpower survey, conducted by Colcolough 
and Murray for the Commonwealth Secretariatt revealed the 
high level of secondary school leaver unemployment in 
1969. Of the 48,486 Africans with one to two years of 
secondary education, 27,076 (i. e. 56%) were unemployed. 
Of the 9,478 with three to four years of secondary 
education, 4,108 (43%) were unemployed and, of the 998 
who had -', 'ive to six years of secondary education, 568 
(57%) were out of work 
4. Those in employment were 
usually in blue collar jobs, low level clerical or 
1. Census of Population 1969, Tables 8.25 and 29, 
Rhodesia Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1978. 
2. Ibid. 
3. S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1970, 
Report of the Education Committee, Cap F, WMMS Archives, 
Box 1967-70. 
4. C. Colcolough & R. Murray: 
Training Needs of an Inde 
secretariat, London, 1979), 
The Immediate-'. 11anpower and 
ndent Zimbabwe (Commonwea-lth 




managerial/supervisory positions in various industries. 
A significant proportion entered the teaching pro. fession. 
University graduates had less employment problems 
as they were readily taken into positions left vacant 
in industry through white emigration caused b-y the 
intensity of the guerrilla war being waged by black 
nationalist forces against the RF government. In 1970, 
8,500 such vacancies became available to African 
graduates 
1. The 2,500 Africans with local university 
qualifications 
2 
easily found employment. Some of the 
3,, 000 blacks who graduated outside Rhodesia quickly 
filled the remaining vacancies3. Other university 
graduates entered the teaching profession in secondary 
schools, while a small number entered the Civil Service. 
Evidence provided in this chapter demonstrates the 
reversal (by the RF government) of the secondary educa- 
tion policy developed under Todd's and Whitehead's 
administrations. The racist nature of their policy, 
in terms of its objectives and ideology, begs a few 
concluding observations concerning the role of that 
policy and of education under the RF regime. 





The most significant aspect of secondary educational 
policy under the RF was its role as an instrument of 
implementing a racist ideology of separate racial 
development. It assisted in effecting a vicious form 
of human oppression and political, economic . 4. and social 
underdevelopment. The CD scheme, which provided the 
framework of that policy, represented the RF's design 
for entrenching that process of underdevelopment. 
The first step in the implementation of the policy 
was the re-organisation of educational administration 
and structure in relation to the overall RF CD strategy 
and objectives. The transfer of educational responsi- 
bility to the African communities without adequate 
provision of economic resources and political power 
undermined the possibilities of their developing educa- 
tion efficiently and achieving effective rural and 
community development. 
Moreover, given the limited scope for rural develop- 
ment, under conditions of scarce resources and poverty 
such as prevailed amongst rural African communities, the 
F2 secondary school system provided little or no solution 
to the complex problems of community development and the 
achievement of individual advancement, socially, 
economically and politically. F2 graduates found no 
unemployment opportunities and scope for participation 
in active rural uplift because, in the first instance, 
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there was no genuine policy and political will on the 
part of the central government to facilitate effective 
rural and community development. 
It can be concluded from the evidence given in the 
discussion that the F2 secondary school system was 
designed largely to provide accommodation for the large 
number of African pupils who were no longer permitted to 
proceed to academic secondary education under RF govern- 
ment policy. By providing those pupils with a rural- 
oriented education, the government hoped t. 0 reduce the 
inflow of African secondary school graduates to European 
towns and cities. There is little evidence to suggest 
that the RF government genuinely intended the F2 system 
to assist in the promotion of community development in 
the absence of essential resources and other prerequisites 
for such development. 
The overall RF gover=ent CD policy, of which 
vocational secondary education was an integral part, had 
as its primary objective the transfer of the burden and 
blame for ineffective rural and community development 
from the central government to Africans themselves. 
F1 academic secondary education policy represented 
a calculated attempt by the RF government, firstly, to halt 
the rapid expansion of secondary education, which was 
initiated by Todd and the churches to assist in African 
political, economic and social advancement. Secondly, it 
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was designed to minimise the African opportunities to 
acquire 'higher' formal academic qualifications which 
provided access to the key professions and skilled 
services in the urban industrial sectors. This was 
intended to restore absolute European domination of all 
key posts in every sphere of life, in keeping with RF 
racial ideology. 
As shown in the discussion, the 1966 Policy, despite 
missionary opposition, succeeded in reducing educational 
opportunities for African students at every stage in 
secondary education to the extent where only a small 
proportion was able to acquire Form IV and Form VI. 
That had the overall effect of limiting the number of 
students able to proceed to university education. 
However, even those who succeeded in securing 101 or 
'A' level secondary education were not assured of employ- 
ment opportunities. An examination of secondary school 
graduates in 1969 revealed that the vast majority were 
unemployed. This also undermined African political, 
economic and social advancement. 
Overall, RF educational policy demonstrated the 
extent to which African education under the RF regime 
became an instrument of oppression, racial segregation 
and African underdevelopment 
1. 
See Bernard T. G. Chidzero: Education and the Challenge 




Throughout this study, various aspects of secondary 
educational policy development in Southern Rhodesia were 
discussed in the context of the country's colonial 
history. An attempt was made to examine the rationale 
for state and church policies, their impact on secondary 
educational development and the implications for African 
socio-economic and political advancement. 
This final chapter summarises the main arguments in 
the study, makes observations on them and, where possible, 
Oraws conclusions. 
The thesis began with three broad themes: (1) the 
impact of the colonial policy of protecting white 
supremacy on the development of church and state policies 
on African secondary education; (2) the various factors 
which accounted for the conflict and/or convergence 
between (a) state and church policies and (b) the 
policies of different churches; and (3) the scope and 
limitations of progressive educational reform in a 
colonial society which was opposed to reforms intended 
to benefit the majority of Africans. 
The first theme discussed the reasons behind the 
attempts by successive colonial governments to influence 
and determine secondary educational policies and 
programmes. It emerged from that discussion that one 
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primary reason underlying government attempts to control 
missionary policies was to use education as an instrument 
in controlling the rate of African Political, economic 
and social advancement in order to preserve white 
privilege and domination. This theme was elaborated 
throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 1 discussed, against the background of the 
conquest and colonisation of Southern Rhodesia, the 
introduction of western formal education for Africans 
by various missionary churches. The role and position 
of successive colonial governments in that process of 
educational development was discussed. It was seen 
that church and state policies had differing objectives. 
The chapter also examined, in the light of that conflict, 
the concerted efforts by the state to control missionary 
policies and programmes. The policy pursued by 
successive governments of protecting overall colonial 
interests against the effects of rapid African political, 
economic and social advancement, emerged in that 
discussion as a major determinant of goverment educa- 
tional policy. The discussion proceeded to consider 
the methods by which colonial governments sought to 
structure African education within the broad framework 
of their colonial administrative policies and objectives. 
In that context, Keigwin's policy and educational scneme 
represented an attempt to ensure that African education 
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evolved along the lines of separate racial development 
which were perceived to be less likely to lead to a 
direct clash of interests with the whites. By deter- 
mining educational policy and programmes, the government 
hoped to control the rate of growth of the African 
electorate and African entry into the key professions 
, 
-And 
skilled services. The intention was to protect 
white interests and domination. The importance 
attached to the accomplishment of these goals was 
demonstrated by the continual application of financial, 
administrative and political sanctions on missionary 
educational work by the responsible governments of both 
Coghlan and Moffat, in order to bring missionary policies 
into line with the state policy. 
Chapter 2 continued the discussion at the secondary 
education level. The rationale for the policy of 
Huggins' government on African secondary education was 
examined covering the period before, during and after 
the second world war. The discussion revealed that, 
during each of the three periods, the primary factor 
determining government policy was the preservation of 
white politicalt economic and social interests. Every 
attempt was made by the government to influence, deter- 
mine and control missionary policies in the pursuit of 
that objective. 
Government opposition to the introduction of African 




largely on white fear of African competition J-n the 
economic and social spheres. During the war, the 
temporary change in government policy and its support 
for the establishment and development of African educa- 
tion was influenced by the need to generate a more 
educated and skilled African labour force required to 
assist in economic development. 
After the war, when educated and skilled Africans 
were no longer required in large numbers to assist in 
industrial development (due to the increase in white 
emigration and the return of white servicemen) govern- 
ment support for the rapid development of African 
secondary education diminished and, once again, there 
was an abrupt change in its policy with the government 
thereafter attempting to control the expansion of 
African secondary education through a number of 
restrictive measures. As was seen, this led to conflict 
between state and church policies, a conflict which 
seriously undermined the growth of secondary education. 
Chapter 3 discussed attempts by Todd and Whitehead, 
in collaboration with the missionaries, to reform 
secondary educational policies in the interests of multi- 
racial partnership. However, any achievements in that 
respect, with the objective of assisting more rapid 
African political, economic and social advancement, 
. ddft AL. 
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were constrained by the opposition of the conservative 
white society which feared the ef fects of such advance- 
ment on its own security and status. As a result, 
Todd's hopes of building a multi-racial society were 
frustrated. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated emphatic white reassertion 
of the paramountcy of their interests through the 
implementation of a racist policy of separate racial 
development intended to establish absolute white 
political, economic and social supremacy at the central 
level. This policy emerged as the framework for 
educational policy and programmes within which mission- 
aries were forced to operate. 
An important link was therefore established in the 
foregoing theme between colonial history and politics 
and the development of African secondary educational 
policies and programmes in Southern Rhodesia. 
significant point which emerged was the way in which the 
nature of those policies and programmes reflected, at 
every historical period, the racially divided structure 
of Southern Rhodesian colonial society. This was 
evident in the racist state educational policy and the 
racially segregated systems of black and white education. 
Although, throughout the time of the governments of both 
Todd and Whitehead, state educational policy reflected 
government attempts to establish a form Of multi-racial 
society, the racial structure of education continued to 
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exist, thus also refflecting white determination to 
maintain a racially segregated society. Under the 
Rhodesia Front regime, state policy, the structure of 
education and its objectives, reflected in every 
respect the 'apartheid' structure of Rhodesian colonial 
society. 
The evidence advanced in the discussion confirms 
the -proposition that educational policies and systems 
of education operating in every society tell us a great 
deal about the nature of that society. Educational 
systems in democratic capitalist societies reflect the 
democratic capitalist ideals and values of those 
societies Just as much as education in socialist 
countries reflects socialist ideology and assists in 
sustaining the existence of a socialist state. It is not 
the intention to suggest that educational programmes may 
not be actively involved in the overall process of social 
change but to agree with Weiler's emphasis on: 
the important degree to which the develop- 
ment of educational svstems is conditioned and 
determined by the state of the social system as 
a whole, and the fact that educational develop- 
ment and reform is limited to what the existing 
dynamics of social structure, political power 
and economic wealth permit. 2 
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis: Schooling in 
Capitalist America (Routledge & Kegan Paul,, London, 
1976), pp. 102-124. 
2. Hans N. Weiler: ''Changing Concepts and Practices of 
Educational Planning: Implications for Training'' 




In Southern Rhodesia, it was shown that state 
policy and systems of education under successive 
governments reflected the development of a racially 
divided society. As May pointed out, they also 
reflected white insistence on maintaining racial 
privilege. 
They provided for non whites limited means 
of social mobility and ensured that only the 
most able Africans were able to obtain a full 
secondary education and thus the means to 
higher education; that small minority would 
not pose a numerical threat to young whites 
in the competition for the goals they reserved 
for the privileged. 1 
A second conclusion may be derived from the fore- 
going theme. With the limited exception of the period 
of Todd and Whitehead, state educational policy and 
systems served as instruments of African oppression and 
socio-economic and political underdevelopment. State 
policy was designed to educate Africans into inferior 
roles determined for them by the colonial system. This 
policy encouraged the internalisation amongst both 
Africans and Europeans of the racist concept of black 
inferiority, while European achievement of high educa- 
tional qualif ications,, partly through policies of racial 
J. May: Where do we go from here? (The Association 
of Round Tables in Central Africa, Salisbury, 1978), 
1: ). 4. 
dok - 
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discrimination, assisted in legitimising their 
'superiority' and control of political power, the 
professions and skilled services. Government attempts 
to determine and control missionary policies were based on 
the premise that the education provided by missionaries 
encouraged Africans to aspire to political, economic 
and social equality with whites. This was considered 
a threat to the continued existence of an inegalitarian 
and racist colonial system which provided whites with 
their privileged position and power base. 
The second theme discussed the conflict between 
varying degrees of missionary political support for 
white rule and their educational policies. Also 
considered were the differences between church policies. 
The discussion revealed thatr up to the period of Todd, 
the differences between state policy and those of the 
Anglicans and the Methodists were not so much due to 
conflict in the political positions of the churches and 
successive governments, but rather to what ought to be 
the purpose and objectives of African education. The 
governments believed that African education should be 
designed to equip Africans with skills and knowledge 
related to rural trades and uplift. The intention was 
to make Africans efficient workers in their own areas 
and where their labour was needed by the whitest but 
without enabling them to compete with whites or threaten 
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white political, economic and social positions. In 
that context, successive governments and the white 
settler community regarded the provision of an academic 
oriented education or high technical training for 
Africans as a serious threat to their supremacy. Those 
churches such as the Roman Catholics, the DRCI the SDA 
and others which, in the earlier years, believed that 
providing high academic education for Africans could 
lead to the undermining of white rule, adopted policies 
which were in line with those of the state, although 
they modified their positions in subsequent years. 
The Anglicans and the Methodists advocated the 
provision of academic education for Africans, not because 
they wanted to undermine colonial rule, but because they 
believed that rapid African advancement, within the 
colonial system was a credit to Christianity and also 
justified white rule. African socio-economic advance- 
ment was not seen as in any way in conflict with the 
objectives of colonial rule or of Christianity but 
rather as complementary to both in assisting their 
continued existence. 
During the premierships of Todd and Whitehead, when 
the objectives of state and church policies converged in 
their intention to promote African advancement and create 
a multi-racial society, there was rapid development of 
African secondary education. That situation lasted only 
until the rise of the Rhodesia Front Party to power in 
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1962. Thereafter,, the conflict between state and 
church policies arose because the government wished to 
use education to promote its racist ideology and 
policies. The churches found that they could not 
reconcile the blatantly racist objectives of government 
educational policy and programmes with their Christian 
principles. Also, they resented government policy 
because it seriously threatened to undermine the whole 
basis and structure of African education which the 
churches had established over a period of many years. 
Missionaries feared that this would have serious 
implications for the future of African education. 
The third theme discussed the scope and limits of 
progressive educational reform in Southern Rhodesia, 
given the conservative character of white society. it 
emerged in that discussion that a central issue was the 
dilemma of a progressive reformer who saw the need for 
reform and was prepared to take appropriate action but 
was constrained by a conservative white settler 
community. 
The first indications of such a problem were when 
Huggins, even though essentially conservative, attempted, 
during the war period, to modify government educational 
policy for economic and political reasons. The support 
he gave to the establishment and development of African 
secondary education in order to create a more skilled and 
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educated black labour force which was needed to assist 
in the revitalisation of the economy, had serious 
political consequences for him. White Opposition to 
African advancement and entry into the professions and 
skilled services was one major reason for dissension 
within Huggins' party which resulted in his losing an 
absolute majority in the 1946 General Election. The 
strength of white opposition to reform was evident in 
Huggins' re-adoption of a more conservative educational 
policy. 
One of the reasons the whites feared and opposed 
rapid African advancement was that many of the white 
immigrants in the 1940s and 50s were unskilled and not 
highly educated. They came to Southern Rhodesia in 
search of the kind of prosperity many of them could not 
achieve in their countries of origin. When they 
arrived, their main advantage over the blacks was their 
white skin which gave them a higher socio-economic and 
political status and access to key jobs. They feared, 
therefore, that if Africans were given adequate educa- 
tional opportunities and gained entry into some of the 
professions occupied by whites, their status might fall. 
They might, in the face of growing African competition, 
find it difficult to maintain their superior status and 
slip down the social scale. When the policies of 
Huggins were thought to deviate from the conservatism of 
pre-war years, which the whites believed was their best 
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protection, his government suffered electoral defeat 
and was f orced to enter into coalition with the Labour 
Party. 
Further clear indication of white opposition to 
reform was evident during the period of Todd and 
Whitehead. In the first instance, Todd's multi-racial 
politics appeared to strike at the very heart of white 
security. The whites in Southern Rhodesia and the 
Federation were not interested in genuine multi-racial 
partnership because it threatened to place Africans on 
an equal footing with Europeans in the political, 
economic and social spheres. To attempt to reform the 
franchise system, industrial relations and laws, land 
and educational policies, as Todd did, was to shake the 
very foundations of white privileged position and power. 
Moreover, white prosperity and the high standard 
of living they enjoyed, significantly depended on the 
low wages paid to Africans and their overall poor 
standard of living. If Africans were to achieve higher 
educational qualifications. they would firstly be 
stimulated to seek admission to jobs currently monopolised 
by whites and, secondly, to demand rates of ipay which 
could affect white standards of living in both relative 
and absolute terms. As one white settler explained: 
If the native were admitted to full partnership, 
it is doubtful whether it could be possible to 
maintain the standard of living of all the 
whites at their present level, under the existing 
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economic svstem. It is undoubtedly the .... appreciation of this fact that is behind the 
determination .... to keep the native out of 
the skilled labour market at all costs. 1 
White opposition to rapid improvement in the African 
position undermined the possibilities of Todd's educa- 
tional reforms making a significant contribution to 
overall African advancement. Todd's failure to 
imulement far reaching reforms in the colonial system 
meant that most opportunities for advancement in the 
political and economic spheres remained closed to the 
vast majority of Africans. White racist attitudes 
undermined the entry of educated Africans to 
professions in government and industry. This, in part, 
accounted for the high level of African secondary school 
leavers in the 1950s who were unable to find employment. 
Those who did find employment were subjected to 
further discrimination in terms of the positions they 
could occupy, their prospects of promotion, the wages 
they received and the labour rights they could enjoy- 
This situation militated against the establishment of 
a multi-racial society. 
This helps to confirm another proposition that educa- 
tional reform, by itself, can not bring about social change. 
To achieve that, educational reform must be accompanied, or 
preceded, by wider and more effective socio-economic and 
political reform because education operates within 
F. Windram: Night Over Africa (Macmillan Press, 
London, 1937), p. 219. 
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the mainstream of other forces existing in society 1- 
Educational reform could not transform an essentially 
inegalitarian. and racist Southern Rhodesian colonial 
society into a less racist and more just society as 
Todd appeared to believe. It could not alter white 
attitudes. Hencer educated Africans were rejected by 
most white people, even though they had achieved the 
so-called white civilised standards. Todd's hopes that 
education would make Africans more acceptable to the white 
community, and thus provide a basis for creating a multi- 
racial society, were thus frustrated. 
Besides, educational reform and the resulting 
increase in secondary educational provision for Africans, 
did not lead to political, economic and social equal- 
ity, within the African community. On the contrary, 
it increased the inequalities between the small minority 
of those who were favoured by the selection process and 
acquired the necessary qualifications to gain them 
positions of relatively high status and income in, for 
An assumption prevailed in Tanzania in the 1960s and 
70s that educational reform, aimed at eliminating 
the elitist and capitalist tendencies inherent in 
western education, could create a more egalitarian 
socialist society. The fallacy of this assumption 
was soon realised and a call was made for wider 
political., economic and social reform. See 
David Court: "The education system as a response to 
inequality in Tanzania and Kenya", Journal of modern 
African Studies, Vol. 14 (Cambridge University Press, 
1976, pp. 661-680. 
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example, the teaching profession and Civil Service, and 
those who were rejected by the selection process and 
failed to attain similar positions and benefits. The 
minority of educated blacks acquired a new social 
mobility which gave them a better chance of entry into 
the small number of professional jobs available to 
blacks than the uneducated, or less educated, majority. 
Education assisted in legitimising the positions of those 
who acquired positions of importance. At the same time, 
it legitimised the failures of those who did not reach 
those positions due to the lack of the necessary formal 
academic qualifications. The inequalities between 
educated and employed blacks and the uneducated masses 
increased. 
An important point needs to be made regarding the 
limitations of Todd's educational reforms in terms of the 
relevance or otherwise of academic education to the 
intentions, needs and aspirations of both students and 
parents. Todd's reforms were, in part, a response to 
African demand for adequate provision of 'higher' academic 
education, which, they believed, would be the solution to 
most of their problems. Students and parents were aware 
that, within the existing economic and political realitiest 
those who possessed academic qualifications had better 
scope for gaining entry to the limited number of jobs in 
the socially prestigious and high income white collar 
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professions. The importance given to formal education 
by Europeans, in every sphere of life, also influenced 
Africans to seek to obtain it. 
But, as shown in the discussion, the expansion of 
secondary educational provision under the first Five 
Year Plan, did not guarantee political, economic and 
social advancement to all those who obtained secondary 
educational qualifications. In the first instance, 
urban industries and other employment sectors could not 
provide all the African secondary school graduates with 
the professional white collar jobs to which they and 
their parents aspired. Even if the racial discrimination 
element, which exacerbated African school leaver unemploy- 
ment in urban and other industrial areas was removed, 
this would not have ensured that every school leaver 
got a job because there was a limit to the number of 
jobs available at any one time. moreover, due to the 
academic curriculum predominant in African secondary 
schools, students graduated and left school with few 
vocational skills to offer to industry. Once out of 
school, they had little scope for undertaking apprentice- 
ship training. This further reduced their chances of 
finding a job and the result was that many secondary 
school graduates were unsuccessful in realising their 
aspirations for advancement. 
The relevance or otherwise of academic education to 
individual, communal or national needs for development in 
P, lb, 
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developing countries is a subject of much contemporar-y 
debate. Strong arguments have been advanced in that 
debate for vocational and rural skills to be introduced 
1 
to the school curriculum One is tempted, in the 
light of that debate, to argue that if Todd and the 
missionaries had introduced vocational and rural 
skills more effectively, much of the unemployment 
problem would have been solved through many school 
leavers taking up rural employment and contributing to 
rural and community development. But, from recent and 
contemporary experiences in many developing countries, 
their attempts to develop a more vocational curriculum 
have not provided an adequate solution to their unemploy- 
ment problems or to the fulfilment of individual and/or 
national needs and aspirations for advancement. This is 
because such reforms need to be accompanied by a policy 
of rural regeneration and the development in rural and 
urban areas of more productive and rewarding forms of 
2 
employment and/or self employment Unless a policy of 
1. See for example, James K. Lindsey: "Rural Education 
and Underdevelopment: Aspects of the Politics of 
Education" (UNESCO/IIEP paper, Paris, 1975) and 
Report on Education Reform: Education for Development 
(Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1976). 
2. See David Alexander, "Community Based In-Service 
Teacher Education Programme and Education Extension 
Centres developed by the North East Group of Teachers' 
Colleges, Thailand", British Council, 1979, pp. 29-30. 
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rural regeneration accompanies curriculum reform, so 
that school leavers can engage in beneficial employment 
in rural areas, they and their parents will reject 
vocational and rural education. Parents will want 
their children to acquire academic education because 
they know that those children who obtain it have a better 
chance of securing the limited number of white collar 
jobs available in the relatively developed urban 
are as . 
This phenomenon was evident in the discussion off 
pupil and parental attitudes towards F2 vocational 
secondary education under the Rhodesia Front educational 
policy. Because there was no genuine attempt by the 
government to promote rural regeneration and industrial 
development, F2 school graduates could find no profitable 
employment. Parents and pupils realised that the RF 
community development policy was not intended to promote 
effective community and rural development. They knew 
that, in the absence of such development, there was 
little scope for F2 graduates to find employment or 
opportunities for sel. -employment in the rural areas. 
Given the fact that there was, under the governments 
of Todd and Whitehead, little effective policy for rural 
and community development, the inclusion of rural and 
vocational skills in secondary school curricula was not 
sufficient to assist in the achievement of either the 
aspirations of parents and students for better paying 
326. 
jobs and the improvement of their standard of li,,, ing or 
in realising social and political advancement. As 
long as it was not profitable to acquire vocational 
education and to work in rural areas, parents and 
pupils would continue to seek academic education and 
urban emigration and unemployment would persist, no 
1 
matter what educational reforms were implemented 
However, despite these limitations, Todd's 
educational reforms'were of considerable importance 
in the contribution they made towards the overall 
development of African education and advancement 
considering the constraints which confronted Todd and 
the missionaries in implementing the reforms. Their 
significance in both historical and future contexts can 
not be underestimated. 
The three themes discussed in this study are of 
major importance in the history of African education in 
Southern Rhodesia. These themes and issues are 
important in terms of understanding the origins and 
development of past policies on the basis of which 
African secondary education was developed. An under- 
standing of the achievements and limitations of past 
See David Alexander, "Community Based In-SerTrice 
Teacher Education Programme and Education Extension 
Centres developed by the North East Group of 
Teachers' Colleges, Thailand", British Councilt 
1979, p. 30. 
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policies, programmes and reforms may assist in deter- 
mining future patterns and the course of educational 
development in post-colonial Southern Rhodesia to meet 






Missionary Archival Sources in Alphabetical order 
Anglican Church (SPG Archives, 15 Tufton Street, 
London) 
Mashonaland Letters Received: Vol 1 October 1892 - 
June 1927; classified under 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 
Contains Letters and Annual Reports of the Bishop 
of the Southern Rhodesia Diocese pertaining to the 
development of Christian and educational work. 




























































Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1911 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1912 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1913 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1914 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1915 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1916 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1917 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1918 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1919 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1920 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D., 1921 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1922 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1923 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1924 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1925 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1926 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1927 
Southern Rhodesia Letters Received: - July, 1927- 
December 1939, Vol. 2., also classified under 
ii) Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D 
and contain Letters and Annual reports of the Bishop 
of Southern Rhodesia on further developments in the 
growth of Christian and educational work. The volume 
also contains letters and reports of priests and lay 
workers. Letters and Reports for 1934 to 1939 are 
particularly important because they contain plans for 
the establishment of African secondary education and 
are a record of consultations made between the Anglicans, 


























Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1935 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1936 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1937 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D. 1938 
Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D, 1939 
From 1940 onwards the Southern Rhodesia Diocese is 
split into 2 dioceses - Mashonaland and Matebeleland 
and correspondence is classified separately under 
Mashonaland Diocese and Matebeleland Diocese. 
iii) Mashonaland Diocese 
Files 1940 to 1952 contain letters of the Bishop of 
Mashonaland and other Church Officials on various 
aspects of the growth of the Church, the establishment 
of the new diocese and overall educational work, but 
the files are particularly important because they 
relate to the establishment and development of Anglican 
secondary education for Africans with special reference 
to St. Augustines' Penhalonga secondary school. Also 
contained are letters from the Rev. A. Winter to the 
SPG Board concerning the development of the school and 
correspondence between the Bishop of Mashonaland Diocese 
and the Community of the Resurrection concerning joint 
participation in developing secondary education. Of 
special significance is the insight the letters give 
into the conflict between missionaries and the 
Government over secondary educational policy between 1946 
and 1952. 
iv) Mashonaland Diocese Correspondence 1940 - 1952 
Mash. /DS/C., 1940 
Mash. /DS/C., 1941 
Mash. /DS/C., 1942 
Mash. /DS/C., 1943 
Mash. /DS/C., 1944 
Mash. /DS/C., 1945 
Mash. /DS/C., 1946 
Mash. /DS/C., 1947 
Mash. /DS/C. , 1948 
olk Ab. - 
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Mash. /DS/C., 1949 
Mash. /EX. DS/C., * 1950 
Mash. /EX. DS/C., 1951 - 52. 
Mashonaland Diocese Files 1953 to 1971 are closed 
Archives. They cover two important periods discussed 
in the thesis, 
(a) the Federation period 1953 - 63 
(b) the Rhodesia Front period 1963 - 71. 
Several aspects of Anglican religious and educational 
work are recorded, but the files are particularly rich 
in information on the expansion of Anglican secondary 
educational work especially during Todd and Whitehead's 
period. The files contain Letters and Annual Reports 
of the Bishop of Mashonaland Diocese, Principals of 
Anglican secondary schools, correspondence between the 
diocese and the Department of Native/African Education. 
They also contain Government Education circulars issued 
by Todd, Whitehead and Rhodesia Front administrations, 
and correspondence between the diocese and other 
churches. The files, on the whole, are of major 
importance in terms of the understanding of Anglican 
educational policy and programmes as well as the 
differences between the attitudes and objectives of 
the policies of Todd's government and the Rhodesia 
Front regime on African education in general and 
secondary education in particular. The files are 
classified as follows: - 
V) Mashonaland Diocese Correspondence 1953 - 1971 
Mash. /EX. DS/C., 1953-54 
Mash. /EX. DS/C. , 1955-57 
Mash. /D/C/TF 263, Finance File 1958-60. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 37, Finance File 1960-65. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 38r Finance File 1966-67. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 262, General File 1958-60. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 26, Confidential File 1959. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 267, General File 1960-68. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 550, General File 1969-70. 
Mash. /D/C/TF 551, General File 1971-73. 
vi) Matebeleland Diocese Correspondence and Annual Reports. 
The files found relevant cover a variety of aspects on 
Ak ml- 
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Anglican educational work in Matebeleland. They 
include Letters and Annual Reports of the diocesan 
Bishop, reports from school principals and plans 
for the establishment and funding of secondary schools 
in the region. Also reflected are the attitudes of 
the Anglican Church towards the political unrest 
between 1960 and 1963. All the files are restricted 
and confidential. 
Mateb. /D/C/TF 262, General File 1958-60. 
Mateb. /D/C/TF 262A. Finance File 1960-62. 
Mateb. /D/C/TF 261, General File 1962-65. 
Mateb. /D/C/TF 550, General File 1966-69. 
Mateb. /D/C/TF 190, General File 1970-73. 
vii) Missionary Reports 'E" Series. 
The following Files were found relevant. 
Missionary Reports 1905 - contains reports on growth 
of the church and educational 
work. 
Missionary Reports 1906 - contains reports on growth 
of the church and educational 
work. 
Missionary Reports 190? - 
Missionary Reports 1908 - 
Missionary Reports 1909 - 
contains reports on growth 
of the church and educational 
wor k. 
contains reports on growth 
of the church and educational 
work. 
contains reports on growth 
of the church and educational 
work. 
Missionary Reports 1910 - 
Missionary Reports 1911 - 
Missionary Reports 1912 - 
Missionary Reports 1913 - 





how mission work was affected 
by the 1896 - 97 war and 




Missionary Repor-cs 1920 - 
Missionary Reports 1921 - 
Missionary Reports 1922 - 
Missionary Reports 1923 - 
Missionary Reports 1924 - 
Missionary Reports 1925 - 
Missionary Reports 1926 - 
Missionary Reports 1927 - 
Missionary Reports 1928 - 
Problems of A. S. Cripps 
schools as a result of 
non co-operation with the 
Education Department. 
St. Augustines taking 





Broderick's Report as 
Principal of Domboshawa 
Government School - the 
training of Jeanes teachers. 
Broderick's Report as 
Principal of Domboshawa 
Government School - the 
training of Jeanes teachers. 
Anglican attitude to the 
creation of the Native Education 
Department. See Fr. Baker's 
Report. 
Council for World Missions Archives (Formerly London 
Missionary Society. ) Livingston House, London. 
The relevant files are all restricted and confidential. 
They contain letters of various church missionaries 
and school principals, reports and government circulars 
which relate to many aspects of Church and State 
relations in African education during the period of 
Todd and the Rhodesia Front regimes. 
File 97-K 1955-60 Southern Rhodesia: Heads od-" 
"'o Tmi ttee. Institutions LI 
File 97-J 1960-66 Soutv, ýern Rhodesia: ----ý4caztiona'4. Work. 
File 97-F 1960-63 Sout, ýern Rýzodesia: VatebeýeZ.,. -n-' 
-'--. ee 4inu-ýes. Educa-, ion ý, OMMiVL.,
abý 
334 
File 97-1 1960-66 Southern Rhodesia: L duc -: ýion Worý. 
File 97-A 1966 : )outn'ern Rhodesia: 1, ýe 
of African Education. 
File 97-K 1966-69 Southern Rhodesia: 
International Missionary Council/Conference for British 
Misionary Societies Archives. 
IMC/CBMS (Africa) . Mic/fi 99,, Box 1221-1224 
Southern Rhodesia. 
University of Edinburgh 
The box contains minutes of the conferences of the 
Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference and 
correspondences between the SRMC, and the International 
Missionary Council. The sources represent a detailed 
history of missionary religious and educational work 
in Southern Rhodesia. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference 
held at Great Zimbabwe, 24th - 29th June 1915. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference 
held in Salisbury, 16th - 19th June 1920. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference 
held in Bulawayo, 5th - 8th July 1922. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference 
held in Salisbury, 30th May - 4th June 1924. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conj"erence 
held in Salisbury, 2nd - 5th June, 1926. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionar: 4 Conference 
held in Salisbury, 26th - 29th March 1928. 
Proceedings of -L-1-he Southern Rhodesia Missionary ýor,, `erence 
held in Bulawayo, 4th - 8th June, 1930. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary --on-, "ereý, ice 
t- held at the Victoria FaLts, 23rd - 28th juL, ý 1 -932- 
Conference of Missionar-'es Southern Rýzodesia -ji:; h 
Dr. Jo; in R. Mott th - 20trz June . 293,;. .. 
Bulawayo, 19L 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionarý Conference 
heZ, -7 a4- Great Zimbabwe... 21s- - 25th June 1ý34. 
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ii) Southern Rhodesia Conference Correspondence 
1) Letters of the Secretary, the Rev. L. P. Hardaker 
to the International Missionary Council, 1922-. '/-'8. 
11) Miscellaneous letters of the Secretary, the 
Rev. A. A. Lowe Jr. 1934 - 48. 
111) Correspondence of the Secretary with the High 
Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia 1940. 
lV) Correspondence of the Rev. Frank Noble with the 
International Missionary Council on the attitude 
of the Southern Rhodesian Government towards 
African education 1940. 
School of Oriental and African Studies, (University of 
London) 
Box 1221 Southern Rhodesia 
iii) File - General: Native Affairs 
1918: (newscutting)DaiLy News 13th September 1918. 
1918: Extract of letter from the Rev. John White 
10th October 1918. 
1919: (newscutting) Times 24th July 1919 - Southern 
Rhodesia Land Inquiry, Times 24th S>eptember 1919 
Rhodesias Future and Responsible Government 
setback. 
1920: 'Drew's articles on Native Affairs' Part 1, 
20 articles by Mr. Alfred Drew. 
1921: Home Rule for Rhodesia: Referendum proposed. 
Also include Notes on Native Affairs in Southern 
Rhodesia, compiled by A. S. Cripps (S. P. G. )missionary 
14th May 1921. 
1922: (newscutting)Times 14th May 1922 Southern Rhodesia: 
Conference at Cape Town. Include terms of the 
new Constitution. 
1923: order in Council, 30th July 1923 and Letters 
Patent providing for Constitution of Responsible 
Government in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
1924: Letter of J. R. Chancellor/Lionel Curtis 26th 
April 1924 circulated by The Round Tabies to 
Editorial Committee. Situation in Southern 
Rhodesia and views of Rev. A. S. Cripps. 
1925: Extract from Report of Chief Native Commissioner 
1924 - Labour supply in Rhodesia 
Ak AikL- 
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and Memorandum for the Dominion Office 
'Segregation Proposals of Land Commission 
in Southern Rhodesia' by A. S. Cripps, 10th 
November 1925. 
1926: Correspondence: A. S. Cripps on Native Juvenile 
Employment Act 1926 and 1925 Southern Rhodesia 
Land Commission Report. 
1934: Notes on problems of South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia. 
1935: Letters of the Rev. A. Carter. 
iv) File - General: Education 
1921: Representations to Sir Drummond Chaplin, 
Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, from 
T. Jesse Jones regarding observations of 
Commission on Education. 
1922: Letter of Rev. Neville Jones reviewing last 10 
years in Education 28th December 1922 with 
Printed Government Notice Order IDI - Schools 
for Natives 27th May 1921. 
1923: Statistical Report: Rhodesian Mission Methodist 
Episcopal Church: Memorandum by Mr. S-J. Lenfesty. - 
Inspector of schools, regarding Item 21 of 
Imperial Education Conference 'Special Means of 
Educating non European races within the Empire 
with a view to developing their highest usefulness 
to themselves and to the Empire'. 
Report of Visit of Inspection, Domboshawa School 
21st - 22nd November 1923 by J. L. Brandy and 
S. J. Lenfesty 
1924: Details of Commission to enquire into the Matter 
of Native Education in all its bearings 1924. 
1929: Letter from Methodist Episcopal Church to Rev. 
J. H. Oldham regarding report from the Government 
on control of Education. 
v) File - Director of Nat-Ive Dev,, Lopment 
Folder - Mr. H. S. Kergwin 
1919 - 1925: Correspondence, H. S. Kergwin to J. H. Oldham 
regarding preparation of Report on Native Development: 
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role of missionaries; meeting with Dr. T. J. Jones. 
Phelps-Stokes Commission visit; Paper "An 
Educational Experiment" read at Ethnological 
Section and Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Education; agricultural and industrial education, 
Kergwin's visit to America sponsored by Phelps- 
Stokes Fund. 
Folder - Mr. H. Jowitt 
1930-4 Correspondence between J. H. Oldham and Harold 
Jowitt regarding regulations under Native Develop- 
ment Act 1929; Native Affairs Department. 
vi) Box 1222 Southern Rhodesia 
1911: Southern Rhodesia: Report on Native Affairs 
Committee of Enquiry 1910-11. 
1912: Southern Rhodesia: Native Schools Ordinance 1912. 
1920: Southern Rhodesia: Correspondence with the Anti 
Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society Cmd. 547 
vii) Box 292 Southern Rhodesia (1948-64) 
This box is restricted and contains correspondence of 
the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference with the 
International Missionary Council and Minutes of the 
meetings of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia 
Christian Conference. 
File No. J. General 1948: Southern Rhodesia Missionary 
Conference correspondence with the SCLICMS. 
Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the 
Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 
14th December 1954. 
the Minutes of the meeting of tne Executive Council o., 
Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbur, ý4, 
15th December 1955. 
Minutes of the meeting of t; ze Execut. ve Council 00" trie 
Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in SaZisb:. tr, -4, 
13th December 1956. 
Min, ttes of the meeting of the Executive ., ouncit o. -: ' the 
Southern R, "Zodesia Christian Con--erence r_zeLý-: ' in SaLisbýir-, j 
29th December 1957. 
338 
Minutes of t; ýe meeting of the Execu-. tive -'oýtnc-z*l o--: ' 7; ý-. e 
Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference ý. eZd az; 
14th December 1958. 
Minutes of the meeting of the Executive (-, ounciZ o: -;! -. e 
Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference ýeld in SaZis, ý:, ir, ý, 
10th December, 1959. 
Relevant information and Proceedings of the Southern 
Rhodesia Christian Conference held in SaLisbury, 13-ýh 
December, 1960. 
Relevant information and Proceedings of the Southern 
Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 13trz 
December., 1961. 
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference 
held at Goromonzi, 19th November, 1962. 
Box 293 Southern Rhodesia (1955-60) 
This box is also restricted and contains 
1) Papers relating to Percy Ibbotson Memorial Fund 
1956 - 57. 
11) Rev. Herbert Carter correspondence 1960. 
111) Consultative Board Minutes 1955-60. 
lV) 'Dissent'. 
V) Newspaper cuttings and speeches by G. Huggins 1959-60. 
4) Society of Jesus Archives Farm Street Church, London. 
Zambezi Mission Letters. These are correspondences 
between missionaries of the Society in Southern Rhodesia 
and their London headquarters. They relate mostly to 
the history of the Society in the colony and cover many 
aspects of religious and educational work. 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 202-375, 1890-91 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 376-430, 1892 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 407-430, 1892 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 431-475, 1893 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 476-480, 1894 
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 516-552, 1895 
Zambe. ---' MissionU 118 Letter Nos. 553-63 9,1896-1913 
m6- 
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513 Mission Letters 367-489,1902 
514 CoZZeges 490-591 
BY11,1-46 TitZe Deeds, Zambezi Mission 1902. 
BY12., 47-139 MemoriaLs of the visitation of -- ,), rz e 
Zambezi Mission, 1924-25,1926-27 by Fr. Bodkin. 
BY13 Correspondence 140-231,1920-27 include 
letters from school principals and missionaries. 
BY17 Correspondence 382-436. 
other missionary letters were published in 
Letters and Notices by Manresa Press. The following 













































5) Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Archives, London 
School of oriental and African Studies, University of 
London - 
The sources are a comprehensive record of the history 
of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Southern Rhodesia. 
They include early biographical notes on missionaries 
who founded the church in the colony, correspondences 
and synod minutes which cover all aspects of the 
church's religious and educational work. Almost every 
file was found relevant. 
Biographical Central Africa Boxes (B/C/A/B). 
B/C/A/B. 6., Papers of Owen Watkins and Isaacc Shimmin 
and correspondence in microfilm 1890-1892. 
B/C/A/B. 8., Rev. S. Douglas Gray, Circular Letters, 
Circuit and District Reports. 
A116-- 
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Correspondence: The incoming correspondence is 
arranged as follows: - 
Transvaal Box (C/T/B), 1891-1896 
Mashonaland Box (C/M/B), 1891-1899 
Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1899-1904, 
Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1905-1917, 
Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1917-1923, 
Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1924-1928, 
Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1928-1932, 
Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/Bl. 
.II- -1 -II 
Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 
Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 






1932-1936, Box 834 
1936-1940, Box 835 
1940-1945, Box 836 
1945-48 
Synod Minutes: These are arranged as follows: - 
Transvaal and Rhodesia 1900-1905, Box 345 
Rhodesia and Minutes Box 1912-1922, Box 349 
South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1889-1899 
South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1900-1905 
South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1906-1911 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1912-1922 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1923-1933 
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B) 
Southern Rhodesia Box 
Southern Rhodesia Box 








All the Correspondence and Synod Minutes Boxes from 
1950 onwards are closed and confidential. They are 
kept by the Secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Church 
at the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 25, 
MaryZeborne Road., London. 
iv) Correspondence 1948-1971 




































Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1950-1953 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1954-1955 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1956-1957 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1957-1960 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1961-1963 
Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1964-1966 
Box (S/M/R/B), 1967-1970 
Box (S/M/R/B), 1971-1973 
B) Southern Rhodesia Government Reports 
British South Africa Company Reports available at 
the Royal Commonwealth Society, Northumberland Avenue, 
London. 
British South Africa Company Reports 1896-1900 
British South Africa Company Reports 1901-1902 
British South Africa Company Reports 1902-1914 
British South Africa Company Reports 1914-1922 
11) Reports on African Education 1926-1971. These 
are found at the Institute o. -f' CommonweaLth Studies, 
27 RusseZZ Square, University of London. 
The Reports are contained in the following publications: 
111) Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 
ended 31st December 1926. 
Report of the Chief Nat-Lve Commissioner for the year 
ended 31st December 1927. 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the ýiear 
ended 31st December 1928. 
Report of the Director of Native Development for tize 
year ended 31st December, 1929. 
Report oý the Director of Native Development -ý'or -., ýe 14 
year ended 31st December 1930. 
Report o. -ý' the Director of Native Development for the 
year ended 31st December 1931. 
"o re Re, oort of týze Director o,; " Sative DeveLopmen, 
' 31st December 1, P32. year ende,. -z 
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Report of the Director of Native Develo7men7 f3r t; ý, e 
year ended 31st December, 1J33. 
Report of the Acting Director of Native JeveZopment 
for the year ended 31st December 1934. 
Report of the Director of Native Development j"or the 
year ended 31st December, 1935. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1936. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1937. 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and Secretary 
for Native Affairs for the year ended 31st December, 1938. 
Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and t; ýe Secretary 
for Native Affairs for the year ended 31st December, 193., ', 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chie., r" 
Native Commissioner for the year ended 31st December, 1940. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1941. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissionerjand Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1942. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1943. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs., Chie., "' 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development 
for the year ended 31st December, 1944. 
Report of the Secretary -,, or Native Affairs., Chie. -; O' 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development; 
for the year ended 31st December, 1945. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Af-airs, j 41 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development; 
for the year ended 31st December, 1946. 
Report o-' the Secretary --ý'or Vative Cýief 
Native Commissioner ana Director o. T iVa:; -I, )e L)e-ýe.,. opmen, 
-1 . ýor 
týze &ear ended 31st December, -1947. 
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Report of the Secretary for Na-v-z. *? )e 4. -Iffairs., 
Native Commissioner and Director of Vative 
Development for the year ended 31st December., 
Report of the Secretary o--" Native Af ' irs , -z. eTa _, 
C' 
Native Commissioner and Director of , Vative 
Development for the year 1949. 
Report of the Secretary for Native AJ12fairs., : hiej-' 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1950. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1951. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1952. 
Report of the Secretar for Native Affairs, Cýzief y 
Native Commissioner and Director o, -, "' Native 
Development for the year 1953. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1954. 
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairsj Chief 
Native Commissioner and Director of Native 
Development for the year 1955. 
Report of the Director of Native Education -, "or 
the year ended 31st December, 1956. 
Report of the Director of Native Education for 
the year ended 31st December, 195?. 
Report of the Director of Native Education for 
the year ended 31st December, 1958. 
Report of the Director of ý. Vative Education for 
the year ended 31st December, 1959. 
Annual Report by the Secretary for African Education 
for the year 1960. 
Annual Report by the Secretary for African Edi-ication 
for t, 2e y: ear 1961. 
Annual Report b4 the Secretary for African 3; 
ducat'von 
jor the : -1ear 1962. 
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Annual Report by the Secretary for Ajý'rican E"uC-:;, -on 
for the year 1963. 
Annual Report by the Secretary for African --ucaz; io-,., 
for the year 1964. 
Annual Report by the Secretary for A., "r-, -can -:. ducat--ir 
j- or the year 1965. 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African A, -uc- -L ---ý on 
for the year 1966. 
Annual Report by the Secretary for African Education 
for the year 1967. 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the year ended 31st December., Z968. 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the year ended 31st December, 1969. 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the year ended 31st December, 1970. 
Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education 
for the year ended 31st December, 1971. 
1V) Government Commission of Enquiries Reports 
Southern Rhodesia: Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry 
1910-11 (Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1911) - 
Southern Rhodesia: Report o. -, ' the Commissioner appointed 
to enquire into the matter of Native Education in all 
its bearings, 1925 (Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1925). 
Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Land Commission 1925 
(Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1926). 
Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Native Education 
Inquiry Commission 1951 (Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1952). 
Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Francýzise ý,, -ommission 
1957 (Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1957) 
Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Education Commi3sion 
1962 (Govt. Printer, Salisbury 1963). 
V) Other Relevant Education Reports 
Education for Development - Repor-: ý on ---duca-ý--onaz', 
.T, 
in Zambia (Govt. Printer, Lusaka 1976). Re'orm 
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Vl) Other Southern Rhodesian Government Publications: 
Soutt'zern Rhodesia Native A-, "fairs Departmen-,.. j L' 
(Found at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
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Vll) Southern Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates 
(Available at the University of York). 
House of AssembLy Debates 1964 
LegisLative AssembLy Debates 1965 
House of AssembLy Debates 1966 
House of AssembLy Debates 1967 
House of AssembZy Debates 1968 
House of AssembZy Debates 1969 
House of AssembZy Debates 1970 





































Vlll) Rhodesia Monthly Digest of Statistics 
(Available at the University of Edinburgh). 
". j'onthZy Digest of S-ýýatistics January - December 1964 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
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Monthly Digest of Statistics, January - December 1965 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, January - December 1966 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury) . 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, January - December 1967 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, January - December 1968 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
Monthly Digest of Statistics., January - December 1969 
(Central African Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
Monthly Digest of Statistics., January - December 1970 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
Monthly Digest of Statistics., January - December 1971 
(Central Statistical Office, Salisbury). 
C) Colonial Office. United Kingdom Government Documents 
Report of the Royal Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
1938-39 (1940) H. M. S. O. Cmd. 5949 XV211. 
Closer Association in Central Africa (1951) 
H. M. S. O. Cmd. 8411. 
Draft Federal Scheme: Report of the Fiscal Commission 
(1952) H. M. S. O. Cmd. 8672. 
Central African Territories - Comparative Survey of 
Native Policy (1951) H. M. S. O. Cmd. 8235. 
Central African Territories, Report of Conference on 
Closer Association H. M. S. O. (1951) Cmd. 8233. 
Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria and Administration 1912 - 1919 (1920) 
H. M. S. O. Cmd. 468. 
D) Rhodes House (Oxford) 
1) Southern Rhodesia 
Lloyd, B. W.: - Early History of Domboshawa School 
1920-39 MSS. Afr. S. 749 
Morton, M. Recollections of a Native Matebele 
Rebellion - Bulawayo 1896 (1925) 
MSS. Afr. S. 141 
Paterman, T. J. African Agriculture and European 
Settlement, the Political Economy 
of land in Rhodesia 1968. MSS. Afr. 
1423 
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Southey, C. W. R. Reminisances of an early settler 
in Rhodesia 1943 MSS. Afr. S. 875 
2) Nyasaland 
Nyasaland National Congress. 
Why we oppose Federation, our 
aims and objects. 
Statement from Nyasaland Africans 
to the British Government, Members 
of Parliament and People, Jan. lst 
1952 MSS. Afr. S. 1321 
3) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
Brock, C Case for the withdrawal of Nyasaland 
from the Federation 1958-59 
MSS. Afr. S. 1050 
Kennedy J. N. The Birth of the Central African 
Federation 1966 
McDonald J. G. Memorandum for the Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland Royal Commission 1938 
MSS. Afr. S. 224 
E) Southern Rhodesian Newspapers 
(Available at the British Library of Newspapers, London). 
Bantu Mirror (Bulawayo) 
Bulawayo Chronicle later The Chronicle 
Rhodesia Weekly Review of Men, Mines and Money (Salisbury) 
Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury) 
The Sunday Mail (Salisbury) 
Motu (Gwelo). 
Secondary Sources 
A) On Research Methods 
Barzun, J. and Graff, H. F.: - The Modern Researcrzer 
(Harcourt Brace and Co., London, 1957). 
Elton, G. R. :- The Practice o.; O History 
(Sydney Univ. Press, Australia 1967) 
Finberg, H. P. R. (edited) :- Approacý. es to H^Istorý' 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1965). 
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Gardiner, P. The ýVature of .1--,. & ý, - x; ý L,, 3 2, ijn 
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Postan, M. M. Fact and Relevance: Asays on 
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(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971) 
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(Academic Press, New York 1978). 
Vansina, J. & Wright,: - Oral Tradition -A Stud&: in 
H. M. Historical Methodology 
13) Books 
1) On Missions in Southern Rhodesia 
Andrews, C. F. John White of Mashonaland 
(Hodder & Stroughton, London 1935). 
Baxter, E. C. A Short History of the Diocese of 
Southern Rhodesia 
(S. P. G. Press, London 1922) 
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(Oxford Univ. Press, London 1968). 
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